Gods and Monsters: The Scientific Method Applied to the Human Condition - Book I


Gods and Monsters

The Scientific Method Applied to the Human Condition

Book II

Giano Rocca

Table of Contents:

The Prologue:

Part I: Cosmic nature, biological nature, human nature, sociability, society and historical structures

: Cosmic evolution, biological evolution and human evolution

: Origin of the need of sociality

: Social progress and progress of the need of sociality

: Human nature and its specific sociality

: Evolution and progress of historical structures and human progress

Part II: Philosophy of the being between historical reality and human nature

: Be, Essence and degrees of manifestation of the Essence

: Conception of the rationality and of the irrationality of human nature and artificiality of reality structural historical

: The Search of the good of the individuals and his relationship with the search of the social good

: The Potential Universality, Universality of Knowledge, Universality of Structural Reality Historical and the Universality of the Human Spirit

Part III: Philosophy of history

: Adumbrations of conception of the cyclical nature of the universe structural statual

: Structural reality historical, the universes structural, and the various social systems

: Multiplicity of theories on the historical reality and on its evolution

: Classification of structural universes, in the evolution of reality structural historical, and of the joints of the aforementioned structural universes

: Determinisms various or several theories of the factors determinants

: Cyclic trend of the universe structural statual, with the transition periods and the partitions of the two historical cycles

Part IV : Essence of science and of the ideologies

: Definition of the various types of science

: Science and concepts of causal principle and of purpose

: Knowledge and human purpose of the self-consciousness and of the consciousness of nature, in general

: Sciences: in the reality structural historical and for the overcoming this reality

: Essence of ideologies

Part V: Branches of science of structural reality historical and their relationship with the ideologies

: Metaphysic ideologized at base of the ideologies, and metaphysic scientific at basis of the scientific knowledge: of human nature and of structural reality historic

: Philosophy: its transformation, with scientific method, or persistence of function and of the ideological content

: Definition of the economy such as: the Study of structural reality historic and of its relationship with the material base of this reality (or structural economy)

: Official historians, and awareness of the necessity of the birth of the science of history

: Sociology and other “social sciences”: the their ideological elements and attempts embodiment of the science of reality historical structural

Part VI: The sciences of the reality structural historical, and of the human nature

: Distinction between the sciences of cosmic nature and the sciences of reality structural historical

: Psychology inherent: to human nature and to the humanity submissive to the contingent structural reality

: The degree of development of the sciences of structural reality historical and human nature

: Historiography and analysis of the history of structural reality historic

Part VII: Knowledge and Conscience

: Nature of the self-consciousness or awareness of self

: The Collective Consciousness and its consequences on the historical reality



The Prologue:

The various theologies (of every religion), arising from certain philosophical theories, speak of a humanity governed by (one or more) divinity, immensely: good, wise, righteous and merciful. The reality that is under the eyes of all human beings, contrasts enormously with this vision. Theologians and clerics, are ready to argue that this is a direct consequence of the lack, or scarcity, of obedience to the “commandments” of divinity, of which they profess themselves as a spokesman and the interpreters. But historical experience shows how the most strict observance of “commandments” and “precepts” religious which, also, is occurred in some historical moments and that occurred mostly when the religions they are professed so as more “fundamentalist”, does not generate a greater fairness and happiness but, conversely, a greater inhumanity and iniquity. This observation leads some people to believe that the God who governs the world is, in reality, a demon! This uncertainty demonstrates, in plastic way, how is totally ignored the actual human condition.

To analyze, in a rational manner, the human condition in act, it is necessary to check the instruments to be adopted, by analyzing, first of all, the main current conceptions, both in relation to human nature how much in relation to social reality. If the first analysis of human nature and of the condition of the human being in the world was accomplished by philosophy, through what is termed metaphysics, before abandoning the knowledge acquired by the said metaphysics, we must analyze it thoroughly, and see if it can still be useful to deepen the knowledge of the subject, that we proposed to investigate: human beings and societies historically realized, for the human beings and pre-humans.  

The disciplines that analyze the social reality, since proved to be ineffective in the analysis, essentially for the forecast of the events and, even more, in the ability to serve as an instrument for changing the social reality, you demonstrate a-scientific. It is necessary, therefore, analyze the limits and the causes that may have generated their delay in relation to the physical-mathematical sciences.

Turin, 18 October 2016

Giano Rocca

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”, 2016, 2nd Edition, ISBN: 9781310488269

“Il Destino dell’Umanità: Il Metodo Scientifico applicato alla Condizione Umana – Vol. I”, 2016, 1st Edition, ISBN: 9781310704383

”, 2016, First English Edition, ISBN: 9781370873893


Giano Rocca was born in a village of the Langhe, called Roccaverano. He moved to Turin at the age of 18, he attended the University of this city, a pupil of Norberto Bobbio, of which he especially enjoyed the ability to give up totally to own beliefs, when these have proved fallacious, which is, moreover, the principle basic of the scientific method, which she led him to accept of the Socratic principle: “I know that i do not know”. If philosophy demonstrates, as well, of be able to recognize its failure, in the absence of the adoption of scientific method systematically, it is evident that, in the absence of a philosophy of history, based on scientific methods, the study of history and of the so-called “social sciences” it is totally useless and misleading, as it comes to studies based on ideological criteria or knowledge, without the fundamental basis of demonstrability or, alternatively, of the falsifiability.

This study responds to the need, felt as urgently, of lay the foundations of a genuine science of society, because able to base own hypotheses and theories on fully verifiable factors and can, therefore, be an element of progress of knowledge, if these assumptions and theories will be corroborated by comparison with the reality of the socio-economic events.

Part I:

The cosmic nature, the biological nature, the human nature, the sociality, the society and the historical structures

Chapter 1:

Cosmic evolution, biological evolution and human evolution

Some discoveries have demonstrated how the forms more primitive the biological elements have existed, on Earth, almost from the beginning of the formation of the planet and that, therefore, the occurrence of life is a phenomenon, in some way, intrinsic to the essence of the matter that make up the planet (1). The discovery of the existence of biological elements in the so-called “Interstellar medium” demonstrates how the basic elements of life have been formed simultaneously with the solar system and can exist in many other Star Systems (2). The “positivism” was hoping to get to know the law of progress, since he considered it as inevitable: namely, hoped that it would be born a theory able to highlight the laws of manifestation of progress. This conception found a scientific support in the Evolutionism Darwinian and had the opportunity, as well, to become a faith of scientistic type (3). The “Enlightenment” had considered, generally, progress as implemented by the human being assumed as positive fact, based on certain parameters established in advance, which also took on the meaning of development (which can be: development of production, or the development of the mercantile society, namely: of the market).

The “neo-evolutionism” affirmed that evolution takes place in a natural way or automatic and the selection or the environmental conditions affect the evolution itself, in an indirect manner, namely determine secondary characteristics or adaptive of the evolution itself. The “neo-Darwinism” appears a genetic conception acceptable. It says that the evolution of the species occur for reasons purely natural, namely, there is a central vein of the evolution, which prescinds from environmental conditioning, since the latter is limited at valorise the secondary aspects of the species, enabling them to adapt at the mutable environmental conditions. This, also, excludes the hypothesis of an influence of the historical structures and of their evolution on the psychic abilities potential of the human species, and of living species in general. The natural evolution takes place in such a way as to favor the characteristics more innovative and progressive of various species. This, in stark contrast with the structural reality in historical, in general, and statual, in particular, where is favored who is more violent or more overpowering and, therefore, he who is morally the worst and the less advanced.

The entomologist Kinij Imanishi, as many evoluzionists before him, he thought that the passage of species in species is determined not by natural selection, but from internal causes like, we think, the “élan vital Bergson” (4). This stated, time ago, the entomologist Giorgio Celli, recognizing as the “natural selection” may not be able to explain the mutation of species.

The evolution, understood as conditioning or determined by the “natural selection”, although it is constantly evoked and cited as if it were a dogma (or paradigm of an scientific axiom) from “science journal”, ends up being apparently forgotten, every time you are in front of a species of living that, adapting himself to specific environmental conditions or anomalous with respect to the generality of living on earth, show some biological characteristics originals, or different from “norm”. This is the case of the micro-organisms found in the Yosemite Park, considered “Aliens”, because they live in an environment rich with arsenic (5). All this demonstrates how to act is not the so-called “natural selection”, namely, a passive adaptation to the environment, but an active adaptation to the environment, where the environment is co-agent of evolution, the causes of which are outside the terrestrial environment, but not from the cosmic nature, that is together: inorganic, organic and vital.

If the application of the concept of natural selection to the social reality is constantly denied by sociologists and anthropologists, for not to appear to be “politically incorrect”, however, its very existence as, alleged, main cause of the biological evolution, constitutes a powerful support to all the ideologies, which have their main purpose in finding a justification “scientific” at the social stratification.

The recent environmental genomics “study the connection between the expression of genes and the external conditions”. From these studies clearly emerges as the environmental conditions can change the internal variations to each species, between race and race or between individual and individual, in relation to the environmental conditions, but highlights such as the environmental conditions do not modify the species, if not favoring some at the expense of other (6). The birth of the “epigenetic”, as new science, is demonstrating how the behavior of individuals can be transmitted to the offspring, without involving the genetic heritage, but it is not excluded that can, gradually and cumulatively, involve the genes, causing a genetic mutation, resulting from behavioral mutation acquired through experience. This can explain better the biological evolution, with respect to the random adaptation at environment, theorized by Darwin (7).

The “principle anthropic”, although if not postulate the existence of the cosmic universe in function of the human being, however assumes the existence of the human being as the basis of the natural constants, being the general nature logically linked and interdependent with human nature. This conception provides an implicit natural teleology (8), which is inherent in the cosmic nature. The most recent philosophy of science (epistemology) has rediscovered the teleological concept or of the purpose, concept that science had abandoned from the XVII century e. v. (9).

The nature pre-human can be, occasionally, in contrast with human nature, the which last evolves with autonomous criteria and different with respect to the nature pre-Human. There is an irrationality, or better to say, a randomness, inherent in the cosmic nature that it is inevitable, and is analogous to the irrationality real present, also, in humans. Some scientists have shown how the irrational, or better: the case, both inherent with the same cosmic nature and biological. In the subatomic physics the irrationality is inherent in the same quantum mechanics and in the existence of abnormal particles. At genetic level, the irrationality, is inherent in the processes genetic anomalous, as is the case of the mutant plants that do not follow the genetic laws. The genetic mutations follow precise laws, except the faults “random” (10). However, the human being seeks to remedy the imperfection of the nature, the rationality is definable not as perfection, but as a synonym for the full humanization of man: the realization of full rationality, namely, of the behavior consistent with the authentic needs of the individual and the fullness of self-consciousness, namely, of the aforesaid authentic needs.

Popper distinguished between: conditional trends confluent, often, in scientific laws, and “absolute trends” or dogmas anti-scientific (11), between which inserted the “Prophecies”. Popper defined: world “physical closed” (12) what we consider the physical universe deterministic (albeit with wide margins of randomness). However, Popper itself and some physicists, define this world “physical closed” as: not determinist, where it is not possible to create interference from outside of “closed system of physical entities” (13). This conception it is suitable for sorting of the essence of reality historical structural. The determinists consider: the case, as an alternative to determinism (14), rather than as an indirect determination, where even the type of bond “indirect” is determined. Popper theorized a dualism, which he defined as dichotomy, between possession of a component and its use (in analogy to the dichotomy between biological evolution and social evolution or structural) (15). He put this dualism in antithesis to the “genetic monism”. By associating this conception at the Darwinism, led him to consider the biological evolution as subtended and dependent on the structural evolution (16): in a mechanical manner. Nevertheless, he considered there was a dependence of biological evolution from the structural evolution, albeit indirect, namely operating through the “natural selection” or environmental (17). It was hypothesized the possibility of the emergence of a “new man” in following the overrun of the historical structures (hypothesis, however, already formulated so instrumental from the misleading ideology of the “Marx-leninism”). This “new man” must, however, be understood as manifestation of the authentic nature of human beings, the which nature, however, evolves with the own autonomy, with respect to its numerous possible, manifestations.

Morgan, also theorizing a fundamental influence of scientific and technical progress on the historical evolution, however, recognized that “inventions and discoveries” are between them in a progressive report, while institutions “grow one on the other”, namely they do not constitute a real progress since, he said, it has gradually come evolving (all) from a few primary germs “of thought”, having, precise, components in common. They respond, namely, to a single logic, and evolve with its own logic, extraneous to the willingness, to conscience and to the real human progress. Morgan stated that the structural evolution historic is predetermined and established within specific variables, in their turn are, indirectly, connected with the logic of the human psyche. Since the psyche is in continuous evolution, the structural evolution can come into conflict with the further psychological development, as suggested, also, the teleologies of various philosophies and religions (18).

Chapter 2:

Origin of the need of sociality

The fullness of being has different levels or mode of manifestation. If for the fullness of being is meant the totality of the individual needs or intrinsic, namely directed to the satisfaction of the only individuality and primarily physiological, you can easily highlight from the analysis of the biological reality as not all biological organisms (of various known species) are joints, if taken individually, at that stadium of individualization. In fact the species such as: ants, termites and the bees, reach the fullness of the personal needs or intrinsic, only in the whole the biological elements that compose the nest (anthill, termite, or hive), namely, the set of elements fruitful male and female, and elements sterile male and female. These biological elements constitute parts only (similar to the cells of the physiological bodies) of the totality of the being individual: with the fullness of intrinsic needs or, precisely, individual. These “individuals”, which in some species, are constituted by a pair of biological elements: male and female fruitful, have little social needs and relationships with other individual complexes are based, almost exclusively, on random conflicts, arising from the ecological needs of coexistence. In the natural societies of animal type lack, however, the conscience of individuality. The biological individuals, components of the society of inferior nature, are nothing but parts of an organism, to which they are linked in such a way also physiological, although each individual possesses, biological level, the fullness of individuality. In fact, the same reproduction and sexuality is subtended to the hierarchy present in the social organism. It has, therefore, a individuality accomplished, coinciding with each individual society or family group. Social relations (intended as inter-individual) are limited, then, to relations of ecological type with other societies of nature, adjacent or nearby. The fullness of the being individual (coinciding with the individual organic) is reached with the creation of the society structural historical.

The organic nature has evolved, adapting to an inorganic nature, but in recent centuries is above all the inorganic nature, to find itself in the conditions to adapt to the organic nature, namely, to the bodies that populate the earth, not only for the influence that is given to them by some climatologists on the evolution of the climate, but because, almost from always, the humans constrain, in some measure, at adapt the biosphere at their nature and at their needs, whether they are dietary or other. The biological sociality has origin from genetic needs and psycho-physical of the mating for purposes procreative, condition common to all species with a sexuality and not hermaphroditic. The aforesaid need, generating the sociality, expresses itself through parental relations, both for the natural societies, prerogative of the pre-human animals, that for social structures crystallized, with the creation of said historical structures. The pre-human animals have a instinctuality biological-chemical that determines their physical needs, which is also manifested in the field of sociality, which, however, will essentially be limited by the satisfaction of physiological needs. In the higher animals, such as, for example, mammals, the sociality is not limited only to the satisfaction of physiological needs, but assumes spiritual characteristics, namely, requires of communication affective and rational. The latter form of need of sociality appears determined, again, by a instinctuality, albeit at a higher level. This fact, in that not involving a rational consciousness of spiritual need of sociality, determines a pursuit of the satisfaction of this need, in ways poorly effectives. This instinctuality generates, in fact, a conception of reality of irrational type, since cleaved from the direct relationship with the need of sociality. The aforesaid conception of reality ends, then, to justify and to consider natural the structural condition, which is instead, clearly, unsuitable to the satisfaction of the need of sociality. The historic structures are the manifestation and codification of a given degree of ability to satisfy the need of sociality. The general sense of dissatisfaction of the need of sociality is proof of the reached awareness of the need of overcoming the structural reality of history.

The philosophy conceives a be absolute, theorized as an essence having the fullness of being, namely, the fullness of the faculties that allow the full self-realization (of their own potential) and the full satisfaction of their own needs. This conception is assumed by the religions, which identifies this essence with the gods and customize in an essence extra-human and super-human. Transform, namely, a conceptual entity purely theoretical, as a projection of a potential viable in future, in a real entity, to which are attributed the characteristic of eternity, or at least, of the immortality. The “Christianity”, in the form matured in the era “medieval”, it has related these entities with the spirit, supposed immortal, of the deceaseds. The mythology of the religions is based, therefore, on philosophical conceptions unsatisfactory and contradictory, since they do not allow to identify theoretical finalities, and feasible, to replace the structural reality: in a reality a-structural and fully satisfactory the need of the sociality, in harmony with the full individualization of the individual.

Chapter 3:

Social progress and progress of the need of sociality

In the societies of nature (or lower, namely: of unconsciousness), definable as societies pre-structural, sociality is virtually non-existent, although, in cases where are composed of human beings, there is a deep need of sociality, which however remains unexpressed, being expressed only as done purely ecological, namely reproduction. With the metamorphosis at structural universes pre-statual the society it becomes an autonomous thing, namely, buys one of its autonomous personality with respect to its adherents, becoming a super-organism with an essence and consciousness independent. This super-organism becomes more complex and complete: in the universe structural statual. With future, possible, overcoming of the structural reality, all humanity, as species, will manifest itself in every individual and every individual will be in harmony with the whole of society to which accedes, which you will perpetuate through the succession of generations, but individuals will survive, spiritually, in society which have acceded, to the contribution not only physical, but mostly spiritual, who will have given to the progress of society and of the social nature of individuals.

Recent research has demonstrated how cats have a number of neurons approximately double with respect to the dogs (300 million compared to 160 million of the dogs). The dogs, however, have developed a sociality much greater with respect to cats. For this reason are considered most intelligent of cats, since it is identified the intelligence to the manifestation of the being and, in particular, to the manifestation of sociality (1).

The nature of living species, changes with the change of the degree of sociality, that each of them is able to express or manifest. The sociality, or better, the degree of sociality that each species can manifest, changes with the evolution of physical and biological, and is itself an element of the overall evolution of each species. The Community animals as the anteaters and bee communities, have a degree of sociality very limited: zero or almost on the psychic level, albeit large on the plane bio-chemical. This determines the natural society, since sociality is corresponding to the degree of intellectual abilities of the components of the society itself: there is a sociality entirely determined by languages bio-chemical communication inter-individual. These societies do not require, therefore, the presence of structural mechanisms. At each degree of evolution of social potentiality corresponds a certain range of possible social structures. At a degree of sociality minimal, corresponding to an intellectual level minimum, corresponds to the so-called state of nature (primordial or society with no structures). The human sociality is corresponding to the degree of intellectual development reached. The degree of sociality that humanity is able to manifest determines the type of social organization feasible.

Hegel stated that the story evolves, not according to the categories of the intellect but of reason (recognizing, implicitly, as human reason progresses very slowly, being not yet managed to overcome the irrationality inherent in reality historical structural). Hegel gave, in this way, the reason of the necessity of the presence of a foreign reality to human nature, which is the structural reality historic, precisely because it considered the evolution of “reason” in contrast with the psychic evolution. This highlights the need for a process suitable for the growth “rational”, as a condition of social progress, namely, as a condition for proceeding beyond the historical structures.

There is, in the field of inorganic matter, a form of communication that is not yet completely known; you know, in fact, theories of various kinds, such as: the rays of waves and particles, and other theories. In the biological field, of the species pre-human, it has an interpersonal communication partial and imperfect. For animals evolutionarily to a level much lower than the human being, and without an actual sociality, the constitution of a society that conforms to their essence bio-psychic natural is almost automatic or, precisely, “natural”, dates the communities of which the individual are part. This, in that, the communicative capacity and psychic is very limited. For animals more evolved socially, such as: dogs, wolves, horses, elephants, and so on, the adaptability of the society to which they belong, to their essence bio-psychic, becomes more difficult. Already from these levels of evolution bio-psychic emerges the gap between: degree of evolution bio-psychic and the degree of satisfaction of needs socio-communicative skills. The sexuality of some animal species, such as: lions, giraffes, dolphins, rhesus monkeys, it is not finalized exclusively to the reproduction, but is part of the, broader, social life of individuals of these species (2). They were made, so, social structures of type primordial, which allow channeling and give a certain satisfaction social needs and of communication. It was determined, then, the structural universe of the horde or of band, in which live various species of animals, such as: wolves, the wild horses, and other similar species. The primates, such as monkeys of various species live permanently in the structural universe of the band. It is not possible to know if the lower animals to human beings perceive the limit imposed by structural reality in which they live, at the full satisfaction of their need for sociality. If the emergence of the species of the homo sapiens may be indicated by the birth of a complex language, indicating the occurred acquisition of a greater capacity for communication, if not complete, at least very deep between the individuals of the same species, being also, finally, of type verbal; however, the emergence of the homo sapiens species has not created immediately the outcome of social structures radically new. The structures statual, if seem prerogative only of the human species, are not, however, radically different from the structure pre-statual, and do not meet the new demands of freedom and equality, proper to the human species and, therefore, are not to be considered of the same nature to the human being, nor suitable, fully, at these. At the human level, communication, although it is more complex, is not fully satisfactory for the intellectual needs of the human being. The human being has, however, the intellectual potential to make the interpersonal communication fully adequate to the own needs psychic. The levels of the manifestation: of the affectivity and of the sociality, that it would, realizing a more higher level of civilizing, constitute (for now: only potentially) the essential nature of the human being. The structural reality, and religions in particular, create needs distorted with respect to the need of sociality; they create, namely, essentially, a love for the structural reality underway that is deified, identifying it, in fact, with divinity.

The realization of a given type of universe structural historical is related to a given level of interpersonal communication skills (3). Anthropologists E. Service and M. Sahlins have classified societies, on the basis of “integration levels socio-cultural”. This classification implies the concept of a development of cultural integration, namely, of the communication. This concept implies that in the structures pre-statual you configure a interpersonal communication more limited with respect to the structures statual (4). This hypothesis, if verified, confirm the validity of our classification of structural universes pre-statual in three, different, levels of civilizing (from the second to the fourth), that we have placed in a scale composed of seven levels of civilizing.

Chapter 4:

Human nature and its specific sociality

The human nature has basic characteristics: original and autonomous, with respect to the biological nature general. This is due to the sociality of new type, made by human beings, based on a more high individualization. Human nature is in continuous evolution, and therefore definable with parameters adapted to measure a reality in continuous evolution, whose destination is definable only on the basis of the data of departure.

The conquest of knowledge, and of the conscience, has implied, to the human being, the toil of work and the unhappiness resulting from structural reality historic. The mythology “biblical” speaks of punishment (fatigue of work and death) divine, due to the desire of the human being to seek “the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil”, namely, of trying to know the essence of their own historical condition, identify the causes and remove them, determining the conditions of the realization of the fullness of its own essence. The Myth The “biblical” derives from the need to allocate to other entities in the pain and suffering that an undertaking necessary and inevitable involves. There was also the need of raising a wall of the unknowable on structural reality historic. The Myth “biblical” had made, however, the Divinity: the cause second of the human condition. This, although it is designed to retain the divinity not directly responsible for the “evil” of the human condition, demotes the divinity, creating a contradiction. In reality the “evil” not born within the human being, but comes from the outside, namely from the problems arising from its psychological evolution and from different process of this with respect to its psychic evolution. The different degree of development between these two entities or potentiality, at a given amplitude level, has determined the need of the rise of the structural reality of history.

The historic structures are the direct consequence of the gap that occurs between natural evolution or bio-physical and intellectual progress and cognitive. This gap creates, in the human being, the consciousness of the inadequacy of the social reality with respect to the needs of sociality and, therefore, the perception of the unnaturalness of the structural reality historically formed. The primordial men, or Hominids, they had an instinctuality addressed to sociality, but with an actual sociality: very low or non-existent. The realization of structures pre-statual, determined by the conscience of the grow of economic needs, has determined a progress in the sociality manifested or lived, although, accompanied by conflict and violence, more or less marked. There is, therefore, a manifest conflict between the essential nature of the human being, which tends to a sociality free of conflicts and violence, and the structural reality, which implies a sociality: conflictual and, often, violent. This structural reality is, therefore, inappropriate to the full manifestation of the social nature of the human being, stemming from his innate need and developed, gradually, in relation to the development intellectual. The further development of intellectual capacities and of the social conscience of the human being, will lead to the overcoming of historical structures.

Gian Franco Minguzzi lists three criteria to indicate the psychological reality of social groups: 

1 – the feeling of being “together”,

2 – the influence it has on the individual the participation at a group,

3 – The interaction between the members.

The first criterion is complementary to the third, because the interrelationship has its psychological reality, namely, is it psychologically perceived (1). Minguzzi states as many psychologists consider that the structures are formed to provide “self-understanding” (2), avoiding: uncertainty, insecurity and anguish. But this is not the analysis of root causes (lack of a communication inter-individual satisfactory) of the constitution of social organizations structured, but of immediate causes of accession thereto.

The generalization of the reality structural historic, derives from the need to correspond to a given stage of development of the degree of manifestation of the being. The ineluctability of structural reality historic determines a dualism in human behavior, which assumes the irrationality of having to adapt to a reality, for which feels aversion and to which is continually tempted to rebel. The structural reality historic has not universal value, but general, being extraneous to authentic human needs, source. the latter, of each universality. The existence of the historical structures is justified by the fact that the actual needs of individuals are inauthentic and mutually contradictory as well as contradictory with the needs of other individuals. Where the needs of individuals are truly authentic or consistent with their deep trends, the society would acquire a universal value, overcoming the conflict interior of the individuals, of individuals against the society and of individuals between them (3). In society natural animal, or unconscious, there is no form of irrational power, there being no consciousness of a distinction between the individuality of the individuals and society. This, due to the low level intellectual and for the absence of self-consciousness and of the natural sociality. With to constitution of the structures you create a rift between individuality and collectivity, that determines the maximum of irrational power on individual, power which it goes attenuating with the emergence of the individuality, and may disappear if the individuality is accompanied to a manifestation of sociality, fully conscious and able to meet fully the needs of sociality proper to the human being (4). Piotr Kropotkin had recognized as “sociality” and “individuality” are inseparably connected and evolve in harmony (5). It can be assumed that the size purely inner of the individual both in evolution consistent with their social dimension. If this is true, it can be inferred that the sociality of the individuals is all the greater the more profound is their individuality, namely their knowledge and awareness of self and the ability to satisfy their natural needs. It follows, moreover, the need for consistency, generatrix of harmony, of the human being with the society.

The specificity of the human nature is not in an alleged “ontological leap”, but in a greater progress, accomplished in the field of sociality and of the individualisation (6). The material nature of the human being is subject to his spiritual nature or intellectual, in its elements: rationals, affective and cognitive. The spiritual nature of the human being, dominating the material nature of the human being himself, acquires the awareness of their own freedom. If in the physical nature and in the essence of reality structural historical there is the law of the predominance of force majeure, in human nature there is the law of equal communication of the equals or equivalent.

Chapter 5:

Evolution and progress of historical structures and human progress

The philosophical concepts of the human nature and of what we call the structural reality historic, clearly indicate the need to understand the causes of the historical evolution, its real trend, and if such evolution entail, or less, an human progress and social, effective. With the series of essays that we are publishing we are delineating, therefore, a conception of the historical evolution in capable of fully responding to the criteria of scientific approach.

It is necessary to apply the concept of progress at the human nature. The scientific analysis, manifests in its two aspects of progress: of individualisation and socializing.

The epicureans have refused to accept the philosophy of history, typical of Greek culture: the theory of cyclicity historic. They theorized a progress of the human condition: created, namely, a positivistic philosophy and materialistic. However, they did not dare talk of progress in act, projecting in the future.

The theory “ illuminist” gave a critical judgment to the various societies that follow one another, implicitly recognizing the shortage on the plan: human and social.

John Bury, as the thinkers “romantics”, he had thought to be able to adapt the Vico’s theory to the theory of progress, considering that the cyclicality not carryovers humanity, periodically, to the starting point, but that the movement of the society purchases an ascent to spiral. In reality: there is no return to the exact point of departure only if science does not regress of everything in the feudal stage, but retains some elements of progress of knowledge accumulated in the previous merchant phase. Occurs, in this case, a substantial return to the starting point on the plan: social, economic and cultural, but an advancement on the cognitive plane, or scientific, that justifies, albeit to a limited extent and selective, the idea of an evolution at upward spiral (1).

With the so-called “Romance” (which included the “idealism” and “positivism”), with the progress term, is was meant the historical evolution, as succession progressive indefinitely (up to conceive: periods of “apparent regression”, as a condition to the next advancement). The history has assumed, according to them, positive qualities: “reason absolute, infinite Spirit”, considered capable of self-determination, without the human intervention. They, unfortunately, did not see, in this, an element of irrationality and inhumanity.

The theory “romantic” had judged in an equally positive way every type of society, being cultrice of the evolution in itself, they regard as the expression, or the essence, of progress. The concept of progress it is applied to all fields: technology, the development of production (identified in an improper manner, with economic development), the tenor of life, industrialization, the politics, life ethics, philosophy, up to scientific research and, in general, to all aspects of life associated (2).

Morgan had stated that the theory of a global evolution (or channeled in a single direction) of human society, it can consider be scientifically proven on the basis of the study “exhaustive of man and of his conquests” (3). If, for global evolution is meant an evolution substantially convergent and concretized in an actual progress, in consequence of the succession of the various structural universes, it can be considered acceptable this conception. It is not obvious, however, that all peoples follow or have followed the same succession of structural universes. In addition, you have evidence of periodic regressions, according to a cyclicity well defined and ascertained. These regressions are part of the evolution of the universe structural statual. This shows how the historical structures are extraneous to the human nature. The same Morgan stated to find, in the eighteenth century, examples of Tribal organizations in Europe, and precisely in Ireland and Scotland (4). In the twenty-first century there are not examples less numerous of this phenomenon. These are, mostly, examples of survivals of structures pre-statual in the structures statual, but, also, of attempts to return to the structures pre-statual on the part of peoples that from millennia live, by now, in structures statual. This is to be ascribed to the general conservatism of those who love the traditions and at the rejection of so-called “civilization” represented by the structures statual, considered less “civil” and more inhumans of the same structures (or structural universes) pre-statual. Therefore, the identification of the “historical evolution” with a progressive direction of human history, is a concept: false, misleading and contrary to the actual human condition in reality structural historical, also because it does not distinguish between the historical evolution, structural evolution, structural progress and human progress.

John Bury had stated that the theory of the progress involves of consider the historical evolution: as a movement in a direction desirable. He had perceived as there are, instead, clear symptoms of an evolution in the opposite direction to what is desirable. Had stated that the theory of progress implies that the historical process is a necessary result of human nature, and not deriving from an external will, because the latter does not guarantee nor the continuity nor the final outcome, except of grant to this external will, of the quality of “Providence”. Bury stated that the doctrine of progress, understood as the conception of an advancement unlimited in the future, is proper of the “modern age” (or better of merchant phase of the historical cycle, that it is part of the “ages”, defined by academic historians: “medieval – modern – post – modern”) (5). In reality: the theory of progress belongs essentially at the time of the crisis of the merchant phase: this is because the thrusts in the sense of a new phase feudal must find a moral justification and social. The theory of progress does not emerge, in fact, if there is an regress toward a new feudal phase. In this case, since it occurs a partial conscience of regression, imminent or in progress (as it was in Rome in the following centuries to the II of the Vulgar Era) you need hide theoretically.

The historic structures, in their evolution, determine the following consequences on human reality:

a differentiation, growing, of type:




a skills of communication interpersonal to overhangs, not always growing and, finally, a integration decreasing of the individuals in the social structures. The fact that the interpersonal communication skills grow, with the growth of differentiation interindividual may give the impression that we need to increase further the second to fully implement the first. In reality, the differentiation interindividual has reached a such level, whereby, is just such differentiation at prevent further growth of the communicability. It is, therefore, evident as that, to realize a interpersonal communication satisfactory, it is necessary to strive to increasing equality, of a type different from that made by the structures pre-statual (where you create a growing equality, but in the irrationality). J. J. Rousseau had stated that the communication follows a gradual progress, due to the lack of expressive means and for the lack of needs or incentives to achieve such progress (6). We can say that, measured on the basis of the progress communicative, it has real social progress, be it structural or less. A qualitative leap in interpersonal communication will lead to a qualitative leap the human condition, beyond the historical structures. Rousseau had attributed to aspects that can be improved (and therefore, at the present of the imperfection) of the human being, the unhappiness caused, in reality, by historical structures (7).

A certain tendency of the psychoanalysis Freudian contemporary, as psychoanalysis Lacanian, defines the unconscious as the equivalent of what we call the structural reality, interiorised, considering the structural reality in its evolution. These psychologists consider the non-membership, or unintegrated, in this evolutionary reality (which define: the “symbolic”), as folly, also called “imaginary totality of the self”. In this, they do not deviate from the twentieth-century philosophy: Heidegger, Wittgenstein and Adorno. With the term “the principle” indicate: animal naturalness, from which it is necessary to emancipate the child, through the natural powers parental, which involves the sexual repression, since we are in the presence of structural reality. The structural reality historical is conceived as an inevitable passage in the process progressive of the humanity, even at the level of the life cycle of the individual. The Lacanian psychoanalysis he theorized a general neurosis or sociality disturbed, since it is characterized by the refusal of the perception of the “wishes of the others”, and since it is limited to perceive the demand of others, being these “desires”: otherness or foreignness compared to the subject. The “neurosis” would be therefore, the condition of the human being, in the reality structural. Who escapes this “neurosis” precipitates in the “anguish”, deriving from the “perception of the desires of the other”, and in depression, characterized by sufferings self-destructive. The sociality not neurotic is based on the coexistence of “tendencies” of the individuals with the similar “tendencies” of the others. The degree of satisfaction of the need of sociality not directly dependent on the social reality in act, but by what the subject manages to express, in relationship with others. However, the ratio that each individual is able to establish with the others cannot prescind from the degree of sociality of those with which it interacts. Therefore, the social nature of the subject is strongly conditioned by the sociality of the people with which the subject interacts. In this way the subject itself draws, besides the conditioning, the necessary hooking with the degree of manifestation of the average of the being, of time or of the social reality, where the subject lives. The sociality of the individuals is measured in relation to the ability to build and maintain interpersonal relationships deep and balanced, where the balance is intended as: the absence of any form of oppression and subjugation. The depth of interpersonal relationships will be measured by the degree of reciprocal communication, whose maximum intensity will be such as to allow to avoid the elements of oppression and subjugation.

Karl Marx had stated that the structural evolution represents a “process of individualization”, through which it is realized the individuality, from a primitive condition as gregarious. In fact, the passage, or metamorphosis, among those that we have defined: universes structural historicals, outlines a progressive growth of the “individualization” of human beings, in contrast with the primitive indistinguishability between the subjectivity of the individual and the objectivity of the collectivity. In this sense we can speak about progress, in relation to the historical evolution, with the progressive alternation of the various structural universes (8).

Luigi Pareyson stated that the truth creates “commonality”, and that the society consistent with the authentic human nature is feasible only between “similars” and between “people (or, better, between individuals), cannot exist in the mass” in which there is no real community because there is no singularity (9). “The true community is similarity: deepening of personality and singularity, not their denial”. The creation of the true “commonality” is considered, by Pareyson, necessary to overcome evil within humanity, forced within a “task”, extraneous to the “nature” (10). The individualisation progresses, therefore, parallel to the grow of sociality, and both are essential to qualify the authentic human progress.

The new man, predicted by Marxism, when Marx spoke of the realization of the “communism”, is in contradiction with the entirety of the ideology itself monist and immanentist, created by Marx. If, in fact, the human being was not other that the “product of history”, not you would see how this can be overcome, nor how it can create a “new man”, self-conscious and able to transcend said historical reality. This, would imply a contradiction implied by the story itself, which would prevent the its functioning. However, such a conception does not seem to be only a necessary element in the completion of its ideology. Derives, also, from the conviction of Marx according to which the evolution comes from a force or endogenous element of each evolutionary stage. The overcoming of one stage, it would be a necessity, manifested, when that given stage enters in contrast with itself. This conception is totally unfounded: contradictions implied of an any phenomenon, would be able to hinder the its existence or the occurrence. The element that generates the exceeding a given evolutionary stage can only be outside, as a manifestation of contradiction between that level of evolution, and a human nature that has generated that level of evolution, as a means of their own evolution and it requires the overcoming, when that level of evolution is no longer suitable for the purpose. The “new man”, then, that will allow the overcoming of the structural reality historic will be the human being, to who will be coming to boredom the repetitive evolution of the universe structural statul. This growing mismatch will be generated by a cognitive level, only indirectly generated by statual society (and not element of this). This mismatch is manifested in various forms and is in the process of becoming general despair, also highlighted by the spread of drugs. Due to a lack of external conditions to the transcendence of structural reality, there would be the disintegration of the same statual structural reality. The absence of a concrete and realisable prospect of overcoming of structural reality structural statual, will would lead of humanity toward self-destruction.

Part II:

Philosophy of the being between historical reality and human nature

Chapter 6:

*Be, essence and degree of manifestation of the Essence *

The be, as every absolute entity, as: beauty, love, the geometric entities or mathematics, did not in itself concreteness, if not in its manifestations. These manifestations of be are related, but possess, in itself, the whole being. The condition of relativity, of the manifestations of the being, is inherent in their limited capacity to manifest itself being, while possessing entirely. The living being, present in every form living biological, itself manifested more so the more the beings living themselves increase their ability of the manifestation of the being. The ability to express the living being progresses in relation to the progress of the individualization, namely of the autonomy and individual responsibility, in the satisfaction of their own needs, among which there is the need of sociality.

The philosophers intuit as a modification in the expression of human sociality would alter implicitly the human nature itself, which would reach the fullness of his manifestation, namely, what they define: the “fullness of being”. The philosophers speak, in fact, of cosmology, to indicate the conception of the cosmos and, at the same time, the vision of the human condition. Knowledge constitutes the means by which the being realizes its own manifestation. The being is fully complete in every living form that may reproduce itself, but its manifestation depends on the degree of knowledge acquired by that specific living being. The realization of full essence of the human being it will be realized when the human being he will have realized a sufficient manifestation of himself, which will be allowed by a given degree of knowledge and conscience. Erich Fromm stated that knowledge of the real nature of the human beings stops at the unconscious, being (the so-called unconscious) a knowledge repressed by the logic of structural reality, of which the individual has a partial conscience, and that determines the only semblance of conscience of the subject or its false conscience, being a false rationality (1).

With the creation of the historical structures, the individual acquires, a albeit vague awareness of autonomous individuality. At the same time, the individual is aware of their social needs and warns the limits and obstacles to their satisfaction, erected by the structural reality. The manifestation of the fullness of the essence, understood as accomplished expression and satisfying of the own needs, it has not yet been reached. The concept of divinity was born from this consciousness of limitation. The divinity is conceived as one who possesses the “fullness of being” and is, therefore, a symptom of the conscience of the limitations produced from structural reality, on the human being. There is not, therefore, a hierarchy of the being, between human and divine, but a hierarchy of the essence, independent from levels of psychological development reached. The human being has not reached the so-called “fullness of being”, because it has not reached the fullness of the evidence of the essence, as full satisfaction, or proof, of the being. It is, therefore, unavoidable and natural the achievement of the fullness of the essence and, with this, the full proof of the being. The advancement of knowledge sharpens the consciousness of his own condition of dissatisfaction and of unhappiness and makes, therefore, increasingly necessary to achievement of the satisfaction of the being. If the gradual climb in a suppository “hierarchy of the: being” can be connected only at the biological evolution, the achievement of the fullness of the essence is an event of type “spiritual”, namely part from the psychic needs of man (need of: fullness of individuality and of sociality), and it is accomplished through the advancement of knowledge. In stages lowest of the manifestation of being, the attainment of the satisfaction of the essence is not connected to the progress of knowledge, but entrusted to biological elements: the male of the termites and the female termites fruitful, they mate, thanks to a chemical recall; similarly, the leader of the pack (in the societies of nature, such as that of the cervids) copula with the females fruitful and receptive, thanks to a recall of the type chemical-hormonal. 

It can be assumed that the beings (bio-physiologically) inferiors to the human being, unlike the latter, they do not have the fullness of the essence. The fullness of the essence determines the full manifestation of the being. The individual human being possesses, in its nature or essence, the fullness of the universality, the very foundation of the universality of species, namely the foundation of the very essence of the species. The societies, whether they are structural or post-structural, reflect the degree of manifestation of the being of those who adhere to one of these type of society. The manifestation of the fullness of essence cannot prescind from the overshoot of the structural reality historical. It can be assumed that anyone who has adopted the model of the society of structural type did not know the real nature and implications, and are not fully conscious neither of themselves nor of them. It is different for one that outlines the project of the societies post-structural, although these do not necessarily possess the degree of manifestation of the being that must be possessed by those who, instead, adheres to these societies.

A form of irrationality is inherent in the gap between the potential of manifestation of the being and its concrete manifestation. The structural reality is, thus, the manifestation of a state of permanence in irrationality, namely, in a human condition not coherent with the full manifestation of the human being: namely, with the realization of the fullness of the essence. The desire of the achievement of the fullness of the essence (2), shows how the human being has not yet reached this condition. The philosophy, often, treats the being and essence as synonyms. The existence is considered as the essence, in the referring to the human being. The existentiality, analyzed by the philosophers existentialists, analyzes the ways and degrees of realization of the existence, where existence is understood as purposes, while the essence is understood as potentiality. The essence of the human species is constituted by the whole of humanity: past, present and future, in its potentiality. The existence of the species is the set of his contemporaries, and it is equivalent to a certain level of manifestation of the essence. The existentiality is represented by individuals, that have, in to themselves, the consciousness of the species (3). The manifestations of the being or expressions of the being, even when they do not implement the fullness of the manifestation of the being, have, in itself, something that is definable as the evolutionary principle, namely, the ability of evolution, which may lead some manifestations of the being at overcoming the condition of a date manifestation, or crystallized. The theologies of the various religions, especially the monotheistic religions, say that the human being was created by the divinity. In reality, are the manifestations of the being that at the being they allow to exist, and of create and recreate, since the being cannot exist if not in the evolution of the structural universe or in its concrete manifestations, namely, with priority: the concrete human individuals. If you can say that every living being, for the mere fact to live, has, in itself, the “fullness of being”, that is a quality for its nature, universal, in that common to every living thing (able to reproduce), however, the manifestation of the being varies by grade or quality, connected to each single species, and evolutionary capacity (connected to the quantity, namely, at each specimen of every single species). The actual capacity of manifestation of the being, belong to every living thing, and is delimited: by own specie of belong, by the features psychical and psychological of the individuals and of the character traits. The historic structures constitute specific levels of manifestation of the being. If the actual capacity of the manifestation of a given individual, goes beyond the logic of structural reality in act and, in general, of the structural reality historic, can create the foundations for the overcoming of this reality, where its greater capacity of manifestation is real or effective, namely, he knows the preconditions for the realization an effective alternative to the structural reality in act. Whatever the actual capacity of manifestation of an individual, it can be assumed that this capacity has a universal significance, since it is universal the scale of the capacities of manifestation of the being. The overcoming of certain levels of manifestation of the being, based on conventions or structures or levels of socio-cultural integration, can take place only on the basis of certain levels of scientific rationality. In the world of the inevitable, there is not that the need to adapt to the level of expression of the being in act, for to be able to express its own sociality and individuality, within certain limits of subjective variability, unless, you want to take the risk of marginalisation and the anomie. The universality of a given level of expression of the being, constituted by the structural reality historic, is provisional (being crystallized in a given organizational model, almost unchangeable in time), namely, although corresponding to a specific level of effective capacity of manifestation of the being, is susceptible of being exceeded, while the universality specifies, inherent in that level of manifestation of the being, being analyzable with specific paradigms of scientific rationality, the which rationality is, by its nature, constantly evolving. The aforementioned specific universality is consistent with human nature, with his unstoppable progress and of its cognitive and psychological capabilities. The actual manifestations of the being can be defined real existences, while the potentialities of the existence are analyzed by science in his development, and are based on the nature of the human being, that guarantees the occurrence of all the potentialities of the existence. The conception of the “superman”, implying a qualitative comparison between the individuals, is unacceptable: since it is irrational. The conception of the “new man”, dear to the self-styled progressivists, since it does not imply comparison between the individuals contemporary, it is more acceptable. The concept of the “new man”, dear to the so-called progressive, not involving comparisons between individuals coeval, is more acceptable. If it is borne in mind, however, that the new man, summarized in the need of the transcendence of the reality structural statual, as are defined “needs radicals”, there exists at least since the time of the ancient Vedas, it must be inferred from this that we need to, actually, make free to the “new man”, rather than create him.

Contrary to those who have stated that “you are what you eat”, we can affirm that the human being is what he feels, namely, is identifiable with its same existentiality, which is constituted by its emotions and by his sentiments. Emotions and feelings distorted, since, being originated from structural reality, limit its rationality and, therefore, they impose a limit at existentiality of the individuals.

Chapter 7:

Conception of the rationality and of the irrationality of human nature and artificiality of reality structural historical

Socrates had stated that the substantiality (identifiable with the structural reality historic) is such only if recognized by the individual, namely, if the individual is integrated in the structures (1). Socrates, rather than analyze the being, identified by the philosophers with the objective reality (or structural), analyzed the essence or structural reality internalized (2). Hegel spoke of “substantial man” (3) to indicate the actual man or factual, modeled by the structural reality (with the which, basically, he identified him).

Arnobius, Christian apologist, was pessimistic about the human condition and noted as “human coexistence never comes to be righteous” (4). Since recognized the inhumanity of history, had considered “sacrilegious” the consideration of the history or the society as: created by God. Had considered, however, that the human being is of the same essence of history and had considered, therefore, that even the human being was created by a Lesser God, as are some of the divinities of religions polytheistic, subject to the supreme god.

Hegel had in mind the irrationality existing in the human nature, as well as in the historical reality. Hegel had distinguished between the self empirical and the human self (5). The young Hegel had theorized the “historical totality (or volksgeist)” (6), meant as total reality, namely, what we defined universe structural statual, and also the same totality of the societies structural historical, in its various structural universes.

Hegel was opposed to the theory of law of “the Enlightenment”, in their conception egalitarian or liberal of the forehand, which, moreover, have considered the society only as a sum of individuals. Hegel, on the contrary, had theorized the “organicity of the people” and, then, introduced the concept of organicity of law (7), in a conception of feudal type of the forehand itself. Giorgy Lukàcs had noted as, in youth, Hegel had developed the concept of “positivity” as the “dead objectivity” (8), namely, as the structural reality: “alienating” and irrational.

Kant considered possible to realize a rational knowledge and scientific, independently from the experience, knowledge that he had defined as: scientific metaphysics, understood as the science of human nature (9). For this purpose, Kant proposed its transcendental philosophy as, necessary, propaedeutic to the, predicted, metaphysical science (10). The “Critique of Pure Reason” exposes the transcendental philosophy of Kant. The Kantian metaphysics distinguishes between the reality structural historical and human nature. He defined the first “reality of experience” and second “transcendent reality” (11). The “form”, for Kant, is the scientific means, or natural parameter, (if is not used in an arbitrary manner) of the analysis of reality (12). The study of these transcendental forms (or of the possibility of the transcendence of the reality structural historical, emphasising the human nature and creating the foundations of a society that is consistent with this nature) (13), it was defined by Kant: “Metaphysics”. Mathieu proposed, instead, of embedding it in the mathematics, namely, in the exact science, reserving the term “Metaphysics” to the traditional metaphysics, which is, anyway, a overshadowing of the essence of the historical reality or structural. Kant identified “God” with the “source of bonds absolute moral” (14), and this is conceivable only if you can identify “God” with the very source of the possibility. This, in that, Kant believed that the divinity, consisting in the idealization of historical reality, as is identified by the religions and by the philosophies, and, so, disregards totally by the absolute moral. If, instead, you identify God with the possibility of overcoming the structural reality historic, as did, indeed, Kant, he identifies himself with the human nature fully realized and, therefore, with the human purposes. On the other hand, the divinity, according to the theology, is identifiable, even, with the human purposes. Then, it must not be considered as a superior being at the human being, but a condition to which you can self direct themselves, namely, the full manifestation of the essence and, therefore, occurrence full, even on the spiritual plane, of being. The concept of transcendentality is, also, intended as the needs of the other. In reality, there is no need of the other, but of the relationship with the other (the need of another is only as a function of the ratio with the other) and, thus, there is no any transcendentality, in this or other senses, if not a diversity of nature between human nature and reality structural historical.

Kant had stated that the organic character of the essence of the statual society make the individual: determined by the state itself “in the position and in its own function” (15). The individual, namely, becomes a mere instrument of the state and, thus, deprived of essence and purpose autonomous. This is the quintessence of the economic oppression – social and political, since subtracts individuals: essence and purpose, transforming them into instruments of the essence and of the purpose of what we call the reality structural statual.

The Hegelian conception of the spirit leads to an identification between the spirit and metaphysics, where the spirit takes three forms: subjective spirit or ratiocination or intellect (namely: the human nature), objective spirit or structural reality historic (defined by Dilthey: “structural connection of individual living beings, which has its continuation in the communities”) and spirit absolute or self-knowledge (science and conscience). The next philosophy accepts, generally, the Hegelian concept of the objective spirit as: structural reality historic. Luigi Pareyson stated that the Hegelianism has killed the philosophy through the idealization of reality (16). In fact Hegel has killed the philosophy, but not for having idealized the reality, operation already accomplished from Greek philosophy. Hegel placed himself at a crossroads, where on the one hand it exceeds the philosophy, transforming it into an ideology wire-feudal (operation performed by Marx and by “Marxism”), on the other hand you can transform the philosophy and its metaphysical in: Science of structural reality historical and in Science of man.

Hegel had to acknowledge as the “world” is foreign to science and, then, he transited from an previous monism at a masked dualism (17), which equated divinity to empirical reality (18) (or structural reality historic). Such equivalence is defined as “crisis of theodicy”, since it is possible to pass from a masked allegory of the concept of divinity, as an image of the historical reality or of its causes, to the explicit equalization of two distinct concepts: the divinity, identified with the structural reality historic on one side, and the human nature and science on the other. This conception brought, however, Hegel to a conclusion totally pessimistic, such that it does not to see any solution to the tragedy of history (19).

Norberto Bobbio spoke of “transcendence” to understand each concept that diverge from the historical immanence or individuals the rationality outside the structural reality of history.

Chapter 8:

The Search of the good of the individuals and his relationship with the search of the social good

Locke affirmed the naturalness of the experience of the senses, not distinguishing between human nature and structural reality historical, the which human nature he identified, correctly anyway, in the source of the research of happiness (1).

Hume identified the human nature with the search of the useful and of the pleasant, as action generated by a feeling that he put in opposed to selfishness, affirming the virtues implicit in these sensations (2). From these considerations it emerges as the term “selfishness” has acquired a negative connotation, having acquired the meaning of absence of the social dimension.

Adam Smith recognized that there may be an identification between the search for the good of the individual and social factors, although, he recognize there might be the development of an inferior “selfishness”, and destructive, toward society and also of the self (3): if it is prevents at the other an equal “selfishness” and if it is prevented at the itself subject the expression of their own sociality, that is the need of the relationship with others, definable, also, as objective egoism (namely not based on the subject in itself, but on the needs of the relationship with each other: that is, with the object).

Chapter 9:

The Potential Universality, Universality of Knowledge, Universality of Structural Reality Historical and the Universality of the Human Spirit

Kant stated that what is empirical (or emerging from the experience with the historical reality) possesses a universality related and not absolute, as it happens, instead, with what it is: a priori (1). Had recognized, then, that: only what belongs to human nature possesses true universality, while the structural reality historic possesses a relative universality, namely, limited to historical conditions, or contingents, of the humanity.

The concept of universal individual of Hegel, imply an infinite number of determinations and variations, and is attributed to an individual absolute, which symbolizes the universality reached in a certain level of manifestation of the being, on the part at a given species, at an given moment. Is equivalent, therefore, at the “universality” of the conscience of his contemporaries, in a given historical moment (2).

The comparative history had brought Bloch at recognize “the fundamental unity of the human spirit or, if you prefer, monotony, the astounding poverty of intellectual resources referred, in the course of history, humanity has arranged” (3), namely, the unity and repetitiveness, for the different peoples, of human history. Jean Bodin he forsook the Platonic idea of progressive human degeneration and had affirmed the equality between the society “modern” and the society “classical”, and introduced the concept of “solidarity of peoples”, namely, the idea of the uniqueness of human history (4).

Part III:

Philosophy of History

Chapter 10:

Adumbrations of conception of the cyclical nature of the universe structural statual

Saint-Simon had defined the philosophy as the sum of the knowledge of the historical reality, namely, of what is the structural reality: of what is and what will become (1). He had defined, therefore, the philosophy as the source and the schoolmistress of the sciences. In reality, the philosophy, up to now, has proved to be only the mother and teacher of every ideology irrational, and for this reason has earned contempt and the public insult of many. However, it can regain credit, proving to be the source of the sciences of society and of the human beings.

Saint – Simon had speak of what we define as the merchant phase, as of “criticism epoch”, which alternates with a “organic era” that is, as we have defined, a feudal phase. He saw this latter as a reality, inevitably, in approaching and, therefore, had considered it necessary prepare his advent, with the spread of ideology “socialist”, because he identified the inevitable with desirable. Marx can, therefore, be considered good disciple of Saint – Simon (2).

The adopted base theory of some German philosophers distinguishes between: “sciences nomothetic”, or that are tending to regard reality as unitary essence (and, therefore, with the conception of the statual structural reality as a unitary reality), and the “sciences ideographic” or that tend to regard the events and the phenomena as random or not connected to the causes and at the purposes (and, therefore, that consider the historical events as a unique phenomena, unrepeatable and, therefore, not associated with other historical events, if not coincidentally), putting in the latter type the “science” of structural reality. In this way you create a category of fake scientificity for the disciplines, pervaded with ideologies, that you want to cultivate, keeping them away from the criteria of true scientificity. The Neo-Kantians they suggest of distinguish, precisely between ideographic approach and the nomothetic method, where only the latter is “strictly scientific”, while the first method is the unscientific, used in the historical field and, in general, in the field of social sciences, namely structural (3).

Also Radcliffe – Brown had distinguished between ideographic searches or concerning events or special statements: and nomothetic searches or concerning the enunciation of propositions of a general nature (4). He proposed that the historiography of nomothetic type, such as for example that of Fustel de Coulanges was, also, defined: sociological history or sociology of history.

Dray stated that there are three models of historical evolution, proposed by the various philosophies of history:

- linear,

- cyclic,

- chaotic (5).

Then, there are forms of combination between these models, such as that of Giambattista Vico, which unites the linear model to that cyclic, to form a spiral pattern (6). The first two models involve historical laws and the tendency “invariable of the historical series, as a totality” (7) (namely, the consideration of structural reality, at least that of statual type, as a unitary fact) and, moreover, it is considered the story as a “self-transformation in the limits of a single closed system” (8). This form of categorization is not an exclusive of the “speculative philosophers of history”, but, in general, by all historians who, however, are concerned about the problem of the “purpose” or “value” or “justification” of history (9). E. Cassin, J. Bottéro and J. Vercoutter have affirmed that the cyclical conception of history it has already seen, even, in the Bible, albeit wrapped in mythological elements (10).

The philosophies of history of ideographic type, namely, tending to consider as random events, or lacking a unitary logic; they induce attitudes of fatalism towards the events or, conversely, attitudes of obsession anxious, at because of the concept according to which every historical event would occur in a completely random way and unpredictable. The philosophy of contemporary history, generally, tends to deny any sense of history, as had stated explicitly Korkeimer and, then, to deny any meaning to life itself in human beings. In this way: it denies any possibility of responsibility for the life and action of individuals. Lyotard theorized “modernity”, as the prevalence of holistic theory or nomothetic of Marxism, while defined the “post-modernity”, as the renunciation of nomothetic theory (that is identified, unjustifiably, with Marxism), and return to a conception ideographic, due to the uncertainty arising from the disappointment for the inadequacy demonstrated from the object of faith unlimited placed in the conception nomothetic of the Marxism. He stated, however, that it is the very nature of the human being at to require a conception “strong” and able to clearly indicate the human purposes and the ways to achieve them, and thus explaining: the life and the world (11). The “post-modernity” is, therefore, theorized in correspondence of the overcoming of the feudal phase, that she occurred from the end of the first decade of the twentieth century and it was outdated by the result of revolutions (social, before policies) anti-communist ’80s – 90s of the same twentieth century. If Marxism has been guilty of a great illusion and delusion, not for this you have to think that humanity can not solve the problem of historical reality, already referred to as the “social problem”. In fact, if the defeatist attitude that takes place, in this historic moment, in the field of social and human sciences, not only not it would never have made any breakthrough in any form of scientific knowledge, but not he would never solved any problem or reality unknown, engaging the human species.

The Greek philosophers had knowledge of the progress that had occurred with the passage from the structures pre-statual to the universe structural statual.

Kroeber recognized that there are recurring phenomena, such as the feudalism, the castes and so forth, but stated that are not phenomena sufficiently uniform for necessarily constituting a theory scientifically valid. While considering valid the concepts of “functional connections recurring with internal relations” (12): namely, the “Links between feudalism, devotion and economy of medieval type” that characterize the systems of the feudal phases, and noting that the various “civilization” they exhibit “phases of development” (13) applicants, stated that it is an unexplained phenomenon, of which there is the problem of clarification. Had stated, then, that there is “a growing recognition of the real probability” that there exists a historical segmentation according to a “model applicant”. Had quoted, finally, Oswald Spengler, that spoke of predestination immanent and Pitirim Alexandroviç Sorokin, who spoke of a pendular movement between the “inclinations relating to the senses” and “ideazional”. Substantially, Kroeber had understood well the mode of the evolution of the structures statual, but avoided to formalize the theory, of fact, from he himself well foreshadowed, perhaps fearing of unnecessarily undermine the structural reality statual, having failed to designed a model alternate of organization social.

The classics Greek have interpreted history as “subjection to natural cyclicity” (14). They, therefore, have saw the cyclicality of the universe structural statual, as a consequence of natural cosmic cyclicity. The conception of the universe of pre-Socratics, had made referencing to an unwinding, of every cosmic reality, within a given cycle. Consider, for example, Anaximander and Anaximenes. Anaximander had considered the infinite as a fact overlooking all reality contingent, considering it then “divine”. The infinity of Anaximander is identifiable with the structural reality historic (15). In fact he, had attributed to the aforesaid infinite, the law or the justice. Therefore, he had considered universal what he termed: the infinite; identifying it to what we call the universe structural statual (16). Empedocle stated that the “four roots of being” (17) are animated by two opposing forces: “Love and contention”, the whose action alternate, causing those which he defined as “phases of cosmic cycle”. The nature of the statual evolution was, therefore, clearly perceived. Empedocle had considered that these two “forces” are: the “conditions of human knowledge”. He believed, namely implicitly, that the evolution of the statual reality is the condition of the overcoming of historical structures. Plato believed that humanity has a becoming and, then, it is divided into different classifications (18), whilst constituting, ultimately, a unit. He, then, foresaw the partitions that we enucleated and defined, of the universe structural statual: the phases statual and social systems.

Aristotle, like Plato and other philosophers, not have solved (with appropriate definitions and adequate at describe the reality) the real consistence of the being or the substance, that they have theorized vaguely or obscurely, but that they left clearly understand, by their arguments, of identify them with the structural reality historic (19). Aristotle had intuited the static aspects of the universes structural and the mutability of social systems or specific joints of the “being”. In fact, had stated that: as “species” the substance is incorruptible, while as “composed” would be generated and corruptible (20). The Greek philosophers were conscious of the deterioration who they were facing with the crisis of the merchant phase of the cycle the historic “Ancient”, at their contemporary. In order to be consistent with this view, they had created legends, such as that of last “golden age”. Aristotle has come to theorising a cognitive progress, “countless times” forgotten and rediscovered, as a result of to cyclical nature of the historical evolution, as fact inevitable and considered characteristic of the nature of the universe. Plato had established, even, a duration of the historical cycles ((in seventy-two millennia: for the first 36,000 years there would be a perfect order, to which would follow a period of decadence, until the end of the cycle of seventy-two millennia). Plato said that the tragedy consists in not know what is the point of the cycle that we are living (21). Pythagoras had intuited, or used, the concept of the historical cyclicity, and this intuition apparently it had been communicated to him by the Egyptians, who considered that every single cyclic period has the duration three thousand years. The Egyptians, in their turn, had borrowed this intuition from the conceptualization of reincarnation (22). Hegel, he adopted, from Heraclitus, the concept of “dialectic” (Heraclitus had stated that the absolute both the unity, or the union, of the being and of not being) (23). Hegel had referred to as: Heraclitus, Anaximander and Anaximenes conceive history as a succession of cyclic periods, defined as: “Year of the world”, which constitute an infinite succession of cyclic alternation between “status of division” and the “status of union” (24). The theory of historical cycles was, generally, widespread among the Greek philosophers, to the point that the Pythagoreans brought to the extreme to consider identical to each other the various historical cycles, under every aspect. The stoics (as Seneca and others), had considered the historical cycles as historical realities that take place over the average duration of human life. Seneca, while seeing clearly the possibility of scientific progress, was well aware of the imminent forfeiture of society, while he saw a possibility of continuation of scientific progress, also in social decadence (Seneca, moreover, had hoped in a scientific progress able of ensure at the newly formed of the dominant caste a domain effectively and total). Hegel recognized that “the negation of negation”, essential pillar of own dialectic, is equals the statement affirmative from which he started, with an specific cycle of propositions (25). William James defined the Hegelian dialectic “an integral part of the Vision or intuition Hegelian” (26), and he believed him, based on empiricism and on the common sense. He stressed that Hegel has changed the logic, moving from the concept of identity (by means of which would have formed the concepts), to the concept of “negation of the previous statement” or contradiction, namely, report in the diversity. This conception is only valid in the structural field, where every thing, as had said James, does not exist in itself but in relation to the ratio in which it is located with the different (27). This is the logic of the alternation of the two phases of the cycles of the universe structural statual.

Various philosophical conceptions speak of cyclicity of historical reality. This cyclicality is, actually, found not in the whole of the evolution of the structural reality historic, but only in the historical structures statual. Polybius is considered the founder of the “pragmatism in history” (28), intended as exposition of the facts in their causal relations. Polybius based its epistemological theory of the cyclic return of events: anacyclosis (29), where the cyclicity is intended as an analogy with the biological cycle: generation, maturity and decay, but was referring to the political regimes, identified, however, with the social systems.

The cosmic time, of they talk about the Indian philosophies is, in some way, to be considered as allegorical of the cycles of the universe structural statual, identified, perhaps unconsciously, even with the geological eras (of which the last one is considered the most short), which would are repeated a thousand times. This, in analogy with the diuturni cycles, and therefore: it distinguishes a part corresponding to the “Day” and a part corresponding to the “Night”. This demonstrates the intuition of the alternation of a positive phase or bright to a negative or dark. All this is in continuous repeatition, to infinity, in the “days” of the centenary life of Brahma (30). The philosophy “Hindu” guesses the real historical evolution, albeit in a pessimistic vision and defeatist. The “Buddhism”, as we read, also, in the biography of the Buddha, it is based on teaching to the “renunciation of the world”, which is common, too, at the “Hinduism” or “Brahmanism” (31). The “Hinduism” recognizes the uniqueness of structural reality historical and the existence of a right universal structural, (defined: “Sanàtana-dharma”) (32). The “Hindu” philosophy recognizes that there is a distinction between time “astronomical” and time “out of time”, with which reiterates the distinction between nature, made of instants unrepeatable, and cyclical evolution, feature to the reality structural statual (33). The “Buddhism” has a cyclical view of history, divided into four “epochs”, where, with the last one it is realized the beginning of the decadency, from a previous apex, to a condition of “misery and hunger”. Also the “Jainism” has a cyclic conception, with two alternating phases of ascent and descent (34) where, with the first, it is realized a progress towards the good, with the second to evil. The “Jainism” clearly identifies the essence of the historical period, in which it was at act at the moment of its rising: beginning of decadence, with the following “nefarious age”, which will culminate in a epoch “extremely nefarious”, from which restart the rebirth (35). Also the “Buddhism” outlines, with precision, the two phases statual and the various systems which constitute the same phases.

The concept “Christian” of the devil and angels, introduced in large measure by Origen, is none other than the idealization, or mythologization, of the concept of historical evolution and of the alternation of the two phases, that Origen had sensed clearly (36). In the twelfth century there was the spread an optimism on human fate, based on the conviction of the next overcoming of feudal institutions, during that time still partially present. Ideologically, such conception had defined the new era as an epoch of the “Holy Spirit”, in contrast to the previous: Era of the “Son”. Joachim of Fiore had proposed a conception of history, in which the first part of history or age of the “Father”, it can be assumed that corresponds to the mercantile phase of the cycle “ancient”, the second or the “Son”, corresponding to the feudal phase of the historical cycle “Medieval – Modern – Post-modern”, at that time, recently exceeded, and the third or the “Holy Spirit”, corresponding to the new phase mercantile, which itself was consolidating in the XIII century (37), with the transition to the bourgeois system.

Gian Battista Vico aimed to establish the study of society, on a scientific basis, as was done for the nature. He believed that the explanation of the society should be sought in the constitution of the human mind. Therefore, had considered that the human brain go through three distinct phases: intuitive perception, the imaginative knowledge or sentimental and conceptual knowledge or of the reasoning. These stages constitute a progressive succession of the thought. Since it took the view that such moments give rise to similar moments in human society, identified the “phase” of intuitive perception in the societies pre-statual, the “phase” of knowledge imaginative or affective, in societies “barbarian” or feudal (they regarded as proprietary of the “Middle Ages”) and, finally, the “phase” of conceptual knowledge, or rational, in society, considered, of the “civilization” (namely the mercantile society, to him contemporary). He had identified the three “phases” conceived by him, as already seen in the history of ancient Rome: aristocracy (or kingdoms of Rome), democracy and, finally, monarchy (or “Empire”, which would constitute, according to him, the highest form of “civilization”). Had thought, then, that, finished the cycle, it falls into a state of anarchy, typical of the condition of the societies most primitive, with the restarting, thus, of a new cycle.

Roger Bacon he theorised about the advent of the “Antichrist”, which he saw as the destroyer of the feudal society, that he warned as nearby to occur (38). Machiavelli had theorized a uniformity of the characteristics of the various societies, even in the presence of a certain variability. She realized, namely, of the uniqueness (or, as we would say today: the globality) of the structures statual. He was aware of how, while some societies are in the progression toward prosperity, others are in decline: he resurrected, thus, the cyclic theory (39), recognizing the main characteristic of each phase of the universe structural statual.

The abbot Morellet conceived the history as a series of cycles with “epochs bright”, followed by “dark ages”. In carrying out the above cycles, he stated that there would be a constant and slow progress (referred ignored, however, nature) (40).

Boutruche had recognized, implicitly, as the ancient Egypt had lived those that we define phases of feudal type, alternated with of type mercantile phases (41). He told how the Pirenne theorized various feudal phases, in the history of the “ancient” Egypt (42). Told, then, as many historians individualize various stages feudal defined, generically, “feudalism” (43), in the ancients: Mesopotamia, the Asia Minor and Persia.

Marx spoke of unnaturalness: of the societies “capitalist” and of the organization of work in factories. He saw, namely, the bureaucracy of the factories as distortion with respect to the specific freedom of the societies “capitalist” and, then, spoke of ‘contradiction’, capable of bringing to the overcoming of the societies “capitalist”. This analysis, although vitiated by ideology, has acceptable elements. The bureaucracy of the factory is, actually, the expression of the tendency to the overshoot of the capitalist system competitive, trend already well present in the second half of the nineteenth century. Fustel de Coulanges had realized an analysis “to be able to try the genesis of economic, social and political structures” of the “dark ages”, that he had well distinguished from the “Roman world” (44). The “Annales” by Bloch tended to unify the conception of Coulanges to German kulturgeschichte (45). The “Annales” they confronted the various “feudalisms”, of different geographical areas and historical periods (46), demonstrating that you understand, at least cryptically, the real nature of the evolution of the universe structural statual. John Tabacco had recognized that exist a “analogy” between “the state apparatus that we are living today” and the society established by Rome (47), being the contemporary society based on that “model”, based in turn, “on contraposition between the public and private sectors, on the distinction between the initiatives individual and social and the activity of the organs constituting the state”.

Saint-Simon had recognized that the analysis of history, namely the historiography that was at him contemporary, was still at a stage infant and, at this stage it was, practically, useless (48). Saint-Amand Bazard, on the basis of Saint-Simon, he hoped in the transformation of religion, from spiritualistic in materialist (49). Marx has fact, evidently, treasure of these suggestions. From the conception of Engels, materialist-dialectics, of the negation of negation, appears as the story is conceived as a spiral evolution, with progressive cycles: from “A”, at “-A” and then to “A2” and so on (50). Although this concept contrasts, in some points, with the vision of the history of Marx, at least in some forms and explicit statements (51), in reality the of Engels theory reflects, in its entirety and in substance, that of Marx.

Saint-Simon had theorized the alternation of “critical epochs and eras organic”: that is a theory at odds with the theory of progress. Johann Gottfried Herder had intuited what we consider to be the real nature of the evolution of the structures statual, and stated that a determined “species of men” (that we would call: rare) is able to perceive the “barbarism” of feudalism and its consequences disastrous (52). The historians of eighteenth-century, Johannes Jakob Brucker and Gilbert Burnet, have defined the feudal age as decadence or the “barbarism”, the next after to the splendour of the “classicism” (53). With the “romanticism”, it went into crisis the conception of history according to which the feudalism it is the essential characteristic of a “dark age”. The aforesaid conception disappeared almost completely in the twentieth century (54). The “dark ages” according to official historians, would vary from one millennium to a century, demonstrating how for the “dark ages” the historians intend to many things and little in keeping with the actual periodization of structures statual (55). Some historians, such as, for example, Domenico di Bandino, identify the “dark ages” with the period that goes from the 13th to the 14th century (56). Between the end of 1200s and the end of the 1300s there was indeed, a partial regression (perhaps due to the plague that spread, repeatedly, in Europe). Pirenne, on the contrary, showed, implicitly, of accept the cyclical conception of history, when he stated that Europe “reborn” (or of the “Renaissance”) is more similar to that “ancient” than to that “Carolingian age” (57). The historic Lewis Mumford had shared, substantially, the thesis of Pirenne, of the death and rebirth of the “civilization”, identified with the regression and the rebirth of the cities (58). Pirenne had believed that the decline of the cities has been parallel to the reflowering of the campaigns. On the contrary, Mumford had recognized as the decadence of the cities is parallel to a similar decline of the campaigns. Mumford had identified, clearly, the cyclical nature of the evolution of the universe structural statual, although, he had exalted, simultaneously and ideologically, the feudalism, that he defined as “protected economy”. He had scorned the capitalism as if it were, simply, the result of the greed hedonistic (59). Pirenne had conceived, in a given period of his life, the “factors” of becoming historical as a reality that determines the cyclicity (60).

The theory of progress, in addition to the many perverse effects (such as the forcings, in feudal sense, which has justified) has, nevertheless, produced the awareness of a possible progress toward the happiness.

The historians of the twentieth century were, essentially, thesis to prove how: through the centuries IX and X there has not been an actual interruption of trade; in order to remove the validity to the theses of Pirenne and of Mumford on cyclical evolution (61).

Chapter 11:

Structural reality historical, the universes structural, and the various social systems

Radcliffe – Brown, analysing the concept of structure, stated that this term indicates a “orderly arrangement of parts or of components”. Had stated, therefore, that the term of structure can serve to define the social continuity, namely, the evenness of what we call the structural universe, since he conceptualized the “structure” as a unified weft, suitable to adjust the behavior. Deepening the analysis, it is highlighted the fact as Radcliffe-Brown identifies structures with the arrangements or social stratifications, while had defined as “institutions” the regulations that govern these arrangements. He had used the scientific concept of function, as well as it is defined by the physiological science: ratio between structure and process, where the second term indicates the practical functioning, in time, of a reality as the structural reality in relation to the level of manifestation of the being, achieved, by the generality, of the population. Radcliffe-Brown had sketched a parallelism between the analysis of social structures and the biological science. He had identified, then: problems of morphology (or configuration of the various structures), physiology (or operation of the various structures), development (presumed origin of new structures or structural elements) and evolution (mutation of structures). He noted how, in contrast with biological organisms, social structures mutate the their “type” (1), without that is cut off the their continuity. He stated that the structures historical do not produce conflicts “that cannot be resolved or regulated”, but did not excluded that a type not adjustable of conflict can arise (he had predicted, then, the possible existence of an antagonism not structural or against structural). He spoke of good governance and of the misgovernment, to indicate the order and social disorder, in analogy with the “classics” Greeks. Had reported as Durkheim had considered the misgovernment (which he called anomie) and has defined the same, as an alteration of a given: “structural type”. He believed that this misgovernment should continue up to the replacement of the specific: “type” structural; or fought until the return of the good governance. He noted, moreover, as in the cases of “disintegration of social structures” (2) (as occurs when certain societies, which are in structural universes pre-statual are in contact with one or more society of the universe structural statual), occur some efforts to return to the previous social governance, maybe through the emergence of new religious forms. He had noted, also, as a single social costume (or term social) can to have functions different in societies apparently very different and, therefore, a comparison between societies or social moments different, must be done both on the forms of the costumes that of their functions. He had distinguished between structure (structural moment directly observable and, therefore, that can be defined as: social system) and structural form overall (and therefore, what we define: structural universe). Spoke of continuity of structures, beyond the revolutions and, then, involving multiple social systems or more types of government. Had identified, therefore, the existence of structural universes, that they comprising various social systems. He had proposed to himself of define exactly the various societies, and to this purpose proposed to classify the various structural systems. Recognized as, between language and social structure, there is a ratio very indirect, and the two facts should be studied in an autonomous manner, although the formation of the various languages is connected with the social structures and their evolution.

Marcel Mauss, in clarifying the structural conception of Durkeim, he theorised about the “fact social total”, that we could identify with what we call the social systems. Claude Levi-Strauss used the concept of structure in the sense of methodology, namely as a model or mental scheme, while denying that there are social structures, intended as reality extra-human (3) thus denying, also, that there are types of societies that adopting (consciously or not), precisely, these “schemes”.

From the phenomenological sociology you can deduce the definition of the structural reality historical, as “historical phenomenon essential or immanent, which subtends, as depth level, the concrete historical manifestations of structural reality: namely, the various historical structural universes, the statual phases, the social systems, the various types of government and the real powers. The sociology, in general, declares as its own object of analysis: the “social organization” or “social interaction structured”.

Some sociologists, as the sociologist of law Henry Sumner Maine, distinguished the societies based on the “status”, from those based on the “contract” (4) where, with the firsts, indicate the feudal phases and the societies pre-statual and, with the second, the phases mercantile. They state, then, that, in addition to this distinction of the “social organization”, there is, between the two types of society, a difference in “system of government”: corporatist or relative to the communities, from one side; individualistic and rational from the other. They say there is, in addition, the following cultural differentiation: sacred or features at the communities, against ideas secular or associative (5). Ferdinand Tonnies stated that the aforementioned definition of the two types has a universal application, namely “global”.

The contemporary sociology analyzes, essentially, the capitalist systems, although it does with conceptual schemes their own of the systems pre-capitalists, such as the concept of status. The sociologists analyze the condition of the workers in a distorted way: initially, for reaction to the new industrial reality and capitalist. Some sociologists recognize, however, such as the condition of the workers in the XIX century and in the second half of the XVIII was clearly better than that of the workers in the two preceding centuries (6). At the rising of the sociological research, the sociologists “conservatives” or “radical”, as Robert Soutey and William Cobbett, which have expressed what were the trends of the ideology characteristic and specific of the bourgeois system (7), they denigrated the condition of workers, with the purposes and methods of reaction, in favor of the bourgeois system in place, but already in the process of being exceeded (8). They wanted to see, indeed, the return to corporatism bourgeois and to its distinction of social status which it is a semi-feudal feature (9). Various precursors of the sociologists, as Robert Southey, which he wrote in 1807, they have enunciated some theories, which were proposed again, subsequently, by Marx, about the naturalness of the feudal society with respect to the artificiality of the current “commercial era” (10). They described the capitalist reality as if it were a work relationship of slave type (11), providing arguments to the analysis mystifying og Karl Marx, as had recognized Robert Nisbet Bain (12). The contemporary anthropology tends to reject the theories of the historical evolution, proposed by L. H. Morgan, affirming that these theories are derived from the biological evolutionism of XIX century. These anthropologists, however, do not refuse the theory of biological evolutionism. It must be said also that the theories evoluzionist of Morgan have influenced, undoubtedly, the ideological theories of Marx – Engels. The ideological theories Marxist, however, still have a strong ascending on the “intellectuals” contemporaries, also as a result of the failures and of the tragedies that these ideologies have produced in the XX century (13). The logical coherence does not seem to be the overriding concern among most of the “intellectuals” of today.

The essential difference between the “radical” and the “conservatives” of the XVII and XVIII century, consists in the fact of to put themselves in opposition, each group, for the two different political regimes or types of government, specific of the bourgeois system: the monarchy absolutist for the “conservatives” and tyranny absolutist for the “radical”. The essential difference between the “conservatives” and the “socialist” (in particular the “Marxists”), in the nineteenth century, consists in the fact that, while the first had considered negative the transition to capitalist system competitive, the seconds had thought that the advent of the capitalist system is necessary, albeit negative, in order to realize a new feudal society, which they considered corresponding to their idea of ideal society (14). While the “conservatives” and the “radical” have assumed a position anti-historical, the “Marxists” have accepted the the idea of historical evolution, aware of the now inevitable generalization of the capitalist system. The Marxists have believed necessary of pander the historical evolution, also in order to be able to define themselves as: “progressives”. The “conservatives”, the “radicals” and the “Marxists” hoped in the overcoming of private property, but in the direction of its strengthening ontolological, because they all hoped: in the return to the feudal possession, far more exclusivist and oppressive of the private property (15).

Marx, fearing an alliance between the nobility and the workers, for the purposes of conservation of survivals of the bourgeois system, he defined this trend “conservative”, or better, regressive, describing it as: “Feudal socialism” (16). This demonstrates how Marx had recognized the possibility of an overlap or identification between the “socialism” and the “feudalism” and, therefore, he was concerned that the his theory could be ridiculed because of that identification and had, therefore, the ideological intent of ward off this overlap. He had, also, the concern of to foster the emergence a type of feudal phase centralized , unlike of the decentralized feudal phase, that he had considered deleterious, and that occurred, in the Western Europe, in the “Middle Ages”.

Chapter 12:

Various theories of the historical reality and of its evolution

The philosopher Antonio Santucci, had noted that the term: history, indicates both the historical knowledge, how much the structural reality, in its evolution (1). Hegel had suggested the use of the term “History” only for the historiography. The question still seems, to still, unresolved. If history can be understood, also, as: the structural reality historic, a historiography really scientific, will be the one that gives account, at least with a certain approximation, of the evolution of the universe structural statual, and it provides the precognition, on the broad lines and probabilistically, the concrete evolution, in the future.

The philosophers of the history of the idealist tendency, accuse the determinists of the alleged hypocrisy, anti-scientific, of seeking confirmation of their thesis, at any cost. They argue that historians determinist identify the significant events, with the exclusive interest to have confirmation of their thesis: “What facts are significant becomes the problem to indicate what facts confirm the hypothesis” (2). This argument is valid if the facts were perpetually contradictory or uncertain. This accusation of anti-scientificity hides their ideological intent and destructive of any attempt to achieve a knowledge scientifically founded of the human condition.

It is, now, generally acknowledged the autonomy of the cultural evolution, and therefore, structural, from biological one. Autonomy which, of course, does not exclude the analogy. In general, it is recognized as the structural evolution has occurred by causes unconscious and, often, external to the society itself (3).

Comte stated that the various “historical epochs” are mutually concatenated and stated ,in this regard, that “every phase is born from the previous and produces the next” (4). Some historians talk about “filiation” between the clienteles of the “ancient society” and the vassallage (5). But all this does not explain the dynamics of the evolution of the universe structural statual and, much less, its causes.

Michel Foucoult, with the structuralists, had recognized the unconsciousness and determination, to which it is subject to the historical man. Claimed to be the task of the historic, make known the mechanisms of reality, making possible its overcoming (6).

Charles Renouvier had deplored, at the beginning of the twentieth century, “the utopia of progress that prevented to discern the evil”. The culture of the XX century, in some of its manifestations in which was not succubus the ideologies anti-democratic, such as: the “Marxism”, “fundamentalism Christian”, the “Islamism”, or other religious conceptions, had identified, yet, the history with the progress, and had enclosed the meaning of the history, into the together of the: structural reality, scientific progress and cognitive, in general (7).

Bloch, in order to corroborate the conception of history, as a succession of events constantly progressives, stated that the servitude is progressive with respect to slavery, since more profitable would be the work of the servants, with respect to that of slaves. For this reason, according to him, to slavery is followed the servitude (8). Since that from the servitude is not followed a generalized return to slavery, he it inferred the confirmation of the theory of the continuous progress of history (9). This is a case of interpretation, subject to the ideology, of an analysis of the history, although based, in part, on scientific criteria.

John Bury had stated that the cyclical conception of history, diffused by the stoicism, has constituted an obstacle to the formation of the idea of progress, at the age of the feudal phase of the “Middle Ages” and of the “Renaissance”. In reality, the feudal phase, for the its very nature, he does not admit the possibility of the theory of progress, since its dominant culture must proclaim the insuperability of existing society, until the end of time, less than undermining the very foundations of the feudal society (10). In fact, only in the XII century of vulgar era (e.v.) is re-emerged the concept of historicity. This happened for the work by Gilberto Porretano (11). The rebirth of this concept demonstrates how in the feudal phases you are free by any knowledge of history or of historicity.

With the various theories “socialist” are disappeared: the theory of indefinite progress and voluntary. This latter is characteristic of the various theories “liberal”, to make room for at a idea of progress, having as a goal the “socialism” itself, with the abolition of the historical dynamism (12), in perfect analogy with the feudal culture “medieval”, at demonstration of his true nature: a wire-feudal ideology.

Chapter 13:

Classification of structural universes, in the evolution of reality structural historical, and of the joints of the aforementioned structural universes

The neo-pythagorean Numenio he theorised three divinities:

1) The principle of reality or king of the universe (which can be interpreted as the essence of the historical structures);

2) The demiurge, that shape the world, and this is the principle of becoming (namely, is the structural universe in act, or universe structural statual);

3) the world produced by the demiurge (namely, social systems specific, with the various types of government and the real powers) (1).

The Anthropologist Marshall Sahlins, on the basis of the theories of the philosopher Charles Fried, had classified them historic structures in four “levels of socio-cultural integration”, which we had defined: universes structural historical: namely the bands, the tribes (defined: societies at ranks, from Charles Fried), the territorial organizations governed by a leader (or, the layered society, according to Charles Fried) and, finally, “the States” or universes structural statual. The band is a small cluster of individuals having a certain degree of autonomy territorial. There are no layers or distinctions stable in functions. These bands or clan are generally nomads, practicing the collection, hunting and fishing. The various bands, although joined by a common cultural heritage, do not possess some unifying institutions. Each band has a charismatic leader more or less knowingly recognized. The power of this charismatic leader is based on his personal qualities: of the type economic (special skills), of type religious or age. This is a temporary role and absolutely not hereditary. Since the job (and therefore its divisions) is virtually non-existent, not occur durable inequalities, if not based on a real inequality psycho-intellectual. Examples of this type of social structure, you have in the contemporary age (between human beings), among the Eskimos, in the Amazon and in some areas of Africa. Between the Bushmen Kung the function of leader is durable and hereditary. This is, probably, an example of a society in transition to the structural universe tribal, since it occurs transmission, from one generation to the other, of the cognitive inequality or of the Charism. The tribes or societies at ranks, represent a higher level of socio-cultural integration. These structures may be constituted by bands or by sets of families, connected together in such a way as to form a whole more complex. It realizes, in this case, a precise spatial location. Appears to be a certain type of apparatus of power, defined tribal institution, which permits a certain regulation of relationships between groups. Within the system of relationship, they are forming some hierarchical inequalities between individuals and groups (firstborns, cadets, men, women, and so on), both inside the elementary units, both among these (between lineages or clan), better definable as gentes. This hierarchization, that is proportionate to the demographic conditions, ecological, and so on, is neither hereditary norperpetuates, nor has a tendency to expand. You can play, in an identical manner, in subsequent generations avoiding of crystallize into real institutions. These inequalities do not itself add one to the other, up to constitute a system of stratifications and political institutions. They occur, namely, some widespread inequalities, based, purely, on inequality psycho-intellectual, and constituting a form of power which does not crystallizes itself in institutions, which will be, instead, at a higher level of civilizing, enucleated by the fullness of the ideal projection. In these societies, if you can distinguish between: reports materials and projections ideals or social configuration; however, there are not the institutions, as an expression of the authority, but only the primary influence, in so far as an expression of the total differentiation between the individuals and between the groups. In the tribes you have examples of a condition that, by the anthropologists, is referred to as the “Slavery”, because the subjects who are involved do not participate of the formation of the hierarchies of the own society, but remain in a state of dependency and are excluded from social life. This condition can be configured, perhaps better, like that of the prisoners. The power derives, in this type of social structures, by two orders of factors: the kinship and the position within this (the seniority, the birthright,and so on), the capacity magical-religious or the capacity with the implications, more directly, of economic thype (the directive capacity, the ability to execute certain works, or combat capacity). The influence, although total, is legitimated. This is demonstrated by the rituals in which it is inserted. The power is, in fact, defined as magical power positive (“swem”). However, since the power comes from a competition, rivalry or real struggles, these latter are indicated as a negative fact and, therefore, the malevolent force against which you can do some exorcisms (“tsau”). If the holder of the power knows how to make it possible neutralize the rivalry: there ensues an additional legitimacy of its power, the which makes it total. The societies stratified or territorial organizations governed by a leader, are characterized by a certain degree of autonomy of the element “political”, namely, the autonomy of the influence and, then, there is the formation of the institutions. The functions socially qualified (the order maintenance, adjustment of production and consumption,and so on), give rise to specific roles, which can become the prerogative of individuals and groups. This produces a social stratification, not based on criteria of kinship, but in relation to the functions of a type socio-economic and ideological: noble, free men and held (or servants). Thus, appear embryonic systems of castes (also as groups specialized professionally). It has, thus, the partial overcoming of the system of controls parentals, with the realisation of the type of control that is typical of the institutions. This type of structure is the antechamber of the level of statual structure and constitutes a moment of transition to the latter. However, it is distinguished from the statual level, for the non-complete autonomy of the political institutions: by all the full of the ideal projection (2). In the “levels of socio-cultural integration” pre-statual exist only “germs” of “system” political autonomous (or institutions political), since the function “politics” exists as a partial function of other social components. In these “levels” pre-statual do not it have a clear distinction, even between the material referent and the ideal projection. This is valid, in general, to the exclusion of the societies layered, where the ideal projection is already considerably cleaved with respect to the material referent (3).

The historical phases statual are taken into account from sociology and indicated as “status types”. The various political regimes are defined as “forms of government”. The term as regimen is used, disparagingly, by sociologists to indicate forms of government does not adequately justified from a given “political formula” or political conception and therefore considered as forms of illegitimate of government. They do not take into account, in correct terms, the low level of political democracy or the absolute absence of the political democracy itself.

Jacques Heers showed how, in those that we define: transition periods from the feudal phase to the phase mercantile (of the cycle “medieval – modern – post-modern”), the various conflicts which have occurred, are not attributable to the “theory of Marx” of the classes, being instead, often, aimed simply at the conservation of structural reality in act (4).

Chapter 14:

Determinisms various or several theories of the factors determinants

Alessandro Tassoni had took for granted that there is not a continuous progress of history, since it is obvious that there are solutions of continuity which allow periods of decline “successive at periods of excellence”. Charles Perrault exceeded the contradiction between the idea of a constant progress of knowledge and the deduction of the feudal decadence, affirming that the decline it is produced by factors unrelated at the human being and at his nature, since the human nature is always equal to itself (at least in the laws that the herself govern). He have istinguished, correctly, between social progress and scientific progress, saying that only the latter is progressive, being the knowledge progressive, that underlies of it, in light of experience. George Hakewill spoke of “a sort of circular progress” as a result of the go back over of the history (1). The Abbot of Saint – Pierre acknowledged that there has been no progress in the field moral and cultural, in the passage from the “classicism” to “modernity”, but considered that it had done a social progress, by virtue of the membership, of scientific progress, at “human reason universal” (2). The baron of Holbach spoke of “material nature” as of the only author of history, in contrast with the human being, the which last is part of nature and, as such, is: neither good nor bad, at birth (3).

Pietro d’Abano had claimed the determinism of Averroes, deepening the his knowledge up to include in it, the birth of philosophies and of the religions (4). The determinism, like every other interpretative scheme, “risk” of limit the historical representation (5). This risk must be properly assessed, and it is necessary adapt the the theoretical framework to the effective historical reality, in a continuous process of the refinement of the interpretative instruments. Henri Pirenne not adopted a economism “technical and restricted””(6), but he tried to incorporate this economism in a cultural vision wide. Emile Durkheim had an idea of the ontological determination of structural reality on individuals (7), stating that individuals are determined, in their nature, from structural reality. This concept is clearly irrational, since the human being has given rise to the structural reality (though unintentionally and unconsciously) and cannot, therefore, be one his creature.

Chapter 15:

Cyclic trend of the universe structural statual, with the transition periods and the partitions of the two historical cycles

The Mayas had a calendar with cycles of 52 years and another, defined “Account along”, which contemplated a cycle of 5.125,36 years (which, according to them, would correspond to the duration of the universe structural statual), based on partitions that, in addition to the “uinal” (or “months” of 20 days), contemplates the “tun” (or years of 360 days), and also the “katun” (or periods of 20 years: corresponding to the cycles of around twenty years), and the “baktun” (or periods of 20 “katun”, that can prefigure the duration of the phases statual). This demonstrates how the mayas had sensed the main partitions of the evolution of the universe structural statual (1).

David Hume accepted the principle of historical cyclicity, while not giving on a judgment in the society of him contemporary, avoiding to say if it were in a moment of progress or of regression. Had recognized, however, that it was in place a degree of “civilization” never before reached (had deduced this conclusion from the fact that had been overcome the slavery).

Under the term of “categoriale law” (2), the philosophers of history identify the tendency to classify, in a cyclic way, the historical events. With the term of “connection” they identify the classification of more phenomena in a single fact, if this proposes a process of change, understood as a unitary, as for example: the revolutions, the wars, the “Renaissance” and so on (3).

Henri de Saint – Simon and Auguste Comte they theorized the statual society as bipartite in two stages: the “feudal stage” and the stage “industrial”, theorizing as the first it is differentiated for the purpose of the accretion of power (defined as conquest), and the second for the purpose of the wellness and of the productive labor (4). The “positivists”, even it they have started, all, from a organismic conception of society, have expressed different conceptions. Herbert Spencer, for example, had recognized as the mercantile society it is based on an organization which is less restrictive for individuals, and for this more advanced. Stressed, namely, the fact that, while the feudal society is based on compulsory cooperation, the mercantile society is based on voluntary cooperation. He saw, therefore, progress, in the gradual departure f this the latter type of the society from a model super-organic, as it was at the beginning (with the formation of the universe structural statual), namely, that is with the stage feudal of the first cycle of the universe structural statual and of the feudal phases of the subsequent historical cycles. Spencer had hoped in the overcoming of the society mercantile statual, with a society where production is aimed at social purposes; unfortunately he did not see as in this there was as a danger that its not that a simple wish of a return to feudal society (5), where the purposes of the production, are dictated not by human needs (social or individual type), but by the socio-political and religious hierarchies, whose goals and needs, are entirely unconnected with relation to the purposes and needs of those who produce and consume. Spencer had considered, however, clearly the “Communism” as a return to feudal society, that he defined “military system”, and had considered every state intervention n the economy as a degeneration of the social body (6). Henri de Saint – Simon had characterized correctly the two phases statual, starting from the analysis of the foundations of the relations of production: the conquest (for the feudal stages) and work (for the mercantile phases), ignoring the fundamental distinction of the ratio of exchange: the market (namely the equal interchange, for the mercantile phases) and the favor (or exchange hierarchical, for the feudal phases) (7). Comte had stated that at the time of transition from feudal phase to phase merchant (of the historical cycle “medieval” – “modern” – “post-modern”) there was an awareness of where the society were, historically, and for where she was moving. Had considered that this fact was the fruit of scientific development, favored by the society that was developing. In reality. knowledge and awareness of he phase in which they was living at a given moment in history, was already widespread inprevious eras: for we know that the philosophers of Greece “classical”, by foreseeing the advent of feudal phase that approached, consider as a golden age, the age that they had behind, while they considered the future harbinger of moral decline and social. The consciousness of the historical evolution in act, more that knowledge of the essence of this evolution, is therefore very ancient, although it can be presumed that it is more common at the time of transition between an feudal phase and an mercantile phase, than can be at the time of the transition in reverse. This, because of the deception carried out by the ideologies, which tend to consider the society which is born, generally hailed as progressive, with respect to the society existing, especially when this is absolutely false (8).

Saint-Armand Bazard, continuer of the work of Saint-Simon, active in the first half of XIX century, recognized that there are, in history, “organic” periods, alternatives to periods: “critical”. He interpreted the law of the three stages, of Comte, as a different exposure of the two phases, with an intermediate period. The same Durkheim acknowledged that the alternations theorized from Bazard are indisputable (9). Karl R. Popper had clearly identified the essence of the merchant phase (which defined “Open Society”) and of the feudal stage (or “closed society”), and the ideologies own of the latter, such as the “Platonism”, the “neo-Platonism” and the “Marxism” (10).

Durkeim had defined “community” the structural reality, for his influence on the individual (11). Had distinguished between social relations rational or contractual, and therefore characteristic of merchant phases, from the reports based on an emotional response and the total involvement and, therefore, own of feudal phases. In this regard, he spoke of Communities mechanicals and of Communities structured as organs (12), inside the “reality of the community” or structural, namely, indicating these two type of “community” as the two phases of the universe structural statual. The “Enlightenment” had identified the structural reality with the “Society”, which we defined as: mercantile society or mercantile phase. Also Vilfredo Pareto had accepted the cyclic theory of the Pythagoreans. He stated that the historical phases alternate with rhythm unpredictable. He defined the two historical phases as: “societies more combinatorial” and “societies who are more likely to aggregate”, to respectively define merchant phases and feudal phases. He said that the only constant of the two phases is the presence of the germs of its degeneration and of the origin of the stage of the opposite type and, therefore, that at an society of a given type is destiny that occur a society of type opposed. This conception is, therefore, of type dyadic, like that hobbesian (13). By Vilfredo Pareto was used for first time the term “social system”: to indicate the overall static reality of a society, namely the entirety of its components (14). Comte stated that every social system has the its own characteristic “quality of an organ”. Stated that the function of every political regime is to adapt to that organic order, by adjusting the social stratification that tends to occur spontaneously in that given society. Had asserted, then, that another task of the institutions is that to define the “purposes of the activities” of society, namely the so-called: Values (15). Marcel Mauss had defined “fact social total” the whole of the social life of a given society, namely, the various social systems (16). Marx had provided for the realization of a capitalist system bureaucratic, as intermediate reality, on the way of realization, later, of the transition in feudal sense, to be implemented, according to him, earlier than elsewhere, in the “advanced countries”. Such systems bureaucratic capitalists would be characterized by the “centralization of credit and the banks, the management on the part of the state of the means of communication and transport, the strengthening of factories and the other means of production of the property of the state” (17). All historical conceptions of the sociologists imply intrinsically a cyclic conception of the historical evolution, conception which they look good by clearly express and that indeed, often, deny and they counteract explicitly. Robert Michels had recognized, for example as, the “historic flows and ebbs” are indisputable (18). The same Ferdinand Tonnies, explaining the real purpose of Marxism, it showed the determination and prediction of the cyclical evolution, implicit in Marx’s theories (19). Engels had recognized as authoritarianism and the despotism in the large factories is greater than it is in the small factories (20). Namely, knew the nature of the capitalist system bureaucratic, as intermediate system between the capitalist system competitive, and the systems of the feudal phases. Tonnies had analyzed the evolution of the reality structural statual, such as a transition from a “communism of the origins” , namely, from a phase feudal of type decentralized to a mercantile phase industrial, and from this to a “socialism”, namely, at a new phase feudal (withholding, necessarily, of the centralized type) (21). This analysis does not differ much from the historical analysis “Marxist”, as he recognized the same Tonnies. Even Durkheim had analyzed the history, practically in the same way, and believed that, realized the “socialism”, you will tend to the return to the “communism”, namely at a decentralized phase feudal (22). Vladimir Lenin took the view that the “financial capital” (namely: what prevails in the capitalist systems oligopolists and in the systems bureaucratic capitalists) was a reality intermediate between the capitalist system (competitive) and the “socialism” (23) or feudal phase. Lenin spoke of them, in fact, in: “Imperialism, supreme phase of capitalism, Assay Popular”. Max Weber, already in 1918, he had understood as “socialism” is equivalent to a “dictatorship of bureaucracy” (24). After all, Marx himself had well understood the mode of the evolution of the statual society and he knew that at what we called the merchant phase would follow soon a new feudal phase, also for the crunches increasingly evident of the capitalist system, and for the effects of the devastating cyclical crises, tht are repeated, alternating two different types of crisis, but in a way that is ever more disruptive.

Claude Levi Strauss which, also, had conceived: the historic structures, as a simple methodological concept or survey instrument of social relations, had distinguished between “orders lived” and “orders theorized” (25), where, with the firsts, he wanted denote the individual elements of the social structure and of the objective reality, and for the seconds he wanted to indicate the images created from myths, by religions and by the political ideologies. Stated that the “Orders theorized” are determined directly by the “Orders lived”, and constitute, with this latters, a “ordered totality” (namely: a social system). In other words, you are referring to the distinction between the material base and the ideal projection.

Part IV

Nature of science and of the ideologies

Chapter 16:

Definition of the various types of science

The difference between ideology and science, essentially, consists in the verifiability or falsifiability, of the latter. The language of science consists in to do precede the indication of the possibility of realizing a the test or demonstration at the enunciation same. Without the possibility to realize a proof there is not, in fact, scientific law, nor scientific language. Antonella Del Rosso recalled that “any new theory has no validity, if not is confirmed by an experiment (namely, you cannot simply invent an imaginative solution to the mysteries of the Universe without worrying about verified the same) and any experiment must be repeatable (namely, not you can announce some results that no one else is able to reproduce).” (1). These are the principles of science “Galilean”. Then there is the so-called “Science Lysenkoist”, (from the name of an quack, named Trofim Lysenko, agricultural biologist, self-styled “geneticist”, protected by Iosif Stalin) that, on the contrary, is based on the enormity of the enunciated, in order to shield them to every possibility of verifiability, or falsifiability. The verifiability, and the falsifiability, of the assumptions and scientific theories requires that, when you want to formulate a theory or a scientific law, we compare with each theory or ideology, though irrational, even with the awareness of the value of the own theory and of the others irrationality, without prevarication, forcings or foreclosures and prejudices. Popper defined assertions “naturally or physically necessary” (2) “the assertions which can be deduced from a assertive function, which is fulfilled in all worlds that differ from our own, admitted that differ, only with respect to the initial conditions”. He, therefore, in addition to the physical reality, had considered necessary also the natural potentiality, irrespective of the conditions quotas (3). The epistemologists, as Imre Lakatos, say that, both the epistemological conception of demarcation of Popper, or of the falsifiability, (which would be inadequate and unacceptable, as the observations potentially capable of bringing to the falsifiability are of uncertain evaluation themselves. for which the criterion of falsificbility would be quite weak), both the conception of Kuhn of the possibility to derive of the theories from commonly accepted premises, and the support of the brain teaser tradition (the which tradition, both in its first as in the second aspect, in no way distinguishes the science from the pseudo-science and non-science), both the other conceptions of verifiability, which, with respect to the theory of Popper, have the weakness not to seek, in negative, the observations capable of realizing the falsification (while the conception of Popper of the falsifiability as a criterion of scientific validity has the value of allow to recognize the obvious advantage of the theory less generic than the more generic), are inadequate as a criterion of scientificity. The most valid criterion of demarcation seems to be the controllability and the control, where the controllability is the ability to control, by all means made available by the “background knowledge” or contemporary, suitability or adequacy of the proposal analysis, at a given theory, with the reality that the same theory it aims to analyze or who has a real object (which may differ from the one shown) and a sufficient (according to the expectations of the time) correspondence between the theory and the reality (and the its causalities), as can be observed, according to general knowledge (as set of observations enunciated and not real observations) (4) (provided by all sciences) of that specific moment in time. You will therefore have: an scientific validity, more or less full of the various theories, the which scientific validity will be tied to the historical and scientific time under way (since the propositions of observation are not, in itself, certainly true) and not absolute, since it can be graded by the full scientific value, at the pseudo-science, at to essence totally a-scientific, remembering that every field of human knowledge (by the magic, at the various ideologies and the religions) is potentially scientific, namely potentially analyzable, or verifiable, with scientific criteria, so you can discover its scientific essence (or at least that the aforementioned verifiability cannot be excluded in advance, because of the character metaphysical or religious or political, place that the alleged non-verifiability of those fields of human knowledge derives mainly from the specific language, often irrational, adopted by these theories). As far as the theory or logic of knowledge, the conception of Kuhn of the refutation through falsification, of some observational sentencies (5), seems to be valid, although the same refutation is not absolute, but relative to the scientific time, where the refutation of the theories essentially takes place with other theories, also disputable (6). According to some epistemologists, diriment characteristic or “discriminating” of science and, consequently, of scientific theories, is their progressivity: where there is progress of knowledge you have science, otherwise no (7). This criterion, rather than as a criterion of demarcation (8) counts as the logic of scientific discovery, in that the progress it can not be taken as a criterion of demarcation, since even the ideologies, which are, by definition, not-scientific, they can have a cognitive content not null. These ideologies, you demonstrate not-scientific, essentially, in so far as they prevent, with the dogmatism inherent in their character or formulation, the cognitive progress. The ideologies, if formulated in an appropriate manner, and purified of the inhuman aspects, may be controllable, although in this way lose their character dogmatic, they may allow the cognitive progress (9). The controllability: is therefore, a criterion of demarcation and logic of scientific discovery (although the latter is based essentially on the cognitive progress, because the control is always uncertain and problematic, since it is connected only to the science of the fund in place at that given time). However, the audit has a own role also in the field of scientific logic, because the progress itself would not be decidibile without control, and in the absence of control, there would be only proliferation of theories, whose scientificity, and progressiveness, become totally random. Emmanuel Lévinas stated that the experience is not the only source of the thought, by deriving, the latter, from knowledge handed down by others, namely, from the knowledge which comes from the experiences of others and from the perception of own essence and of the nature of the humanity. The experience derives from the senses and instincts, which constitute the basis of life itself, as such (10). Some epistemologists recognize as there are not sciences purely deductive, including the mathematics and logic. All sciences support the own status, on empirical observations corroborating, without the which they could not boast a scientific status, but only the status of hypotheses, open to verification (so the geometries not euclidean they have won the “status” of scientific theories, when it was checked the their heuristic value). On the other hand, all sciences originate from empirical suggestions, due to the same very nature of human thought, which cannot arise if not from analog comparisons. So, from inductive suggestions, arise all forms of knowledge, including the most abstract, as the metaphysical theories. In particular, these latter, are born from intuitions or findings on the nature of the humn being. We can distinguish three fields of scientific knowledge: physical, historical – structural and human – social. If the first field it has been achieved, by time, the degree of full scientific approach, in the second field, the scientificity is still quite partial, because the theories academically accredited are to be considered mere assumptions, devoid of the character of a scientific approach, because they do not have the characteristic of the falsifiability, being fouled by the ideologies. The third field, that is to strictly human, is a field that you can define substantially unexplored, because theories in the act are not able to distinguish correctly between the structural reality, human nature and the interaction between the respective natures of these two entities. It is example psychology, which is affected, in its claim to acquire a scientific valence, from the lack of analysis of the psychic nature of the human being, of the nature of the structural reality and of the interaction between the one and the other.

Karl R. Popper he had distinguished, correctly, the human knowledge by the reality historical structural. He considered the structural reality: accidental and arbitrary (11). Defined the knowledge: 3° world, while the structural reality historical would be the 2° world (12). The “scientists”, in the course of their research, they are compared with the contradiction between human nature and the structural reality and, finding himself in the need to choose the latter for the absence, albeit quota, an alternative concretely realizable, they are faced with the need to combine (at least theoretically) human nature with the structural reality historical. This operation succeeds only if it leads the analysis at a level of abstraction such as to allow the acceptance of the absurd as an element of the truth. You create, so, such a theory in which the contradiction, from external becomes internal and accepted, as sublimated in an analysis completely abstract. The emergence of a true science of structural reality historical and of the human nature, will determine the conditions for circumscribe the absurd, causing a full knowledge of it and making it harmless. The scientific truth is characterized by its be cumulative, open to every comparison and challenge. The social sciences and the human sciences (when they will have reached the status of science) will be the heritage of every individual. The current situation of the knowledge of reality structural, on the contrary, is two-sided: an truth ideological, dominant or only, on the one hand, preached by the “intellighentia”, namely by the priests of the dominant ideology; on the other the “truth” practice, lived in the palaces of power and corriponding in the immutable art of management of the power or of the skill said “cunning”. The art of power is acceptable, if the person who manages the power is able to perceive the spirit of time and its evolution in the act, which is often in disagreement with the desire of the majority of the people, which people, often only of aftermath, surrenders to the spirit of the time, of which is always: unaware or unconscious. The rulers who shall take account of the spirit of their time and the authentic good of their nation, deserve the title of statesmen, while those that are solely concerned with the will of the majority are only some politocians.

Popper had stated that there is only certainty of incorrectness of the theories, while of the truth can exist only be doubt (13). The only truth that the human being knows it is the fruit of science, because the scientific method, which constitutes the very essence of the science itself, is the heuristic method that allows to approach, in more or less constant progression, to the knowledge of the real. The science, for its intrinsic rationality, is much more responding, and in keeping with the human nature, with latter, while presenting elements of irrationality is, in itself, rational or tending to rationality, and is the measure same of rationality. To those who possess scientific spirit and acts in accordance with the scientific principle, the doubt remains in every field of knowledge. In fact, the science, does not cancel never of all doubt, even on scientific laws more consolidated, as can always emerge new knowledge, in contradiction, at least partially, with the scientific law established.

Peter Laslett had stated that: who exposes a given theoretical system, with the refutation of a system of others, he has exposed, in advance, the own theoretical bases (14). G. of Ockam had derived the knowledge abstractive from intuitive knowledge or experiential (15). Ockam took the view that the intellect (or the ratiocination) also intervenes in the intuitive knowledge, collaterally within the meaning. The scientific method, which captures the essence of science itself, is to highlight the foundations of every scientific assumed, be it: hypothesis, theory or scientific law. The falsification, if any, of these foundations, would involve the same falsification of the assumption. The verifications of these assumptions and their “discussion”, or revocation in doubt, is always open, and highly desirable, for the scientific method. Popper did derived the inventive, that he considered the main source of the knowledge, from the biological evolution, which would result, precisely, in the capacity with inventiveness and cognitive (16); he revalued, in this way, the deductive method, believing that human nature, being the very essence of the universal, can be the source of the rationality, of knowledge and, therefore, of science. He neglected the cognitive source, deriving from the experience and the storage of the same. Popper had believed that the theories or scientific hypotheses, precede and guide the observation, and not the contrary (17). This concept has its validity, even if it cannot be an excuse to exclude any validity to the inductive process. The of Popper epistemology, if it does not contain the principle of falsification, would be a pure return to the “irrationalism” and at to the anti-scientific approach, of deductive method (typically feudal). The falsification is not an expression of the deductive logic, as he had claimed Popper (18), but the method deductive-inductive, on the basis of which are formulated the hypothesis, and uses mainly the induction, as verification or falsification. The critical against the inductivism of Popper, has validity, in that as it is directed to the criterion of the verification, which has major limitations with respect to the principle of falsification. Popper had placed the probability calculation in contrast to the corroboration (19). The who is criticized by his detractors, since the calculation of probabilities is, itself, a corroboration. The fallibility of scientific theories does not demonstrate how knowledge cannot derive from the experience, as had considered Popper (20), but simply that the experience is, stilland always, limited and imperfect. The regularity is, indisputably, natural and, then, “antecedent”, as had affirmed Kant (21) and had recognized the same Popper (22). He ended up to realize, implicitly, as his theory against the inductivism is nonscientific because “undamaged” from criticism and confutations (23). Alfred Tarski had considered as a proposition absolutist of the truth, the assertion that a proposition is true if and only if, it corresponds to the facts (24). The scientific truth, in fact, although it must correspond to reality, it must indicate the limits within which it is valid, or corresponding to which of many reality, is the specific one proposition. The “formal logic”, exposed by Popper, highlights how in all logic there is a measure, greater or lesser, of scientificity, or adherence, to a given reality (25). Popper had admitted as the ultimate end, is: the search for truth. He proposed, as reality intermediate, the search for the “verisimilitude” (26). Tarski had proposed the construction of a “formalized language” or scientific (27) which is to be realized, while you are using the normal language. The experiential process is essential and constitutive of the construction of knowledge, as had recognized the same Popper. He stated that the “3° world” or the world of knowledge, has origin from the human being and is greater than the human individuality, but not its essence (28). Affirming that the activity of the understanding is part of the “3° World”, he implicitly recognized as each critical activity, if scientific, is foreign to the structural reality historic, and feature, instead, of the “world” of knowledge (29) or of the human nature and of its ability to be rational. Roger Bacon and Diltey believed that to understand the whole of a theory you should understand their constituent parts, and to understand these latter it should be clear fully the overall (30). The theoretical together is inseparable from the individual parts and vice versa. To know an ideal system must have of it a vision of the whole: an “situational analysis” (31). Namely, it is necessary to make a prior analysis of the general situation, held in scientific terms. The scientific method is the quintessence of science, as acknowledge some epistemologists (32). The topological theory of the size, created by Peano, demonstrates the relationship bi-unique between qualitative and quantitative differences. The principle of induction completes the basis of the arithmetic, to which it is returned to the whole mathematics (33). The scientific method is a dynamic process and progressive, in time. Often consists of an unconscious process or not fully systematized, nor always rationalised, but capable of advancing knowledge (34). The scientific revolutions generate a new philosophy and a new scientific methodology, the which latters transform the ratios between the various fields of knowledge (35).

The use of “paradigm” was proposed by R. K. Merton, as an explanation of the assumptions of the concepts and fundamental propositions, used. This method had the purpose of avoiding the use, voluntary or less, of concepts and assumptions not declared (36). The functions of the paradigms are essentially: designed to denote the main information of the analysis; analytical, in the sense of clarifying what is logically derivable from what is incorporable; also serve for the theoretical accumulation of the interpretations, in addition to the systematic and comparative tabulation of the concepts and to the coding of the methods for qualitative analysis, in a rigor that approaches to the quantitative analysis (37). Scientists of all branches of knowledge: natural sciences, human and social, feel the need to search, for its own science, the “laws of form”, namely the organization of their field of inquiry. They intuit a certain commonality of forms, between the various sciences. This is confirmed by the various congresses, on this subject, held by philosophers and historians of science. Science consists in a cognitive methodology, or a set of cognitive methodologies which, often, they benefit of the existence of other cognitive methods, not scientific, to increase knowledge. However the method of the “formalisations” pseudo-mathematics and the explanations, has determined a false scientific methodology, which can serve to continue in the masking from “science” of some positions that are, in reality, purely ideological.

Scientific Theories allow a search quiet, with precise benchmarks. The assumptions are the expression of the doubts and of he research itself. The doubt is the generator of scientific knowledge. John B. Bury had stated that every scientific hypothesis, to be such, must be deduced from the known causes, and should be verified, by comparing it with reality (38). Kurt Lewin had stated that in every science it is necessary to develop theories, previously as to data search “that specifying the general with the ability to grasp the concrete of each specific situation” (39). Such theories must be formulated in a way devoid of prejudices, but as a working hypothesis, editable in the comparison with the reality. Aristotle had attributed to Socrates the merit of being the founder of “inductive reasoning” (40), namely of the definition of the essence of a thing, starting from special cases. Plato had referred as Socrates had considered research, namely the way, par excellence, to attain knowledge, as the only valid aspect of life, being knowledge as an purpose of the human being (41). Epicurus had considered research as a means to free the human being from the fear (42).

Plato, on the basis of the theories Socratic, had stated that virtue is unique, and identifies herself with knowledge (43), since the knowledge has for natural object: what is the good. Spinoza had recognized as the knowledge, if inadequate, involves the falsehood (44) and, then, as only the scientific knowledge can identify with the truth (albeit relative). Spinoza identified the scientific knowledge with the purpose of the mind and the guiding principle of morality (45). Immanuel Kant had stated that what is a matter of faith “is only sufficient subjectively and meanwhile is deemed insufficient objectively” (46), while the object of science is “sufficient both subjectively as objectively”. He wanted to say that only what is the object of science is fully valid for the human being and fully moral (47), being fully knowable. He had defined as knowledge “historical” is: that which the subject had acquired without the intervention of the reason. He had defined as rational: the thought processed rationally from the subject (48) itself.

John Robinson Pierce was the first to affirm that the random element, in physics, is regulated by the laws of the case or “statistical probability”, namely that the case is subject to a sort of determinism indirect physical (49). He expounded the main definitions of truth:

- truth: as correspondence to the facts,

- truth: as a coherence with the rest of knowledge,

- truth: as utility or usability pragmatic (50).

The “Quantum Mechanics”, supporter of the universal validity of the laws of probability, was considered by Einstein valid in its entirety, as has been proven experimentally, although inaccurate in its formulation. This, in so far as it is not possible to exclude, completely, randomness nor the determination. Some scientists recognize as quantum mechanics does not contradict the concept of causality nor the teleologia. It involves only the taking into account of the multiplicity of the causes (51). The Principle of uncertainty of Heisenberg does not exclude the deterministic nature of the universe, although there may be different levels of determination, not all being investigated and perhaps some not investigable. The very existence of a cognitive evolution, in the sense cumulative and quantifiable, demonstrates the validity of the deterministic principle. The denial the deterministic principle mean denying the science itself and even the human being, as being who seeks to knowledge, as its fundamental characteristic and its need, not compressible.

Chapter 17:

Science and concepts of causal principle and of purpose

Kant had distinguished clearly between “deduction by concepts” and its “synthetic proposition regardless” (1), which gave scientific validity, at least as position propaedeutic, to scientific theory, as proposition: deriving from the essence more properly natural of the human beings. He stated that “only for the fact that a certain order in the temporal relationship of our representations is necessary, to they is assigned an objective value” (2). Stated, that is, that the alleged inevitability of structural reality, allows to make her assume, generally, of the maximum validity and even of it deify. The contemporary epistemology states that the only inevitable compatible with science is the result consistent with the purposes and the means necessary to achieve the purpose. The aforesaid purposes must not be inconsistent with the general nature and with that of the proposers the same purpose, namely with human nature. The persistence of the aims of the research imply the existence of cosmic purpose and human, consistent, namely, with the nature of the universe and with human nature. The cause and the purpose are generated from the very nature of the cosmos, which evolves under the thrust of determined cases, according to the logic necessary to the achievement of the purpose.

The founders of modern science, namely: Galileo, Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, Newton and Spinoza, they recoiled from the conception of a finality of nature and of the science itself. This conception tap its culmination with Darwin, which envisaged the randomness as locomotive of the evolution of the species. The randomness is, however, the absence of scientificity, by definition. Then, taking this road, the modern science has gone down a blind alley, although initially fruitful, as it has allowed at the scientific methodology of prescind from ideologies and of proceed in a rational way. This conception, bringing, however, toward its logical consequences, denounces itd own limits and its self-contradiction. It follows that: to a sense of purpose of feudal type and ideological, must be replace a finality natural and human, namely rational. If in this way you will achieve a new capacity for scientific progress, it would derive the proof of scientificity of the postulate same, placed a premise.

The search for the purposes, is not other that the deepening of the research of the causes, search the latter, which is inseparable from science itself, because the search of the ways not consists of nothing but try to give answers on the causes, albeit at levels more simples. The folding on the analysis of the ways, made by the Galilean science, is none other than the correct way for the research of the causes which, in their full unfolding, give reason (or reason to exist) of the purpose, since the aim is implicit in the causes. Scientists they realize the importance of the anthropic principle (of which has already been discussed above) and of its link with a new senso of purpose, which would to reconcile with the science, after its suspension, happened between 1600 and 1700. By analyzing the modalities of the occurrence of the phenomena, science has come to the discovery of many causes and many purposes of phenomena or events. It can be assumed that science is now able to deal directly the search for causes and purposes, without the fear of being diverted from the ideologies or by religions. Science can be defined as: the expression of the degree of progress of the manifestation of the being, with respect to the purpose cognitive dictated by cosmic nature, of which humanity is in a position to be conscious, or not. Recent studies on the quantum mechanics demonstrate how the physics is deterministic, although not uniform nor unidirectional. These studies show how also this physics allow, namely, some space at the times and ways of evolution, or multiple trend and responsive to multiple causes and at to a complexity of purposes (3). Some scientific studies speak of “constants of nature”, in which the human being and life, in general, would be inserted and from these subjected, in an inseparable manner. A cosmology has recently reformulated the “principle anthropic”” which implies a finality, inherent in the nature. It recognizes, in fact, as, even minimum variations cosmic, with respect to the constants of nature: would have made life impossible (4).

Some recent cosmological theories have recover the causality and shelved the randomness (5), as fact marginal. The concept of cosmic purpose and human aims, as every other metaphysical concept, must be considered a scientific hypothesis, which can be confirmed or falsified: by comparison with the cosmic reality and human and their respective evolutions. The metaphysics is analysis of the forms and absolute essences. It must be demythologized and considered an gill of the knowledge, object of analysis with the scientific method. The forms and absolute essences, as well as the same mathematical entity, are entities of metaphysical type (definable as spiritual, since it are nothing more than the fruit of thought), having an own heuristic validity. These concrete manifestations give concrete existence to the abstract entity (or give at the value of object of scientific theory) while, regardless from these concrete manifestations, remain pure spiritual construct, devoid of existence, namely pure scientific hypothesis, at least if formulated in an context of falsifiability. Thus, one can speak of a scientific hypothesis, in the cases: of the causative source cosmic or principle, of the cosmic purpose (purpose or the simple arrival point) and the means of evolution, namely, evolutionary praxis of the cosmos itself. The concrete manifestations of such entities, conceived by Plato, are the statements of the scientific theories, such as the “big bang”, for the cosmic principle; the entropy, the implosion, cosmic contraction, its expansion or the cosmic cyclicity, as regards the cosmic purpose. For every living being and, therefore, for every human being, there is, similarly, a principle (or efficient cause: parents and their intention or the ability procreative), a means, or life story, and an purpose: deep instincts and purpose of life. The theologies and philosophies tend to confuse the metaphysical entities with their concrete manifestations. This confusion substantiates the personification of the being, made by religions.

The adleriana psychoanalysis, considered in the psychoanalytical field as a heretic, itself research, not only, the causes of psychic phenomena (already in itself in contrast with the canons of scientific currents, which instead propose to search only the ways in which a given phenomenon occurs), but also the purposes, giving thus value to the objectives, in all fields (6). This reborn finality, appears, however, suggested by ideological motives.

Chapter 18:

Knowledge and human purpose of the self-consciousness and of the consciousness of nature, in general

Radcliffe-Brown stated that there are two concepts, contrasting,of the nature. The first: the naturalistic, connected to science. The second: the spiritualist or mythological, implied in the myth and in the religion, and made their own, often, from philosophical theories (1), and identifiable with the logic of structural reality historic.

Alberto Masani stated that the human being can be defined as the means of nature to achieve self-consciousness. Since this self-consciousness is realized through science, in that only rational form of knowledge, it is evident the necessity of making scientific the knowledge in field social and human. It is, thus, necessary to create a scientific sense of purpose, subtracting it to the theologies and of the their teleologies (2). Religion is distinguished from science: essentially in placing the subject, the object and the purpose of knowledge, outside by the human being. On the contrary, science identifies the subject, the object and the purpose of knowledge: in the human individual. The human science, and in general the knowledge, are not in contrast with the cosmic nature, nor with human nature, nor with the individuals, but are the expression of the conscience of nature itself. The conscience is definable as knowledge based on the feeling or on love for themselves and for others. You can, therefore, say that the fullness of consciousness constitutes the intrinsic purpose of cosmic nature and of the humanity.

Cerniscevski has declared as “the Nature, stifled by reason, by circumstances, by pride, is silent and does not give a voice to the conscience, but still keeping the silent he suffers and undermines the life” (3). He recognized, namely, as: the structural reality smother human nature. Federico Chabod has reported as Friedrich Meinecke had took into account the historical evolution as a continuous “progress” of the “historical consciousness” (4). Beyond the “positivist progressivism” in this statement there may be some truth, when you consider how the endless repetition of the cyclicity of the universe structural statual cannot avoid producing a progressive consciousness of the essence of the structural reality itself.

Francis Bacon had individuated the purpose of scientific progress in improving the existence and alleviate the sufferings, increasing happiness, namely: in contributing to the welfare of the human being. Had recognized as in the historical evolution there are ages favorable at the scientific progress (the Greek, the Roman and the “modern”), while had identified in the “age of contemplation” or of the “doctrinal science”: a period of decline of science (5). He noted how, with the seventeenth century, is born a new period, particularly fruitful for scientific progress (there was, in fact, the phase mercantile consolidated and, in particular, in the period of transition to the capitalist system competitive); there was, in fact, the birth of: scientific associations, academies and astronomical observatories. The Cartesianism, in addition to defend, as positive axioms, the “supremacy of reason” (namely of reason) and the invariability of the natural laws, had proposed an analytical method, valid in any scientific field (6). The spring that pushes the “Scientists” and the researchers can be defined: rational faith. This, since it is based on the hope of acquiring the knowledge. It is based on the belief of the the existence of a complete truth and on its reachability by humans. This conception is not based on empirical evidence, but on a theory of man that excludes the contradictions, which they are, however, implicits in the theories that deny at to the human being, the reachability of completeness of itself, namely the satisfaction of all its needs. This is the premise of a coherent epistemology with a conception of the human being not self-contradictory, and not inconsistent with the possibility of to realize themselves (in the sense of the achievement the full manifestation of the essence) of the same human being.  

The esotericism is a metaphysics based on the assumption of danger, for the truth itself, that certain truths from falling into the hands of people unworthy (“not given the pearls to pigs”). In reality, the esoteric cosmology is not, in itself, dangerous, nor for the persistence of the structural reality, nor for humanity, but is based on the assumption that the researchers of the truth can attain some knowledge that could undermine the existence of the reality structural historic, since there are not, still, valid alternative theories, capable of allowing to overcome the same structural reality historic. From this concept was born the exclusivism and sectarianism of the esoteric. Science, by its very nature, must be known by all, because its universality prevents, in theory, a its misuse. Is part of the scientific spirit, the generalization of the same scientific knowledge. Without the universal diffusion, the same scientific knowledge it would be devalued, as science, losing part of its heuristic value. Conversely, all the religious mythology has, also, the function of esoteric knowledge or knowledge reserved for researchers. This methodology of knowledge acquisition of the condition and of human destiny, remains a backlight knowledge and partial, not having reached (and not being able to reach) the heuristic degree: of science of the society and of human nature.

The philosophy is part of the culture of a given society, being at the base of the specific ideologies of that society. It can become a science of man and of his social life: if you wriggles by the conditioning of the historical structures in act or in progress. Luigi Pareyson stated that there are several “personality” of philosophy (each corresponding to one of the two phases statual), and stated that these “personality” have need to be incurred even at the cost of life, by those who recognize himself in them. He had stated, however, that a such an attitude, while it is necessary at the philosophy, it is useless for the science (7). This shows the a-scientificity of philosophy, as recognized the same Pareyson. In fact, science, does not require the sacrifice of his supporters to demonstrate its validity. The sacrifice of the supporters of science is justifiable, and valuable, as a personal choice and as a way of life.

Chapter 19:

: in the reality structural historical and for the overcoming this reality

The scientism was defined: a utopian ideology in so far as it sought, among other things, to “make rational” the political and social reality, applying them the scientific methodology (as it was imagined during that time). This ideology had considered the rational essence, with respect to the human nature, of structural reality historic. It was based on the absence of knowledge and awareness of the essence of the social reality in act. Roberto Sabatino Lopez stated, instead, that the scientism was not only a religion of science, but above all a conception of science according to which it would be possible to adopt the scientific method for every aspect of knowledge of reality (1). The latter meaning of scientism, is worthy of being preserved and enhanced, although the historian scientism has qualified for the misconceptions of the historical reality, described above .

Piotr Kropotkin stated that “the Romantic” have proclaimed the “failure of science” (2) since it had not had successful (yet) to resolve the human and social problem. Essential task of science is, therefore, that of solve the problem the social and the problem human. Michel Foucoult has had intuitions on the possibility of overcoming the structural reality of history.

There is a connection between cognitive level, achieved thanks to the development of the sciences, and the possibility of overcoming the structural reality historic, confirming that there is a social progress or of the human sociality, next to the structural evolution historical (3). The current level of technical and scientific development amplifies the conscience of the inadequacy of the reality structural statual for human beings. Then, sets the conditions for its overcoming. The “Scientists”, recognize, in agreement, the hiatus between cognitive level in the field of physics and level of the knowledge in the field of social and human sciences as well as between the development technical-scientific, and the social reality. In the latter field there is, still, irresponsibility and unpredictability. The club of Rome of Aurelio Peccei had recognized, in the eighties, the need for a “leap of quality”, namely accomplish a “new human revolution” that makes the human beings able to be responsible for their own destiny (4). Some thinkers recognize as the level reached by the natural sciences involve, for the society structural historical, a stress which express the requirement of his overcoming, since it requires “advanced forms of democracy” (5). If science, in its progress, proposes gradual approximations to the truth, in a constant movement of approximation thereto, there is a stadium, in which the scientific knowledge allows to have a sufficient knowledge of the human condition, such as to put humanity able to mutate the same human condition, according to own needs and desires. The scientific knowledge of reality historical structural will determine the possibility of overcoming this reality, with the creation of a social reality actually consonant with human nature. The science is accused of chasing the Faustian myth of the creation of the new man. In fact, the new man exists at least by when there are conceptions teleological, acquired by the religions, which denounce the dissatisfaction of the human being to the conditions in which it is located. Science, indeed, it is able, only, transform the teleological myth of religions in reality, which is to allow the satisfaction of a need, at long heard, and the satisfaction of which is ever more urgent and whose failure to meet, by now, puts in danger the same survival of the our species.

Norberto Bobbio stated that science and its development are: fundamental rationality, namely “enlightenment irreversible” (6). The science, in its development, tends to reduce the area of irrational knowledge, extending, at the same time, the area of the rational knowledge. This is what happened in the field of medicine, of the astronomy and of the physics. So can occur in the field of social and human sciences.

The human knowledge, that is expressed, mainly, in the whole of science, is not only the instrument of the achievement of human purposes, but is element of those purposes, being (the knowledge) a constitutive element of happiness. When this body of knowledge is threatened in its survival, both locally that in a general sense, deserves to be defended, not so much for itself because, corresponding to the purpose of humanity, will survive anyway, until will survive the species, but because its own patrimony of every individual, of which constitutes the foundation of own expression of being.

The need for absolute truth (which is expressed in science) is antithetical to the absolutization of knowledge (which is expressed in religions), according to the distinction that runs between the scientific spirit and the religious spirit.

Bruno Rizzi foresaw as the institutions own of the universe structural statual, at least in its merchant steps, they are not opposed to scientific progress in the field of mathematical and naturalistic, while in the social field, or structural, the opposition to a real progress is clear in every historical phase, albeit with a control perhaps less suffocating, where there are types of government more democratic (7). If the sciences mathematical-physical had reached soon the scientificity, because of to be stranger of their object from structural reality, on the contrary, the humanities and social sciences, since they have a more direct relationship with the structural reality, in which he lives the researcher, need to work hard to reach a degree of scientificity worthy of this name. In their turn the human sciences can be split into two separate fields, depending on their object: from one side the sciences directly related to structural reality and to the knowledge of this reality; on the other hand the humanities real, intended as the sciences of the human being, as such: philosophy, psychology and the neurosciences. The firsts cannot achieve a degree of scientificity acceptable: if those who study has interests connected, in some way, with the structural reality, both of that contemporary, than of what is about to be realized or realizable in perspective. The seconds, which in its intentions and declarations of those who study them, should possess only a scientific approach with respect to the human being “natural”, are in fact the most affected by structural determination, because the statual culture, in act or dominant, has great interest to become an instrument of continuity, and obtains its purpose, replacing the object declared with the real object: where, the latter, is the essence of man structural or historical, distinct and distant from the natural human being. In this way the reality structural statual becomes the real object of these sciences, or the criterion of their scientificity (of the this is example the philosophy, which constitutes the basis of the dominant culture of a given statual system, while it should be the study scientific of the human essence and of its sociality). The interference of the structural culture with the physical-mathematical sciences it occurred, especially, when it was aimed at the achievement of the knowledge of the how, through the knowledge of why. Now, if, the prevailing scientific method, in the search of the knowledge, will become the search of why, through knowledge of how, since the interference of structural culture it has faded, although once again, threaten to become heavy, when the science moves closer to the goal of responding to a few because, threatening to subvert the religious culture, or irrational, wich it is specific of the structures statual. The so-called “human sciences” are impregnated with ideologies, if they are not themselves mere ideologies. This is, because these pseudo-sciences are functional to the conservation of the statual structure that a given phase, while they can be quite laughable, or absurd, in the other statual phase.

In the reality structural historical there is a barrier against the knowability, definable as: barrier to preserve the unknowability, in the field of human and social knowledge. In fact, at to the human and social sciences is not allowed to grow beyond a certain limit. Only with the demolition of the wall of the unknowability of the human and social sciences, humans will fully adhere to the scientific spirit, and this will allow: on the one hand, of achieve the knowledge essential to overcoming the structural reality historic; on the other hand, of encourage every individual at give an autonomous and own, contribution, to the further advancement of knowledge.

Science, entering the field of metaphysics, occupies the space reserved at the religions and at the ideologies, providing the nswers that were previously reserved at the latters. In this way the science you would instrument of the achievement of beatitude, as prided themselves on being the religions and ideologies.

Unlike of the religions and of the ideologies, science does not provide answers that knows no and its statements (hypothesis, theories and scientific laws) are always verifiable. It is not exclusive, because his answers are always questionable and it is always possible to doubt of them, and precisely in such uncertainties, is its strength, and the means for progressing. While for religions and ideologies, the knowledge provided is always in function of its own success and consolidation, knowledge provided by science she puts herself constantly in this debate and, for this, progresses and increases the authentic human knowledge. If the priests of all religions and ideologies, are definable as prostitutes of the Spirit, the “Scientists” are the gravediggers of existing science and perform their function by creating new knowledge, namely a new spirit. They bury the dead spirit, to feed the new spirit. Are the nurses of the spiritual growth, the which last, is the scale for the attainment of the absolute. The priests of the religions and ideologies subtract vitality and embalm the spirit, for the their own advantage. They are some authentic prostitutes of the Spirit. The science and natural reality are between them in the ratio of subject to object. The science is the knower: the natural reality or cosmic. We can say that science is the daughter of the cosmic nature, since the latter, responding to principles or mechanisms initially unknown to the human being, has enabled the latter to grow in knowledge. Now the science is becoming adult. If happen the obtaining a sufficient knowledge of the reality of the human situation can be said to be pregnant and next to procreate. Daughter of science will be the new reality of the human condition. This new reality, fully responding to the needs of human sociality, will be the daughter of science. The human being, authentic producer of the science, will be the father of the new human reality, the latter, therefore, will be the daughter of the human being.

Science of society is the study of the inevitability, finalized to the realization of what is optional, namely, it will be the result of the willingness authentically human and, therefore, natural. The human will is the quintessence, or substance, of what is optional, achievable through the scientific knowledge of reality social and human.

The control of this reality, on the part of human beings, will be achievable, only, in light of the achievement of the required level of knowledge, and awareness, of the essence of this historical reality and of the ways for fully realize the sociality natural of human beings, without coming into conflict with the full satisfaction of the authentic needs of the individuals. This control will be achieved when you will found the synthesis or convergence of the needs intrinsic, and of the social needs, of individuls, by providing a form of society that allows the satisfaction of both types of needs, since a truly humane society is together the purpose: both of the implementation of full individualization, as of the realization of the full sociality. The individual is generated from the sociality of the same individual, and not by the society, which is always generated, until now unconsciously, by individuals, and reflects the them degree of knowledge and conscience. The creation of economic science and, in general, of the sciences of structural reality, which allow to give account of the evolution of the same reality structural statual, will serve as a de-legitimization, moral and legal, of the same reality. The result will be the gradual disintegration of the societies statual. We must, then, that at the constitution of the sciences of the reality structural statual, immediately follow the creation of the science of the human being and of his sociality, in order to create an ideal alternative, before that effective, to society in act. The social scientists, they will become midwives of a new social reality, with the absence of structures.

The science of social reality and human is definable as: the authentic interpretation of reality, which delimits and cancel the arbitrary interpretations or illegitimate, as affirmed by Umberto Eco in the work: “The limits of interpretation” (8). It appears necessary to create a new definition of science or new epistemological paradigm, especially for the field of social and human sciences. The current scientific theories, regardless of the degree of their formalization (generally considered index of scientificity) often, are nothing more than justifications, more or less fanciful, of reality structural ongoing. Science can be defined knowledge: the nature or aspects of reality, susceptible to introduce modifications in the manifestations of nature or of that same reality analyzed. It is definable, in this way, scientific law, that theory, sufficiently proven, that allows the creation of a technique capable of modifying some manifestations of reality, object of the same scientific inquiry. Thus, as the physical laws make it possible, to modify the manifestations of the physical entities studied: the optical allows you to create light rays of very different between them, physics allows you to modify the manifestations of the individual atoms and of create new of ones, the astronomy, allowing new visions of the stars, allows you to create a new cosmology, namely to change the manifestation of the human being in the cosmos; similarly, the scientific laws relating to the human sciences and social will modify the manifestation of the human being and the essence of his society. Scientific Theories will allow a different perception of the human being and of society, but they will assume the status of scientific law only where will actually to allow the birth of techniques capable of modifying the manifestation of the human being and the essence of his society; the which society will be able to make possible the full manifestation of his sociality. The verification of scientific hypotheses, through the observation of the occurrence of forecasts, deduced from the scientific hypotheses formulated, it will allow the their definition as: scientific theories, which could be called scientific laws if will result in techniques that use those scientific theories, to modify the manifestation of human beings in the cosmos.

Morgan, while he was theorizing a fundamental influence of scientific and technical progress on the historical evolution, however had recognized as “the inventions and the discoveries” are between them in a progressive report, while institutions “they develop themselves one on another”, namely, they not constitute a real progress since, he said, they are all gradually developed from a few primary germs “of thought”, having some components in common. They respond, namely, to a single logic and evolve with its own logic, extraneous to the willingness, to conscience and to the real human progress. The ideologies and structural culture aim at to suggest the science as a direct fruits of the structures, species of the structures statual. In reality, the science progresses in an autonomous manner, with respect to the structural evolution. The science and knowledge in general, precede the structural evolution. Science, the only positive fact generated by human evolution, is outside by the structural reality, while being conditioned, in its progress, from the structural evolution.

Ralph Linton had recognized that “the technology”, and the rest of culture (9), are not rigidly interconnected and itself modify in a virtually autonomous way. You can consider culture as the ideal projection or complex of ideality of the historical structures. You may also say that science is not part of the culture, being a cognitive world stand-alone (10). Karl R. Popper stated that criticism is permitted only there where there is an real detachment between culture and the knowledge (11). Then: scientific progress you can have only where knowledge is not confused with the dominant ideology, which happens, essentially, in the feudal phases.

Roger Bacon had recognized that the logic of structural reality intervenes in scientific research, since it interacts with the ratiocination and the experience. Had recognized as the philosophy is fully subject to structural logic (12). The science is conditioned by the prevailing ideologies of a given historical period. The “Scientists” hardly manage to free themselves from the prevailing ideologies in their historical era and, therefore, they remain conditioned, by distorting so, in a more or less marked extent, research. Scientific progress is, thereby, severely affected by the evolution of the universe structural statual.

In the feudal phases of the universe structural statual, the science is, almost completely, blocked by the dominant ideology and, indeed, in the moment of maximum closure, science regresses in many sectors, while, in the time of the transition to phase feudal, the science develops itself in the field of the war or in areas that promise to enable an increase in the power of the dominant caste. In the merchant phases research develops mainly in sectors which guarantee a greater profit (and therefore a greater economic development). Thus: in the early 40s of the twentieth century there was a strong boost to research in the field of atomic physics, connected to the development of the atomic bomb, in the latter part of the 40s and in the 50s there had been, instead, a strong impetus to the development of science, of the technique and technology, which allowed the strong productive development “of the postwar”, in the sixties was the race for the conquest of space, connected to the purposes of war and/or strategic prestige, in the seventies it tended to give impetus to the search for new sources of energy, in connection with the “oil crisis”: this as an basic stimulus, although science tends to be left relatively free in the merchant phases, at least, if it does not clash openly with the ethical paradigms imposed by religious ideologies. Thus, for example, in the years zero of the XXI century there was a tendency to curb or impede strongly the research in the field of embryonic stem cells, and this for the influence of faith “Christian”, and of the what “catholic”, in particular. The science is conditioned, in its progress and in the choice of the direction in which to develop itself, as a matter of priority, by the evolutionary moment, in act. of the universe structural statual.

The technique can interact with the organization of work, although it is mainly the social system in place at influence, primarily, on the organization of work. Bloch had recognized as is not the technical development that determines the social changes, but how are these latter to act on the development of technical-scientific, which, in turn, can co-determine the social mutations such as, for example, it happened with the overcoming of slavery (13).

Eric Hobsbawn spoke of “technological revolution” for to point out the evolution technical-productive that occurred from 1950 to the 1980s (14). He stated that the “sexual revolution” of the sixties and seventies has been favored by the “technological revolution”. This is certainly true if you think, for example, at to the progress made in the field of chemical and biological (15).

J. J. Rousseau had recognized the influence of social structures, over the type of activity carried out and on the scientific development, avoiding of putting the two facts, in mechanical relationship between of them (16). Eugenio Garin foresaw as there was a link between “the revolutions: mercantile, scientific and industrial” (17) of the XVII century. In the seventeenth century she occurred, in fact, the transition to the capitalist system competitive, favored by the scientific revolution in act, which determined, in turn, the industrial revolution. With the consolidation of the capitalist system competitive was realized, in fact, the full resurgence of “rationalism”, favoring, fully, the scientific development. If it is incorrect the position of the anthropology and of the other “sciences” social, in classify the societies depending on the type of existing production (and this is demonstrated by the fact that coexist, in a given type of society, productions that they are, among themselves, quite different), such as the breeding nomadic and agriculture sedentary at the Kyrgyz Republic; however, dates forms of production, they favor, or induce, the development of data levels of socio-cultural integration (or structural universes historical), or of certain social systems. Thus, the industry has allowed the development of the capitalist systems, rather than of the slavery systems, while agriculture is more in keeping with the slavery systems and the feudal serfdom (18). Maurice Godelier, citing the anthropological problem raised by the “Formalists”, about the level of “cheapness” of economic action in the societies pre-statual and in the phases feudal, had recognized as the proper values of the structures pre-statual they inhibit the constant flow of the innovations and, therefore, they tend to limit the technical development – productive, reachable in these forms of society. This phenomenon is also present in the feudal phases, as well as in the societies that they live in a mercantile phase, but with elements or tendencies toward a feudal stage, or are in the transition between the two phases statual (19). The historians academics testify of a certain scientific progress, which would have occurred during the persistence of a feudal phase, in particular where there is the centralized variant of the aforementioned feudal phase. In the feudal phases the scientific progress is manifested essentially in the field of agriculture and of military technology, while in other fields there is, at most, the preservation of scientific knowledge previously acquired (20). In the feudal systems centralized, or partially centralized, of the “Arab empire” and “Byzantine Empire”, the science is regressed, but there have been some advances in science, operated by the Arabs, and such progress, has been made known to the West, in the course of the XII century (21). In the Empire “Byzantine”, of the X century, there he devoted himself to conservation and transmission of science and knowledge (22). This is a feature, in fact, of the feudal phases centralized or partially centralized. All scientific discoveries anterior to the IX century were, however, only used when he began the transition to phase mercantile (23). Ernst Bloch showed, talking about the case of the water-mill, as with the feudal phase “medieval” there has been a stasis technological-scientific.There was, in fact, the lack of generalization of water-mill until the XII century (24). At demonstration of the, frequent clear, regression (25) that occurs, especially in the use of the technique, in feudal phases, it notes the return of water-mill with horizontal blades. In the“U.R.S.S.” of the seventies, there was an incipient economic decadence, not only in relation to the West, where it was in act the mercantile phase, but also in relation to the previous situation of the Russia itself “czarist”. This decline was highlighted by the non-operation of the fundamental services, especially health sectors (26), with progressive forfeiture of medical therapies, also with the methodological progress scientific, induced by the West (27). The stay in hospital was now only a symptom of willingness to total control on the individual and not the provision of intensive care (28). The technology of the mini and micro – computer, which was developed, in the West, since the eighties of the twentieth century, allowing access to the archives of private and public data, before the emergence of “internet”, has determined the crisis and he paved the way for the transition from the feudal phase to the phase mercantile of the historical cycle “post-modern”, in the Eastern Europe. In fact, the countries who were in the neo-feudal phase, have rushed to prohibit the new technology in development, prohibition that delayed slightly the “social revolution”, that broke out, however, at the end of the eighties. The industrial revolution and technological of the 80s, was not the direct cause of the revolutions in the sense mercantile, of the period 1989 – 1993. In fact, the effects productive of the technological revolution is witnessed in the West, only at the end of the eighties, and in the Eastern Europe, who was in a feudal stage, the practical effect of the technological revolution there was not still in 1993. Eric Hobsbawm had recognized, in fact, as the society “Soviet” had inhibited the “technological revolution” and industrial (29).

Morgan had recognized as ways of subsistence, namely, the types and forms of human activity will be developed through a technique, only indirectly connected with “inventions and the discoveries”, namely, with the development of technical-scientific truly appropriate (30).

The historians academics have established a relationship between technical development-cognitive and historical evolution, and this, in the erroneous conviction of an identity between scientific-technical progress and historical evolution. Thus, they speak of: “Stone Age”, “age of bronze” and “age of the iron”, to describe the first moments of the history of the structural reality (Pre- and Early History). They distinguished in : "Evo ancient", "Middle Ages", "modern age" and "contemporary age" (and, for some, the “post-modern age”), to indicate the various moments of the evolution of the literal history, namely, the various moments, in time, of what we have defined as: the universe structural statual. This periodization, both for the history of the universes structural pre-statual (not identifiable with the “Age pre-literal”), both for the history of the universe structural statual (much more extended, temporally, of what they consider the historians academics) is totally erroneous and misleading.

Marx was aware of the fact that, with the end of the Roman Empire, there has been a decline or involution technical-scientific. This fact, cannot be reconciled with the vision of the history that he wanted to accredit, namely the vision of a continuous progress, and therefore, with the inseparable relationship, that he wanted to accredit, between scientific-technical progress and historical progress (31). Marx and Engels were forced to theorising, entirely instrumentally, as the “Disappearance of a people from trade” makes inevitable the “disappearance” of scientific and technical progress, where it had been previously reached; being well aware the consequences of the feudal phases on scientific and technical progress, although, so of all instrumental, they have held responsible of a such an event, the wars and the raids “of peoples barbarians” (32).

The theory “Marxist”, according to which: the concentration of industries is dependent on the degree of technical and scientific developments, is rebutted by the same conclusions of Marx and Engels, of the trends toward concentration, which occurred already at the time of the guilds, that are the features of the systems of the Lordships and systems bourgeois, concentrations that have occurred “despite the regulations of the guilds”.

Marx and Engels wondered, perplexed, how it can be possible to a new feudal phase, in the “modern age”, given the dimensions in the world market. The answer was, clearly, in mind of “Lenin”, since he knew well “What to do”, about this (and the “Gulags”, he founded, are a glaring example). By imposing such inhuman, forcings, he was able, in fact, to create a new feudal phase, which it was consolidated in a real centralized feudal system.

Morgan had stated that the progression of human knowledges takes place, generally, in geometric shape. In fact, every single advancement of knowledge becomes, in turn, an essential factor of further acquisitions of knowledges. It follows that while progress was slower at the beginning, it grew up its speed to the passing of time, while the relative importance of the primitive acquisitions, or more ancients, is, proportionally, greater than the subsequent ones.

Walt W. Rostow had stressed the distinction between discovery and innovation (33), where: the first is the work of the “Scientists” and the second for applies this discovery, in order to change the conditions of the market. J. A. Shumpeter showed as the second it is bound to prevail, where is a greater development. Shaun Usher had highlighted as well as the inventive activity requires development conditions, and results in the same development, in turn (34) and, therefore, the invention is not foreign to entrepreneurial activity, and not completely separable way from this. This reappointment as the inventions, the discoveries and the scientific progress, are related to merchant phases. Kindleberger, in fact, showed how the “state intervention in the economy” does not create, nor can create, entrepreneurial capacities (35), determining factor of an actual growth in production or an development. The entrepreneurial ability is the fruit of the resourcefulness and of the freedom of initiative, feature of the merchant phases, maximized in capitalist systems competitive and in their inherent “laissez-faire”. Shaun Usher had distinguished between primary inventions (namely: not addressed directly to the commercial application), those secondaries (those that are open to the application) and those tertiary (those applied to specific sectors) (36).

Some economists say that new products tend to essentially increase demand (37). In reality there are two possible types of new products: those aimed at increasing demand, responding better to the satisfaction of the needs, and those aimed at improving qualitatively and quantitatively the domain of the dominant section of society. Therefore, the most important distinction is not between technologies to create new goods or to produce, in a new way, goods already tested, but between technology that fits in the best way to meet the general needs of the individuals (either by changing how to produce, that creating new goods) and technologies aimed at increasing the dominance of the dominant section of the society, of which they are an example both the technology of the pyramids and like that military.

The science tends to make “scientific”, or rational, making rational the report of production, and in the attempt to inherent exceed the irrationality inherent in work, in an attempt to allow to exceed the same job, considered as irrational occupation of the human being.

The ideologies religious and political, as the “Christianity” and the “Marxism”, recognize that a given social reality can become surmontable: namely, when it has ceased to give its fruits. The statual structural reality, in fact, becomes surmountable, when there is awareness of its essence and of the evolutionary dynamics and if you perceive his limits: in order to the satisfaction of human needs. Human progress is determined by the completeness and the mode of satisfaction of needs. If you find a type of society that meets most human needs, realizes a genuine progress, conscious and voluntary.

Some philosophers, such as Ludwig Wittgenstein, rhave ecognizing how the language reflects the historical culture, namely the culture of structural reality, they say that there exists the need to create a stranger language to the schemes of structural cultures. Say there is a big gap between real and possible, as the gap between the history of structural reality and the normal society, or consonant, at the nature of human beings. It can be said that the language is part of the science (or its instrument) and, at the same time, part of culture, namely of the structural reality historic (38). Popper had reported as the “Stoic philosophers” were likely to consider the language as belonging to all three worlds: the physical world (physical actions and symbolisms), the structural world and subjective (subjective: for the character and behavioral implications), scientific world, or cognitive, (because it contains, or it can enable, the transmission of the information) (39).

Popper had stated as, upper functions of human language are: the descriptive, and the argumentative (40), instead of the communicative and of the expressive. In reality, the faculties: communicative and expressive are present to a lesser extent also in other animal species, and only with the emergence of the Faculty descriptive and moot or critical, the communication, or expression, takes a higher value, and such as to make the human being capable of creating social structures more advanced with respect to the structures that we have in common with species pre-human (as, for example, is more progressed: the universe structural statual).

From a search of two American scholars emerges as both a common place the assertion that the word and the languages spoken are the unique means of communication, or the only possible languages. In fact, emerges as the languages of the deaf are also rich and complexes, as well as completely autonomous by languages spoken. Such languages involve, more intensively, the expressions or emotions visual externals. This confirms how verbal communication is not the only type of communication possible and, then, demonstrates how the language of animals of other species may be sufficiently complete to enable the realisation of structural universes of type pre-statual. This study shows, furthermore, as there is no a direct relationship, or bi-unique, among intellectual development and communicative capacity or richness of language, the latter being connected to the degree of sociality or to the type of society in which he lives the subject (41): pre-structural, structural or post-structural.

Walter Benjamin had predicted the need of overcoming the structural reality statual and had believed it was necessary to create a language capable of achieve a full coincidence “between practice and word” (42). The philosophy of language feels the need of a greater correspondence between: language. terminology and reality. A qualitative leap of social sciences would allow a precise biunique correspondence between word and its meaning, namely the specific aspect of the real that, with the word, you want to allow to understand, namely: shape, quality, causes, effects and the purposes.

Communication through the internet, and the telematics in general, they determine the dawning of a new language, tendentially useful to the development of human communication (43).

In the reality historical structural, the language is used, essentially, for the purpose of conquest or of conservation of the power, namely, of the predominance on third parties, or for realize its own economic pre-eminence.The language is almost never used, exclusively, for realizing a authentic communication, namely, to meet the need of sociality of the individuals. The realization of the equity in the social and economic field will allow you to use the language solely in order to realize the fullness of the satisfaction of the need of sociality of individuals.

Chapter 20:

Essence of ideologies

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, in France, with the term of ideology you wanted to mean the science of ideas, namely the study of thought, conducted according to the methods of Locke and Condillac, namely applying the reasoning to the facts observed, avoiding the deductions regardless. Usually, however, for ideology is meant a system doctrinaire based on dogmas, and that establish the basis of the faith of a people (1). The irrational knowledge, represented by ideologies, shall be accepted for the good of the same ideology, proposal, and for those it proposed the ideology. On the contrary: the rational knowledge or science is accepted, voluntarily, and therefore, solely in the interests of those who accept it. This would be the demonstration, more evident, of its universal value. The fact, of easy ascertainment, according to which the ideologies and religions do not achieve ever the ideals that they propose and they support, pertains to their very essence, for which the achievement of ideal would entail the disappearance of the social organism that has promoted the ideology or religion. This does not happen in the scientific field, where the agent that aims to realize an any scientific purpose is qualified as “scientist” only if fully realizes, or it performs verification, of the hypothesis that proposes and, therefore, instead of being canceled by the achievement of the objective, it is legitimazed by this. In the case of the assumptions made by a researcher, the presence of the gap between reality and theoretical hypothesis, simply demonstrates the absence of scientific of the hypothesis itself. In the field of ideologies, the gap between real and ideal is inevitable and legitimised by the same structure of the ideology and the social organization that promotes the same. For this reason ideologies and religions have placed the attainment of the ideal the further away in time, as much as is possible, in an indeterminate time or indefinitely distant, as for example: the “end of times”.

Bonaventure of Bagnoregio he had put in opposition, clearly, the science and faith, recognizing that the first regards the intellect and the second “the affection” (2).

There is expectation, very widespread among the “scientists”, of to be able to reduce the various sciences: the physics, the chemistry, (and also) psychology, sociology (namely all the social and human sciences together with those physical-mathematical), to a single science. In such a conception there is an ideological concept, namely the so-called “physicalism” (3). However, there is something realistic in this conception, since in all sciences there is a common substrate, as demonstrated by the concept of “emergency” or emergence of a field of facts (for example of the type psychological) from other fields (for example: the physics and the biology) (4). In ideological knowledge there are many elements of invention fantastic irrational. However, fantasy is, for science, a precious instrument for the advancement of scientific knowledge itself. The fantasy, then, starting from being cause of irrationality, may become an instrument of the rationality, namely a knowledge that is truly reliable and consistent with human nature.

Marx had distinguished clearly between: “the way to make the search” and “the way of exposing the its contents based on the category of the same” (5). This, shows how Marx had distinguished between the understanding of the structural reality and the presentation of the same, according to its ideological interest (6). This shows the measure of the cajolery inherent in the “Marxism”.

The Marxist conception was articulated in the analysis of the “class struggle”, as a result direct of the “contradiction” between the “forces production materials” (or that which he identified with the degree of development of technical-scientific) and the “relationships of production”, which he identified in those that we define social relationships, namely the relationships between the various social layers (7). This contradiction he stood within of that he defined the “economic structure”.

Marx had used the conception of the first sociologists of the XIX century, on the alienation in respect of structural reality historic, which is manifested above all in the capitalist systems (for the greater freedom that occurs in these social systems), for theorising the alienation of individuals which, according to him, would be created by the capitalist system competitive, using this alienation presumed, a phony purposes and inclined to feudalism (8).

Marx, in the “Critical to the Gotha Program” (namely in the criticism at the program of the “social democracy” German of the nineteenth century), had criticized the concept according to which you considers the useful work as the possible, only, “in and through the society” and, then, “the useful belongs to the society and at the individual worker it belongs it so much as it is not necessary for maintain the condition of the work, the society”. He observed that “this phrase was always relied upon by samples of the social regime of every time” (9). However he, although he had evoked an reality post-structural, which defined “communism”, he characterized it as a new feudal phase, and consequently had thwarted every potential content of a new social reality, divorced from reality historical structural.

Part V:

The sciences of structural reality historical and their relationship with the ideologies

Chapter 21:

Metaphysic ideologized at base of the ideologies, and metaphysic scientific at basis of the scientific knowledge: of human nature and of structural reality historic

Jacques Niel had defined “mysticism”, the Hegelian philosophy, in that it had the intent to reconcile, in the unit, the finite and the infinite (definable, respectively, as: the structural logic, and rationality or the naturalness specific of humans). Hegel proposed such unit as “reconquest of the human integrity, of the total man” (1). This is, certainly, a form of “mysticism” that connects to the eschatology “Christian”, trying to complete it. Religion (“Christian”, but also one definable as the religion “Hegelian”) says that the original unit of the universe it has split by sin: namely the rationality it has cleaved, and opposed to reality, with the birth of the historical structures. Propose the synthesis between historical structures and rationality, as he did Hegel, equates to propose the unification between “the sinful world” with God: and this is manifestly absurd. Hegel attempted this unification, namely a “conciliation” (2) in the: “History of Philosophy”, with the concept of “historical mediation” (understood as historical transition between different types of societies) and a “mediation logic” (or of reason). This concept has been used by Marx, and it is useful to indicate the mutation between the social systems and between the historical phases statual, but is equivalent to attempt, inhuman, to reconcile the structural reality historical with the rationality of human nature.

Hegel proposed the overcoming of religious dualism (between the ideal and actual), through science, which can ensure the “full realization of man” (3), but the overcoming of the aforesaid dualism occurs, for Hegel, in the “mysticism” of the union (distinct from the identification) of the human being with God. For Hegel, the know absolute, or the wisdom, is the final result of philosophy, because is the wisdom it respond to all the problems to which the philosophy cannot respond. The wise, for Hegel, unlike the philosopher, is optimistic, and model to himself and to others (4). The wisdom will be, however, really this, only if you will be able to identify herself with the science of structural reality and of human nature. According to Hegel, the final goal of the human being is knowledge, which would be implemented gradually through the history, that, for this final outcome, it could be said the history of “freedom”, although, for its essence, is in opposition to the nature (5). The realization of such knowledge would occur through a “revolution”, which allows the “conciliation of man with nature” (6). If the contemporary philosophies, such as the “Marxism” and the “Existentialism”, theories daughters of the Hegelian Philosophy, however, present shortcomings and some unilateral interpretations of the Hegelian Philosophy. The Hegelian philosophy it has yet to be thorough in order to grasp the its real essence (7). Bobbio defined “worldly theology”, the Hegelian philosophy, since, by analysing the nature and structures, with terminologies and content that Bobbio claimed to be characteristic of religions (theory of the purpose of history and of the alienation of the human being with respect to the history). The “theology” Hegelian, however, outlines an immanence of the human being, of nature and history, that no religion can have. We can say that Hegel has demystified religion, freeing the content from the idealizations and from irrational transcendences. The “Hegelianism”, which is a philosophy (that is proposed as the ideology of a given historical phase or historical moment) is ‘contradictory’ (8), in that proposing the appropriation and the fulfilment of history, in that “world” in which he was (although containing elements of a concept meta-historical). In fact, William James acknowledged that the Hegelian dialectic has predicted the overcoming of the structural reality, fact that he had considered currently, unattainable, but “that a day could prove feasible” (9). Norberto Bobbio stated that “all roads of the philosophy after Hegel are locked” (10). This, because every philosophy that limits itself to justify the structures, no longer has credibility. This, indicates that Hegel has come a long way in opposition to the historical structures, and philosophy, to continue to be the handmaid of structural reality, must ignore Hegel. It can be inferred as the times for the overcoming of historical structures are mature, also in the field of history of philosophical thought.

John Locke had used the experience, namely the empirical method, as the basis of the concepts, namely of the knowledge of reality historical structural and as “control instrument of the existential judgments” (11).

In the field of structural sciences and humanities, Bobbio noted “the inconclusiveness of the science” (12) current, and hoped the advent of the “total know”. We can say, therefore, that also on the level of structural sciences and human is felt the need for a qualitative leap, that allows to overcome of the logic of the historical structures.

Emile Durkheim defined sociology as the continuation, of type specialistic, of the philosophy (13). The epistemologists define as metaphysics, the conceptions: on the nature, about man and about history, that come to constitute the core of the “research program”, as stated by Lakatos, or “paradigm”, as stated by Kuhn. While accepting this “Metaphysics” as scientific, or basis of science, they demonize the metaphysics extraneous to their theories “scientific”, defining it as a unscientific, as, the rest, are doing, also, the same philosophers. Since a clear separation between scientific metaphysics and the unscientific, is very difficult, since the set of metaphysics constitutes the core of the current knowledge: on nature, about man and about history, there is an urgent need to create a metaphysics genuinely scientific, or falsifiable, namely controllable and progressive. Its current not controllability, stated Popper, derives mainly from “syntactic reasons” (14), or from “methodological reasons”, as stated by Lakatos. However the current metaphysics is not controllable only for reasons syntactic but, often, also for methodological reasons, and this both in the part “influential”, or connected to the science, as in that autonomous, the which last is never such of the everything, except in the case of items purely ideological or of type demagogic or pertaining to faith. Lakatos stated that exists the possibility to insert elements “uncontrollable” in “research programs”, as “hazels” (15), whose scientific approach would be inherent in a “regulatory issue”, and would, therefore, at be represented, essentially, by progressive capacity. On the part of many intellectuals and philosophers, you says, often, that it is not allowed to assimilate the the science, the content of metaphysics and the human sciences. Francis Bacon had recognized, moreover, that are not the contents of metaphysics at be unscientific, but its methods and its shape.

Sociologists, as Auguste Comte, do not transpose the transcendence of the human nature with respect to the realities of the historical structures, although they comprise the falsity of the religious concept of a being transcendent the nature human same (16). The positivists were aware of the fact that the “sciencessocial they are constrained by the structural reality and by the dominant ideologies and hoped that all the sciences can become truly scientific or “positives”. However, actually, ignoring the extraneousness with respect to the human nature, of reality historical structural, have ignored, at the same time, what should be the foundation of scientificity of social sciences and of the philosophy of the future (17).

In the XVIII century the “reason” was considered, species by “the Enlightenment”, capable of finding (in itself) the solution of the social problem. Such a degree of confidence in the “reason” ended to determine “rationalisms” or transformations in a divinity, of the “reason” itself. Let’s talk about ideologies or of objects of faith, the which objects of faith, when they have become such, are explicit signs of the failure of the confidence, which had been granted regardless, in the “reason”.

In the nineteenth century, the lack of confidence in the ability of the “reason” to allow the solution to the social problem, became commonplace. Emerged the conviction that the maximum capacity of the “reason” were the adapt to structural reality in act, the understanding and encouragement of the evolution. This is the philosophical conception of Marxism. It emerged the conviction that the sign of the maximum “rationality” and the maximum intelligence consisted in the adhere to what seemed to be the inevitable event, namely what proved to be: the advent of a new feudalism. You do not even tried to investigate what was actually the essence of this new society, that was considered and it is proved (at least partially) to have been inevitable, and only in so far was inevitable, can be considered as desirable. In this way, the so-called “intellectuals” and “Thinkers” you are self-defined as “intelligent”, since they hoped in the return of a feudal society, only because it deemed unavoidable. This was the failure of “reason” in the period between the XVIII and XX century.

The “reason” or ratiocination, without an adequate cognitive tool, generates a faith irrational, while with a cognitive instrument adequate, generates awareness of their own potential and capacity, namely: rational consciousness of self or rational faith, being based on tools of the actual human emancipation and means of achieving this end.

The “socialism” was born as a theory of the possibility of resolution of the social problem (namely of the problem of the contrast between individuals and society) and of the social question (namely of the conflict between workers and employers), in the eighteenth century. The “Communism” was born it too in the XVIII century, on the basis of “Platonism” and of the “neo-Platonism”, as a reaction to the consolidation of the capitalist system competitive. The Marxism has melted together the two aforementioned theories, although these were of nature far and opposite. Of nature idealistic, utopian futuristic the “Socialism”, of nature inclined to feudalism the “Communism”. This operation of Marx, since prevailed on the above mentioned two existing conceptions (and in mutual opposition), has finished to kill the substance of the ideal “Socialist”, polluting and upsetting the same. The version “Anarchist” of the “Socialism”, made a synthesis, defined “Anarcho-Communism” from Kropotkin, and has, then, hybridized, it as well: the ideal “Socialist” of tendency “Libertarian”, with the theory “Communist”.

Durkheim, speaking of “Socialism”, it highlighted the multiple characteristics appropriate to the nature of the feudal phases of the structural universe statual (18), although he not recognized him, explicitly, as specific ideology of the feudal phases. He spoke of “Communism ancient”, about the ideologies inclined to feudalism, produced in the “Ancient Age”, as the “Platonism”, while had distinguished them from the “Socialism”, or ideologies inclined to feudalism of “ Era Modern”, since the latters would tend, in a more explicit manner, at provide a phase feudal more centralised, with respect to that which was realized in the “Middle Ages” (19).

Marx had accused Hegel to be a metaphysical and he pretended to associate his theory to the supposed methodology of science “modern”: the inductive method. In fact Hegel, while adopting a metaphysical terminology, undertook an inductive analysis of the real human condition. Marx, on the contrary, undertook an analysis deductive, starting from incorrect assumptions and absurds. From its alleged empiricism had deduced the total immanence of the human being compare to history, eliminating entirely the essence of man and transforming him in the simple tool of the history. Marx accused Hegel of “speculative spirit” (20), namely accused him of being a philosopher, (because he analyzed the human essence), being obviously aware of being only an ideologue. If Hegel stated that the solution of the human drama consists in scientific knowledge, Marx accused him of proposing theoretical solutions to real problems (21). If Hegel is, certainly, open to criticism for not having been able to find outlets valid at his intuitions, the affirmation Marxist is however absurd: is equivalent to affirm that science is useless, because is a theoretical fact and, as such, it would unsuitable to solve the practical problems of the human being. In fact, since the Hegelian analysis invests the human essence, the proposed solutions may not start that from the human being, modify the her way of manifestation, to create, so, the conditions for overcoming the historical structures. Marx, on the contrary, herself reduced at analyze the historical reality, thinking its evolution editable, albeit only in the timing, on the part of human beings, thus falling in contradiction with its conception of human being: simple product of history. In the years 2000, some intellectuals have, finally, realized the scam cognitive, inherent in “Marxism” and in the “Marxism – Leninism”, and on the nature of “Slavery”, namely, of actual servitude inherent in the lagers “Communists” of the twentieth century (22).

Marx, affirming that the machines are the fruit of the mercantile society, should have drawn the consequence that: with the overcoming of the mercantile society, automatically, they are overcome, even, the machines; but since this would have revealed the true essence of the society that he propounded, he was careful, saying, absurdly, which machines do not constitute capital and, thus, they are able survive to the overshoot of the “capitalism”. In reality, the mechanization enters, surely, in crisis with the overcoming of the mercantile phase, given the cognitive decline and, then, scientific, that accompanies it. Another absurdity lies in the affirm that they are means of alienation, and, at the same time, beseech for the survival at the “capitalism”. Marx, in its historical analysis, had adopted scientific methodologies of type “positivistic”, while in its ideological formulations had dismissed the “positivism”, and adopted dogmatism typical of feudalism and, then, in total antithesis with the positive science, and able to oppose and to replace herself to it. If you can, then, say that the “Positivists” they put science to ideological base of the mercantile society, Marx proposed the ideology as the science of new feudal society, and he, starting from the analysis of the methodology proposed by the “Socialist utopians” for the attainment of the “Socialism”, and starting by the stadium of knowledge of historical reality, which was acquired in his epoch, came to the conclusion that the “Socialism” (so as assumed by the “Socialists utopians”), was unfeasible. He had deduced, then, that the “Socialism” it could have be used as an idea-force or theory-desire, which can be used in order to accelerate the spontaneous historical process, in which he saw the only possible form of “human progress”. He saw a progressive valence in the reality historical, since he had analyzed the historical process, as reality inclusive of scientific progress-cognitive, underestimating the cyclical component of human history, that he, however, did not deny. This theoretical confusion of the concepts of historical evolution and of the human progress, had determined a hoax, enlarged from the articulation of an ideology consistent with a new feudal phase, of which he he pleaded: “midwife”. He, thus, became the mandator (moral) of the murder of millions of people, victims or executioners of a faith which created a useless forcing, and totally inhuman, of the cyclical evolution of the structural reality statual. The “Marxism’, believing, or making us believe, of have achieved the scientific knowledge of the historical reality, has identified in the repetition of a new feudal phase of the structural universe statual, the implementation of the latest form possible, and desirable, of society. Beyond the theoretical absurdity of this concept, how much such presumption and intention, were carriers of deception, the historical events of the last part of the twentieth century: it have fully demonstrated.

With the crisis mortal of “Communism”, subsequent to the revolutions political and social of the 1980 – 1993, you can assume that can relive the ideal “Socialist”, perhaps with another definition, title and, especially, with a different theoretical basis, this time: of authentic scientific value. Exists, currently, a movement tending to unify the science and philosophy. This fact shows that we have reached a stage of knowledge which makes impelling the unification of cosmic sciences (or physical-mathematicals) with the human and social sciences. It is, however, necessary avoid both that science not allowing it to be caged from philosophy (as happened in the, previous, phases feudal), nor that science will inhibit, or limits, the philosophy, while extending its method to the latter (23).

Kant had distinct the image, by the “plan”, where the latter is to be understood as “rule”, or general image of an object having dates general characteristics (24), defined as “determinations regardless of the time” (25). These can be the “plans”, characteristic of the universes structural historicals. Kant had stated, that time is, in itself, immobile and permanent, with the change of the phenomena (26). At the tempo, corresponds, in fact, the “substance” or structural reality historic. He stated that the “judgment synthetic”, (contrary to what it is “analytical”) consists in a comparison between two concepts based on a third term, the which last, consists in “a collection, in which they are contained all the our representations, namely the inner sense and its form first, the time” (27). Stated that the “judgement synthetic pure”, for exist, they must refer to the existence and at the possibility and, in this, is based their “objective validity” (28). Thus, he showed to believe superable the structural reality historic, since the latter is only a possibility. Kant had stated that “only in what it is permanent are possible temporal relationships …. namely the permanent is the substrate of the empirical representation of the time the same” (29). In this way, he had demonstrated not a quality of time, in itself, but of the reality structural statual which, in fact, he identified with the “substance”, affirming also the possibility of existence of other “times” (30). The changes are, therefore, regarded as of the “Modus” of the existence of what is “constant and permanent” (31).

Chapter 22:

Philosophy: its transformation, with the scientific method, or persistence of function and of the ideological content

Already Spinoza had recognized as the plurality of ideologies, present in his contemporaneity, where there was a “Open Society” was, also, a symptom of a lack of knowledge of scientific truth (1).

The philosophers are unanimous in believing that the reform of the society (of any kind) must be accompanied by, or be consequent, to a reform of knowledge (essentially as acquisition of scientific methodology, for those who call the society sciences and human sciences) (2).

The philosophy can transformed into science, only identifying himself with the knowledge and awareness of the essence of structural reality and of the nature of human beings. Kant had stated that the human being, reduces, in the own ideological schemes, all reality, including the space and time, schemes which he defined as “the formation of schemes transcendental”. Such projects influence, indirectly, the object of knowledge. Kant had stated that, where a knowledge of the objects will be transformed , in order to be qualified as positive or scientific, there will be a acquisition (of knowledge itself) as reality common “to all in the same way” (3).

Filippo Barbano stated that the “functionalism” has been “extrapolato” (4) by the societies pre-statual, in which is better suited, applying it, inappropriately, to the contemporary societies of the mercantile phase of the structures statual (according the terminology of the our classification), where there is no “integration” between the base material and the ideal projection, but there is an elastic relationship between the two structural domains, such as to give rise to disputes between the same two, at least in certain moments of transition between the two historical phases or the their multiple social systems. He was opposed to the “theoretical functionalism”, because this would deny the historical evolution, but accepted the “functionalism pragmatic”, because this offers the functionality of the various structural moments, in a given historical moment, namely: the evolution would be functional to the needs of society in a given historical moment. In fact, although evolution is undoubtedly instrumental at the current structural reality (that is, essentially, at the universe structural statual), it is not “functional”, certainly, to humans being, who do not voluntarily choose (often: not even a fraction absolutely of minority of them) the new society being formed, nor they are aware of the current change and of its nature.

The “Positivism Comtean” as well as the “Socialism”, they define the “Social sciences” as social facts, namely: theories to the service of the structural reality in act or evolving (5). Sociologists speak, then, of “socialization of science”, also for undertake the attempt of application of processed sociological to economic reality. They, for “socialization of science” mean the creation of a culture based on “rational values” where, however, with this term, means the creation of an ideology based on their sociology (already impregnated, by itself, of ideological elements). Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer have theorized a distinction between “progress in the civilizing” (“Zivilisation”) and the “progress in civilization” (“Kultur”), where with the first concept, they wanted to refer to the historical evolution, while with the second, they wanted to refer to the consider a certain society, that already existed, or in the nascent state, as an ideal of “civilization”. Since, however, the ideologies that they have propounded, have placed a given statual phase as the essence of their ideal of “civilization”, if it deduces that for “Progress in the civilizing” they intended to, in fact, the transition between the phases statual, while for progress in civilization they intended, in reality, the consolidation of a given historical phase, even if this is, in fact, regressive compared to the previous phase statual. Comte had deduced the “positivity” sociological of the social integration (namely: “consensus”), bearing in mind that integration was considered in the sense ahistorical, as natural fact and, therefore, regardless of its systemic valence. In history it is realized, in fact, a continuous integration process, now in favor of a given historical phase, now in favor of the historical phase that comes next, which is opposite to the first. These phenomena of the alternate integration, although elements constituting of the history, not are its own cause. Comte is considered, generally, the founder of sociology, since he has institutionalized and ideologized the his theory of historical evolution, although some detect that the sociology, if understood as a: theory of historical evolution, dates back to the philosophy pre-Socratic (6).

Luigi Pareyson showed as the philosophy to him contemporary, or philosophy of the crisis and in crisis herself, had sought the language with which to express themselves and did of this research, the most evident component of its crisis (7).

The philosophy fits in the various areas of research in the human science and changing itself in methodology of the same research areas (8). In this way, it can be transformed into the science of sciences, which, moreover, constitutes its principal aim.

William James stated that in each individual the acceptance of new concepts is subtended to the need “to assimilate what is new in its experience” (9), pivoting on the “basis of his beliefs”. The pragmatism of James him induced to consider knowledge as: “constitutive and determinant of the same their nature of facts” (10). The knowledge, to which he referred James is, in reality, ideology, which seems to determine the structural reality, in the specific social system to whom the ideology is fits, even though it is, in the fact, a simple ideal projection.

If it is true that the human being, as the whole of nature, in general, is not fully rational, however, the human being yearns at the full rationality and, therefore, there must be the opportunity to exist of a world that achieves this fundamental need, which consists precisely in the demonstrate, at least gradually, an ever more complete rationality. Karl R. Popper, noting how the theory of the correspondence of the theories to the facts, has been traditionally placed in difficulty, showed how philosophers are aware of the ideological content of the mechanism to match the theories to the facts. This awareness led Alfred Tarski to propose, to establish the correspondence of the theories of the facts, the use of a “meta-language”, namely, of a language different from that of the theory itself (11). The contrast that is generated with the structural reality historic, creating a scientific theory of the same reality, must be taken into account, with due precautions. Previously, it is necessary to detach itself from the structural logic, to decide which theories correspond to the real essence of the same reality structural historical. Radhakrishnan had stated that philosophers should be distinct from structural interests or links with the structural reality historical (Both in general both in its manifestation that exist) (12), in order to realize an investigation really scientific, of the same structural reality (13). He ended, however, to locate the emancipation from structural reality in renunciation to the physical needs (14).

Chapter 23:

Definition of the economy such as: the Study of structural reality historic and of its relationship with the material base of this reality (or structural economy)

Economists define “economy” the study “scientific” of the processes of the material referent of reality structural statual of the mercanilet phase, study that is born in the XVII century (1), namely at the time, indicated by us, as of the transition to the capitalist system competitive (2). The economists “classics” (so defined, in that the economic study was born before in England, more advanced in the transition to the capitalist system competitive) have stated that the surplus created with the production is given by the difference between the value of production and the value of the goods and of the labor employed (3). This conception, because it ignores that the value of all goods is determined in the exchange, justifies and creates the preconditions of ideological conception of Marx.

The economists “contemporaries” recognize as the entrepreneurs, with the recruitment of “labor”, they buy the their “production capacity” (4) and not the “force – work”, although, then, they speak of “working energy” (5). They affirm, then, that the coin has, in the productive process “capitalistic”, a different role from that of intermediate goods (or numerary), namely of simple measure of value, being, also, capital (6). Siro Lombardini stated that, priority task of the economist, both research of the consequences of the economic policy of the States, on economic dynamics. Another task, would be to provide certainties at the economic operators, through the forecast of the trend economic (7) (task, not randomly, totally disregarded, up to now). Lombardini stated that the theories of the marginality, at the purpose, of course, of avoid the ideological positions, propose systematic theories, that they are based on a few principles and few concepts (8). Occur, thus, for example, the consideration of economic processes as results of the choices of the operators among the various alternatives in field. The principle, place by the “theoretical of the marginality” at the basis of economic activity, is the search for the maximum satisfaction of the needs of the individual economic operators. They indicate the term “marginal utility” the degree of satisfaction that the consumer obtains from a unitary increment additional of a certain well (9). The “theoretical of the marginality “ say that: distribution of income, is a problem political-social. They had recognized that: income distribution, is a problem political and social (10). The “of the marginality theory” recognizes as not only there exists the market of free competition, but takes into account situations alternatives of market. However, it does not distinguish enough between natural needs and structural needs, namely, modified by structural reality in evolution. According to the “theoretical of the marginality”, the purpose of the economy is the study of the behavior, defined “rational”, in coordination with the Sociology (11). This would allow the formulation of “scientific laws”, from verify statistically, defined “econometrics” (12). Some “theoretical of the marginality” make a clear distinction between the moment descriptive, and regulatory moment, of the economic analysis, where the second is connected with the analysis of economic policy choices, while the descriptive moment is connected with the analysis of the elements of the material referent: the latter is the specific object of the economy. Lombardini recognized an analytical validity to this distinction (13). Economists, instead of considering the economic aspect of the goods used in production, as a productive factor, they take into account, especially, the aspect technical-technological, denying to themselves, thus, the possibility of understand the essence of the relations of production. They define, then, “technology”, the productive activity itself, also called “organic implementation of techniques” (14). In addition to “science” economic, economists define “the Economy” also the “economic system” (15). This is especially true for the Italian, since in English there are two separate terms, for the two different objects. Lombardini showed how economists define “market” “the search of the equilibrium of the potential demands of a given good… to the potential offer of the same good” (16). They, therefore, define as “market”, also, the exchange peculiar of feudal phases, not realizing the differences between the two different relationships of exchange. Economists, as Lombardini, speak of “World economy”, intending to, practically, the existence of a single system, but the concept of the world market is foreign to them, as it is that of the universality of the structural reality statual and of the structural evolution, in general. This is demonstrated by the recent “fashion” of speak of “globalization”, as of a fact emerged very recently and such as to averted or invoked and favored.

Lombardini had defined “system”: the organization that determines the possible ways to operate of the economic subjects (17). For the “physiocrats” the “economic system” was the material referent, that is focused, for them, especially on agriculture. For the economists, in general, the “economic system” is the object of their study, understood in a static way and almost unchangeable. The “physiocrats”, as well as, also, the “classics” (with the exception of Marx), they have considered essential, for the “economic system” the balance between “quantity asked and quantities offered” (18), equilibrium that in phases mercantile is realized through the market, of which the “classics”, in particular, have totally ignored the balancers capacity, stating, even, that even the equilibrium occurs in the production.

Jean-Baptiste Say stated that the expansion of production, automatically, create the adequate incomes to create demand required to absorb all products (19). Thomas Robert Malthus and John Maynard Keynes have affirmed that this theory was not correct or incomplete, because they have noted, or they have predicted (Malthus), the economic crisis arising from consumption. But, they, do not had spotted the causes of these crises by consumption, and not distinguish these, from crisis from production, equally numerous, and that constituting together, a cyclicity of twenty years. The contemporary economists define “macroeconomic balance” that which occur between the supply potential and actual demand (20). The “marginalist theory” recognizes as, with the market, is realized, in the equilibrium achieved on the market itself, for each individual, the maximum utility possible, given the utility reached by the others (21). The vagueness of this proposition allows its becoming true regardless by the forcings and limitations suffered from the market, for how deep they are. Only recently, some economists, recognize the alternation of crisis from the side of the production to the crisis by the side of the consumptions (22).

The “science” economic, in the presence of the structural reality, must analyze an economic reality not balanced, but distorted by the irrationality inherent in reality historical structural, that determines some elements against the inexpensiveness, if not even, a reality in total contrast to the economy. An analysis really scientific of such irrationalities, and of the causes of the such reality contrary to the inexpensiveness, take away legitimacy at the same structural reality and, therefore, for be able to assert itself as science really such, must exist a clear prospect of overcoming the structural reality historical. Science has triumphed, up to now, only in the field of the sciences materials, namely of the inorganic nature and of the organic nature, noting the substantial rationality of the cosmic nature. When the science has dealt the social realities, namely of reality structural organic-stratified, has not been able to achieve the status of scientific theory, because it has applied to this fact, in itself, irrationals, rationalistic conceptions. Is derived, from this, a irrational knowledge, in that inconsistent with the nature of own object. This knowledge irrational, ends to justify the existence of structural reality, since considered the fruit of the human irrationality, that would be consequent to the supposed contradiction between the needs: individual and social, of the individuals.

The study of structural reality, in the its material base, when it is free by the conditioning determinant of structural reality in act or in evolution, which does not tend to promote, a date, phase statual rather to promote the other, but it try to get to the knowledge of the statual reality as a whole and in its relationship with the human reality and can be defined, with good reason, scientific study of the structural economy.

Chapter 24:

Official historians, and awareness of the necessity of the birth of the science of history

The official historians, such as for example Fustel de Coulange, define “feudal regime” what we defined: the feudal system. This is because, basically, they only admit the existence of the capitalist system, considered universally valid and universally present. They, namely, analyze the structural reality historical, and in particular the universe structural statual, as a fact structurally static.

Alfred Reginald Radcliffe – Brown stated that a distinction should be made between “historical explanation” and “theoretical understanding” (1). Had stated, in fact, that it is possible to speak of the first for the societies “historical”, which he its identification with the literal societies, while for the “societies pre-literal”, had considered that we can speak only of “theoretical understanding”, for the impossibility to build a historiography acceptable for these societies. The tools of philosophy of history, acquired at the academic level, do not even allow to speak of a true “understanding” theoretical for the structures statual, imagine if you can speak of “historical explanation”, if by this term is meant the understanding the evolutionary logic of statual structures, which allows to understand the past and the present and to predict the future (albeit within the margins set by mole of the variables in play).

William Herbert Dray had recognized as the historians use general laws, to cover their ideological model of historical survey (2). Edward Carr stated that : facts and interpretations are not separable, in so far as the facts would be already, interpretations of the phenomena (3). Hence the lack of objectivity of every historiography which does not provide scientific explanations (4). The analysis of the history accomplished with ideological intent is well exemplified by Robert Boutruche, which he recognized as the exchange between states, in the centuries IX and X, has not been not at all open (5). He, however, as many official historians, it avoided to draw the necessary consequences from such recognition. Boutruche, in fact, by the presence of some “merchants” and of some “coins”, in the centuries IX and X, although used for the operation of an “economy of consumption” (6) (namely, for the feudal economy), drew the absurd conclusion that in the West not there was “closed economy”, and that the latter is never existed, even in the “primitive societies” (7). This conclusion, time to deny each subdivision of the historical evolution in categories or stages, is justified only with the fear to undermine every justification of structural reality historic.

Historians, as Victor Mortet, they say that, with the feudalism, it is realized a servitude of land, more than a personal servitude. The fact that both the caste, and not a single individual of it such caste, at exercise the power both on the servant that on the means of production, suggests to these “historicals”, that the condition of the servants is better than that of the slaves. They deny, also, that the feudal lords exert a total power on the person of the servant, since, to this, it would provided the religious ideology; as if the religious hierarchy did not form part of the feudal hierarchy, in an inseparable manner, and the religious ideology is not the exclusive ideology of that type of society (to which, therefore, are submissive both: the servants as the feudal lords) (9). These historians, in consideration of the different etymological derivation of the terms “slave” and “servant”, they distinguished, sometimes, between the two terms, but since the term “servant” was introduced, in the West, after the X century, namely in an epoch in which the characters constituting the servitude were attenuated, or substantially processed, the “scholars of the history” they attribute, to the two terms, contradictory meanings and misleading (10), because nothing at all corresponding to the effective reality that they would plan to indicate.

Jacques Heers stated that historians, if they are not “Marxists”, refuse to classify, with the definition of social classes, social divisions of earlier epochs to that “modern” (11) and, even more, they avoid the use of the “theory Marxist” of the classes. Furthermore, had referred, as the same “Marxists”, in this regard, have doubts, and propose nuances and exceptions, or try to avoid its using, unless they are forced, if they live in the social systems “communists” (12).

Robert Boutruche, and historians in general, just to be able to say the uniqueness of the society “Feudal” European, and then, of be able to deny the essence of the “feudalism” of societies outside European, end up saying that “the organization of states and societies are based on foundations of subordination different from those of the vassals and by authentic feoffs” (13). This statement suggests that the existence, in Western Europe, of “feudal societies”, is the result of a mystery or anomaly. Some historians, in consideration of the easy observation that the first phase statual (after the establishment and the consolidation, of the universe structural statual) is, generally, the feudal phase, say that the “feudalism” is a necessary element for the formation of states “modern”. Boutruche had considered, the “feudal societies” outside Europe, expression of the decadence of the respective States (14), and this, although he had ascertained the existence of feudal phenomena in the presence of Member well solids. This ascertainment is not induced him, however, at to distinguish between the solidity of the states and the their economic and social decline. Boutruche had related the fact that historians, are able to identify many types and grades of societies “feudal”: “societies similars to the feudal society, initial feudalism, subsequent societies to feudalism, without forgetting the feudal societies who aborted and bastards; pullulan, still more, the following types: the feudal patriarchal societies, the feudal societies urban nomads, the societies feudal bureaucratic and the societies feudal, decentralised or centralised…” (15). This demonstrates how the historians are not far away from a correct interpretation of the structural reality statual and as, they are prevented from reaching its full understanding only by the ideological needs or the fear of de-legitimization of the same historical reality.

Some officers historians (such as J. Calmette) intuit the existence of historical laws and the existence of factors determining the historical evolution, that however they ignore, while considering, rightly, that such ignorance undermine seriously their same historical analysis (16).

Bruno Rizzi defined “historical ages” those that we have defined phases statual and spoke of the “ages within each age”, to indicate those that we have defined: the various social systems of the two phases statual. This, because he did not conceive fully the cyclicity statual, although he notice an evolution, now in progressive sense, now in the sense regressive, of which, however, he did not grasped the ineluctability nor the logic.

AJP Taylor quoted the payment of the “right to pasture” on the ground state property, that still exists in England in the era of his day, and stated that it was a survival of the universes structural of the previously existing types compared to the universe structural statual, legacy to the conquest on the part of the Normans, rather than a residue of what was once the subsequent feudal law of common possession of the earth. Taylor, from this observation, he had deducted the norm to analyze each made in the light of the entire previous history, so as to avoid provide plausible explanations, but false, of certain phenomena (17). Karl Popper and Dario Antiseri have considered scientific, the analysis “genetic” (namely the narration of events antecedents and converging), which is generally adopted by historians, since, according to them, would be explicative of the causes (18). In reality, the alleged scientificity of these explanations you can define only: “sketches of explanations”. This, because the events preceding, cannot be considered: surely causal events of the subsequent events.

Auguste Comte stated that when you will make a historical analysis really positive, namely scientific, it will become possible to predict rationally the future (19).

Chapter 25:

Sociology and other “social sciences”: the their ideological elements and attempts embodiment of the science of reality historical structural

Robert Nisbet highlighted as sociologists of XIX century (who advocated the creation of a new feudal phase) have identified the foundations of democracy in the feudal community (1). This demonstrates how the ideology tending to feudalism tries to save the concept of democracy, believing it to be valid, while trying, at the same time, to distort it and nullify the same, while retaining the name same. The sociology, as had demonstrated Nisbet, since its inception, was an expression of reaction to the capitalist system competitive, and expression of the various attempts, theoretical and practical, to overtake him (2), naturally, with the return to a new phase feudal. The sociology was, therefore, historically, an articulation of the ideologies which tend to feudalism. Already the first sociologists, as Comte, attacked the term and the concept of “Metaphysics” so derogatory, in order to counteract the political and social rights, from positions that they have defined, of course, “Progressive” (3), although they have criticized scientific development, technical and technological, justifying the their, alleged, “progressivism”, on the fact of considering the metaphysics as a remnant of the “feudalism” (4). Nisbet showed as the “progressivism” Comtean, rejecting the technical progress and productive, although they had proposed, in its turn, a “dogmatic scientism”, hoping and favoring, the evolution of structural reality statual, he not has did nothing but cultivate the hope, and favoring, the coming of that which we defined a new feudal phase decentralized, like that of the historical cycle that we have defined the historical cycle of the “Ancient age and of the High Medieval” (5), also because it was a society with a low level of technical-productive (and that , therefore, is not in contradiction with his ideal society: the feudal society) (6). The “positivism” Comtean is it consisted thus, essentially, in proposing the cult of structural reality historic, he came to idealize it, at the point of deifying the same, directly, though without transcendental allegories, unlike the traditional religions (7). This operation was resumed, and extended, by Karl Marx and by “Marxists”.

Sociologists speak of “individualization” (8), with regard to the possibility of distinction between individuals, through the regained freedoms: social and political, which occur with the return, and consolidation, of mercantile phase. The “Marxism” does not can deny the value of the individualisation, but it proclaims that the same will be obtained, in greater quantities, in the future society of the “personal dependencies”, namely in the new feudal phase, that Marxism had identified with “socialism made or real” (9).

Positivism, at first, professed a “methodological collectivism”, which is counterposed, very soon, the “methodological individualism”, used, for example, by Vilfredo Pareto. The latter method seems more scientific, as well as, most consonant with the mercantile phase (10).

Filippo Barbano stated that the language and methodology, imposed at researchers, in the social field, from the academic world, constitute a limitation at the advancement of science (11). Barbano remarked that the contemporary sociology is substantially a comparison between Positivism and “social dialectic”, namely between “Comtism” and “Marxism”. In this way the sociology appears as a fake science, subject to the conditioning of various ideologies, of which is impregnated.

Dario Antiseri had defined “convenzionalist moves” or “stratagems convenzionalist” (12): the mutation, made at a theory, so that it is not confuted, where such mutation makes this theory no longer falsifiable in principle, namely makes the same openly ideological, where the theory was, before the mutation, falsifiable, namely potentially scientific. Antiseri stated that such stratagems have been adopted for the theories and the forecasts which are most exposed to Marx, making everything completely ideological, while remaining here and there some scientific potentiality (submerged by ideological formulations) (13).

Thomas Sprat had predicted the advent of a “true philosophy”, achievable thanks to the collaboration between the sciences (intuiting the structural conditioning on social disciplines) (14). The ethnologist tends to ignore the ratio of the societies analyzed with the rest of humanity, in relation to its ideological motives. The ethnologist tends, therefore, to use concepts that would explain the part or individual community as an entirely self-sufficient, totally original and unique (15). J. Copans had stated that the ethnology has for object an ideological product. He it sets out to demonstrate the illusoriness of ethnological method and of replace ethnology with alternative ideologies pure and simple (16). Copans stated, that the ethnologist, tent to identify themselves with the object of his study, considering it a microcosm in itself, ignoring, or forgetting of insert, the Community that he had studied within a broader relationship and inside suitable generalizations.

Nisbet stressed that there was dichotomy between the “Partisan identification” (17) of the terms of current use and their subsequent scientific utilisation (18), although the terms used by the “social sciences” born almost all asjargon, perhaps under the thrust of ideological interests or contingents.

Carlos Barbé, as many “intellectuals” contemporaries, he has come to define: “political society”, the structures statual, while making a distinction them from the “state of nature”, meaning with this definition all universes structural that have preceded the structures statual themselves (20).

Barbano had recognized as sociology cannot be wholly scientific, receiving its determination from his same object (21), namely, undergoing the influence of the historical moment in which it is produced (22).

Nisbet showed as the French Revolution, as well as the same concept of revolution, have been mythologizednby the sociologists (23), which have contributed to feed the myth “revolutionary” “Marxist”.

Sociologists, moreover, have feared, already in the nineteenth century, the dangers of the evolution of the “industrial society” (namely, the capitalist system competitive) (24), although they had not detected, explicitly, the advent of a new phase feudal (25), despite having some scent, as he had, for example, Jacob Burckhardt (26). They spoke, however, of inversion of progress, and they meant, with this, especially a regression of human progress and, above all, a reversal of the progress, in the process of individualization (27), which occurs actually and inevitably, with the return of a new feudal phase.

Sociologists that operate in the era of capitalist systems, define the society (meaning, perhaps, that which we call the mercantile phase of the universe structural statual), as an ideal projection, that would manifest itself, only in the systems capitalists (28). This ideal projection, would be based on contractual consensus, as is defined by the design “of natural law”. The “community”, they had contemplated the resurgent social nuclei, of type totalitarian, such as: the trade unions, the churches and the political parties (29). These nuclei reappeared embryonically, towards the end of the nineteenth century, after having been overcome, almost entirely, on the end of the XVIII century and in the first half of XIX (30).

The anthropology, tends to distinguish the structures antecedents the universe structural statual, in: societies based on the organization of kinship and, societies based on the territoriality. This distinction is linked to the difference between the nomadic life and the permanence, distinction similar to that between the various types of techniques used, and therefore, substantially irrelevant for the purposes of the analysis of the evolutionary stages of historical structures (31).

Many “social scientists” are fleeing from a total knowledge of reality historical structural, because they are afraid that the total clarification of the essence of the structural reality should necessarily lead to recognize the irrationality of structural reality historic. They ssume this position, while recognizing that the further deepening of the knowledge of reality structural, leads to better know the human being, without undermining the freedom, but indeed exalting it (32).

Popper had stated as sociology denies the possibility of realising a rational world (33). This position, common to all the “sciences” social and human, denounces the its subjection to the logic of structural reality.

Some sociological theories, already in the middle of the seventies of the twentieth century, have posed to themselves the aim of overcoming the ideologies. Making themselves aware, perhaps, to be too impregnated of ideologies, the sociologists, posed themselves the objective of acquire greater scientific validity. Some sociologists they placed themselves, in this way, in a perspective anti-structural (34), even if their real objective was only to not be crushed by what felt to be imminent, and was called the “end of the ideologies”, of which they felt, distinctly, the crunches.

Charles Fourier sought, without find minimally, the law of social evolution. He thought that, through the knowledge of this law, it would be possible to mutate the society, in such a way as to no longer having to curb the human passions, satisfying these, entirely, without destroying or damaging the society. He wanted, namely, the overcoming of historical structures and the realization of a society capable of fully meeting human needs. The science is, in itself, amoral. However, the application of science, in general, may, or may not, be moral. However, science applied to the society and at humanity, it will be moral, if it will be really scientific or consistent with human nature. For this reason, in the presence of structural reality historic, the science applied at the human being and at the society, cannot be fully scientific, since it cannot be fully moral, if not putting themselves in antithesis to the same structural reality historic. It is necessary to realize the science of sociality of individuals and of the modes of expression optimal of this sociality. It needs a social technique suitable to allow the realisation of a society in keeping with the sociality of individuals and such as to allow the fully satisfaction of the needs of social type, avoiding the contrasts between the needs: as well that strictly individual and the ones social; and between the social reality and the sociality of the individuals. The scientific knowledge proceeds in stages or levels (defined as paradigms). Until the knowledge, in the field social and human, has not reached a stage of sufficient scientific rigor, the overcoming the structural reality historic remains utopian. When, however, knowledge of the structural reality has reached a stage which allows to know the its true essence, its evolutionary dynamics and the human nature, in its essential elements, the omission of use this knowledge to achieve a social technique able to create an alternative to structural reality historic, would constitute an inhuman action, since it would become fruitless a knowledge which, in itself, constitutes the main instrument of human progress.

Part VI:

The sciences of the reality structural historical, and of the human nature

Chapter 26:

Distinction between the sciences of cosmic nature and the sciences of reality structural historical

Duns Scotus had distinct between the knowledge “abstractive” or the scientific knowledge universal, and knowledge “intuitive”, namely the knowledge of the existence, or of the contingent historical reality (1). There was, thus, a distinction between: the sciences of nature and the sciences of structural reality. Kant recognized as the “pure mathematics” and the “general physics” are sciences a priori (2). They are, namely, the natural sciences, or extraneous to the structural logic. They had considered, therefore, that a few sciences were exempted from structural conditioning, even in their essence. The “new-utilitarians” express the need to make scientific morals, looking for a link between the natural sciences and the human and social sciences (3).

Karl R. Popper had clearly distinguished between the “Statements true, strictly universals”, having a character “accidental”, from the “true universal laws of nature”, giving only at to the second the “Principles of necessity” and the “Principles of impossibility” (4). It is, therefore, obvious how the first is worthy of the reality historical structural, which has, precisely, an accidental universality or subject to chance, while the second are inherent in the nature cosmic universal human and in particular.

If science pre-Galilean had a close relationship with the human and social sciences, the science post-Galilean has refused, for centuries, every attempt to analysis of historical reality. This, if on the one hand, allowed to the science not to be getting hooked at the ideologies, however, it restricted the its scope of action and had ended for not meet its own purpose, that is the knowledge of everything that concerns the being human (5).

The apparent absurdity of the persistent lack of knowledge of the evolution of the structural reality and of the human condition (within this social reality), in general, despite the degree of development reached by science, can be explained by the lack of a real alternative and practicable, to the same reality structural statual. Only the emergence, or the prospection, of a such an alternative, will dissipate the so-called “veil of ignorance” and it is realized a knowledge really scientific of social reality and human. The unity of the cosmic universe implies a reciprocal influence between the physical sciences, human and social, being the science necessarily univocal, as unitary is the cosmic universe, although in multiple stages of organization. The physical sciences are, often, used to interpret social reality, using, in ideological way, the same physical laws, in order to justify the social ideologies, as for example the ideological use of relativism and the “law of indetermination” for the anthropology and the epistemology. You can, however, propose a similarity between cosmology and analysis of structural reality historic. Thus, some astronomers hypothesize a cyclicity of expansion and contraction of the Cosmic Matter, disproving the hypothesis of the entropy and proposing a new cosmological hypothesis, incorporating the recent discovery of the acceleration of the Cosmic Matter. You can draw a parallel with the aforementioned cosmological hypothesis with the need to overcome the organizational level of the structures statual, causing a qualitative leap of organizational capacity, namely of the expression of the sociality of individuals, making them able to create a society that is consistent with the will aware of the human beings.

As in the physical-mathematical sciences the verification of the proposed theory, with the comparison method with the reality, is not always immediate, but is deduced from postulates widely tested. In other fields is possible there are theories not based on immediate comparison with reality, but falsifiable, in some way, for example, in relation to future events planned. The scientific validity of a theory does not result solely from the method with which it is formulated, as for example the possession of the means to demonstrate the falsity of the theory, or by the its alleged compliance with the reality that wants to study (that it is impossible to determine at first glance, or instantaneously), but also from the its correspondence with the progressive nature of science. A theory it will be considered scientific, when allows further processing. The scientificity, or less, of a theory is, therefore, determinable in relation to its opening to further progress. Of some theories, conducted in ideological forms, is immediately evident the lack of scientific value. Of other theories, the scientificity, or less, will emerge only after completing the necessary verifications, namely by comparison with the reality. For these latter theories you can propose the definition of provisional scientificity. The science, being, by definition, progressive, cannot that be characterized by the intrinsic progressivity of every single theory. The foundations of science are identified, from Galileo onwards, in the verifiability and repeatability of the proof, expanded, recently, by the concept of falsifiability, which may seem redundant, but is useful to better clarify the boundaries of science. These principles do not ensure the validity of the starting point, but are limited to ensure the consistency of the theory with the consequences envisaged, with the abandonment of the theory formulated, if it is not found this consistency.

The starting point of the human sciences is the nature or essence of man, from which you can discern all that is alien to this essence. The so-called social sciences, being sciences of the structures, namely of the structural reality historic, belong to a field clearly distinguished by the natural sciences. You can locate, therefore, two scientific fields, different with respect to the physical sciences – Mathematics; on the one hand there are the sciences natural human, that comprise the natural sciences, applied to the study of the human species; on the other side there are the structural sciences, which include: the history, the anthropology, the sociology, the philosophy, the economics and part of psychology. Only with the understanding, at full, of the essence of the historic structures, and of the structures of the states, in particular, can we talk of structural sciences, with status of scientific laws.

There is a conception “realistic” and one “instrumental”, of science. The foundations of science can only be realistic, because they are based on the analysis and conceptualization of certain plans of the real. Having to, however, analyze and predict the evolution of the real, the analysis of the real must be instrumental with respect to the prediction of the concrete possibility of the realization of a new evolutionary stage of human society. How much more will be “realistic”, namely, capable of grasping the roots and the essence of the real, the more it will be really useful, on the plane “instrumental”, as a source of forecast and address on the fields: social and human (6). Umberto Eco had established as the science is not such if not considering the its application outcomes or by its applicability (7). The scientific value of each single social theory derives from the usefulness of this theory in relation to solving social problems, as occurs for any other science. In fact the scientific value of a given theory is given by the usefulness of that date theory, for the solution of problems, cognitive or practical, of whom the theory relates. The problem of social and human sciences consists in the possibility to compare correctly theories and problems in their actual essence, to the solution of which the theory itself gives an effective contribution. The full scientificity of the Social Sciences, in analogy with the physical-mathematical sciences, will be realized, and demonstrated, only when the above mentioned social sciences will make possible a true and satisfactory progress of humanity.

Alfred Reginald Radcliffe-Brawn spoke of: description “Synchronic” (or static) of the “forms of social life” (8) and of description “Diachronic” (or dynamic) of the same “forms of social life”. Evidently, with the term of description “Synchronic” of the “forms of social life”, he was referring to the analysis of the various partitions or joints of structural reality historic, while, for description “Diachronic” he was referring to the evolution and at the pace of succession of those partitions. Radcliffe-Brawn, despite being convinced of the need to use the scientific method in the study of society and not the historical method, had stated, however, that the various components of social systems should be classified typologically and not on the basis of groupings in: species and genera (9). This demonstrates how he was aware of the unnaturalness of the structural reality historic. Radcliffe-Brown stated that the method of historical survey (or ideographic) serves for identify the structural dynamics (and is used, in fact, mainly, in ethnology), while the functionalist method it studies the static namely the social physiology (and is used from the social anthropology). Radcliffe-Brown had compared two methods of anthropological analysis, which he defined as respectively: the “History conjectural” and the “sociological analysis or structural” (10). Had defined as history conjectural, the analyzes of structures, conducted on general considerations and/or particular (citing, for example, the works of McLennan and of Morgan). He had blamed such method, thinking it to was nonscientific, being conjectural, and stated that to give value to the conjectures advanced (on facts that would have occurred, by placing them in connection with the facts established), would be necessary to know the laws of historical development, and not allowing that this latter derived by the conjectures. It remains to be determined, whether and how much Morgan has derived laws of historical development from conjectures, and if they were not, however, simple observations of real events. Radcliffe-Brown recognized, finally, that that which he defined as the “history conjectural”, possesses sufficient characters of scientificity to enable it to define the same: inductive history. The above mentioned inductive history is also definable as: inductive analysis of structural evolution. He has proposed for himself, the aim, merely, of determine how to operate the social systems, ignoring that the complete knowledge of the how (or: of the modes) allows to establish, at least in part, the because (or: the causes).

Contemporary science, clearly distinguishes, between the stochastic phenomena, namely, based on calculations of the probabilities, by the deterministic phenomena, namely based on a rigid consequentiality between cause and effect. It is clear that the structural sciences and human sciences, for the multiplicity of causes in game and to the difficulty of separating the causes close (in time) from those more distant, you can only have one science based on probabilistic calculation (11).

Karl Popper had proposed, as scientific method, the triad: 

- Problems,

- Theories (or the hypothesis),

- Criticism (or discussion of the experimentation or analysis of the errors) (12). 

Popper had identified the logic, with the scientific methodology (13), stating that the various logics are not contradictory, but more or less suitable to realize out the scientific progress, being more or less valid scientifically. He expounded his logic in these terms: “The transmission of truth and the retransmission of the falsity”. The transmission of the truth is intended as a means of “doing tests” (14) and the retransmission of the falsity, for falsify the basics of same theory, when occur consequences fake, realizes the falsification of the basics of same theory

Arnobio of Sicca stated that a “man remained from birth in complete solitude would have the spirit empty” (15), but he recognized that “the feeling is the only source of all human knowledge”. In this last sentence had demonstrated to know that the origin of the human spirit is, at least in part, in its instincts and innate needs, developed through the acquired knowledge, with the development of sociality.

It is essential to consider the possibility of the knowledge last of things, which is, in fact, the purpose or ultimate object of science, as well as of the natural evolution.

The scientific inquiry must be based on:

1 – the consistency between the assumed and the data derived from reality,

2 – the internal consistency of the assumed same,

3 – the internal consistency of the theory, of which the assumption is part, 

4 – the correlation of the proposed theory with the knowledge acquired, in the scientific field specific.

Chapter 27:

Psychology inherent: to human nature and to the humanity, succumbus of the contingent structural reality

Comte and Spencer hey were aware of the fact that also the psychology to their contemporary was only fake scientific, because it was not capable of abstracting human nature from the structural conditioning on individuals and, then, he did not know study human nature authentic and the psychic laws of components intellectuals, namely of the determinants of the “human spirit” (1).

Psychologists are opposed, generally, at the “physicalism”, since they include, darkly, that this theory would lead to consider human behavior as a fact resulting from determinants outsiders at the human nature. The “physicalism” is in contraposition, then, with large part of the theories of the fake sciences, of the humans beings and social. Either, as much the theories “physicalists”, as the psychological theories, who are opposed to the first; are, in reality, consistent with the logic of reality structural statual. The theories “physicalists” they have done naturalized, simply, the reality structural historical. For this purpose, they avoid ruling on deep psychology, with the only purpose to deny the opposition between nature and historical structures. Opponents at the “physicalism”they tend, instead, to grasp the distinction between determination of reality structural statual and the determination of a specific social system. Tend, therefore, at consider of the deep psychology, as an expression of the structures Statual, which they consider, therefore, as naturals. At the same time, they consider the behavior of the surface as determined by the culture of the various social systems, which are in continuous evolution.

The “new Freudians” refuse the Freudian theory on the dualism between aggressive instincts and sexual and substitute it with the theory of “force of growth”, according to which the human being possesses inherent potentialities, that are, then, distorted by the social reality (2). The complexes: of Oedipus and of Electra, theorized by Freud, they are not universals or biologically determined, but depend, instead, totally from the culture. The general presence of the incest taboo does not prove the existence of the complexes of Oedipus and of Electra, but the existence of a general trend of the human being to establish sexual relations with those members of the environment of the knowledges of which, more intensely and mutually, they are attracted sexually. This fact, if not prevented, does not give rise, in itself, as theorized by Freud, at an permanent conflict between the components of the social nucleus, but simply a conflict ecologically positive, as occurs in natural society of the animals, where life takes place under the guidance of the instincts. At the human level, namely at the Rationalized level, in the absence of coercion, aimed at the preservation of social hierarchy, would be determined, according to these theories, a general and continuous conflict, not caused by sexual needs, but by the desire of social domain. If it deduces, therefore, as the institution of the incest taboo has functions strictly structural, as they constitute the basis for all forms of historical structures. This conception is, at least in part, supported by the theorisation of social psychologists and sociologists, like: Linton, Sarbin and G. H. Mead, which they had formulated the theory of the role, as a structural function of the subject (3). The “Freudian psychoanalysis” was born when he was prevailing the “Positivism”, that theorized the full autonomy of the human being, considered sole maker, and rational, of their own destiny. Freud, on the contrary, he theorised how the elements determinants of the human being, were the irrationality and the unconscious. The irrationality, in the human being, derives, partly, from its own primary instinct. He, namely, had sensed as the causes of the social reality in act are internals at the nature itself human, and of the living being, more in general (4).

Many psychologists tended, in the XX century, to replace at, rare, elements scientific existing in the psychology, with ideology “Marxist Leninist”, although they arrived to recognize, then, as the structural reality is substantially detached from the “psychological mechanisms of the individuals”.

The psychology received a great impulse, to its development, in the period in which it occurred, in some regions of the Earth, the transition to a new feudal phase, in the course of the twentieth century, for the need, which was resulted from this, to establish a total control on human beings. Its development had found, however, a limit, which it prevented him from reaching real characteristics of scientificity, that would finish to reveal the unnaturalness, in relation to humans, of reality structural statual and historical in general. With the arrival of a new feudal phase, the psychology develops itself in some of its aspects, namely, in those places where can return useful for the realisation of total control on human beings. However, in its more general aspects, it dries up and stops, as occurs for any other branch of science.

Some psychologists use, in the study of the personality, concepts of structure and processes. With the first concept, they indicate, the psychological categories, more or less stable, consistent with a given social system or structural universe, with the second: intend the functions performed by the parties of the psyche, how they interact and change over time. These concepts are also useful in the analysis of reality structural statual (5).

Minguzzi had stated that: one who occupies a central position with respect to the communication, purchases, necessarily, a form of power. He had recognized as the same emotional bonds constitute the bases for power. The research conducted on the social power provide the following elements: 

- The ordering of the positions or definition of the persons in the condition of dependence,

- The index of the intensity of the dependency, comprising the limits and the scope of the power, namely, if it is limited to the duty of group or if he oversteps the same.

The “formula Socio – Dynamic” (6) theorized by Schindler, represents the “emotional structure unconscious of each group” and consists in four positions characteristics:

Alpha = emotional leader of the group;

Beta = rational stimulant of the group (or councillor of “alpha”, of which is an ally);

Y = mass passive in the face of “alpha” and, partially, to “beta”;

Omega = those who, seeing beyond the boundaries of the group and, then, not accepting, entirely, the leadership of “alpha”, they go at preparing themselves to become the scapegoat of “y”, and at find support outside the group: leadership seen as hostile by the ensemble of the group itself.

In the “unconscious structure”, therefore, becomes part also the external opposition, which constitutes, in this way, a fifth position. Schindler had stated that this “structure” is dynamic, in the sense that the hierarchy of power can mutate: for example “beta” can assume the leadership, in the event of tension with the outside. “Omega” can become a leader, with character of tyranny or authoritarianism: without the consent. If, then, the leadership is held by “y”, occurs “the institutionalization” group (with the creation of mechanisms of representation or with charismatic leadership or with authoritarian power, although equipped with consensus).

Kurt Lewin criticized the “associational psychology”, in so far as the latter, wishing avoid both “the idealism”, that what is considered the “metaphysics of teleology”, rejects every dynamic factor oriented to a goal (Not only in relation to historical reality, but also in relation to human nature), giving value only to the past of man, in a conception of the present as if it was a simple “repetition”. Lewin, who refused this logic, had stated that the field psychological has a temporal properties, for the which comprises: the past psychological, the psychological present and the future psychological, the which times constitute one of the dimensions of the space of life existing, in a given period. In this way he avoided (what it called) the “injury of teleology”. However, had stated that, the fact of considering the existence of factors oriented to a goal, is not a characteristic of teleology, because the causal explanations, in physics, do not avoid such conditions, since the physical force is a entity oriented in a certain direction: a vector. In this way he had circumvented the risk of be accused of pursuing a teleology of metaphysical order, with the contradiction in logic, tht is common in the academic world contemporary.

Jacques Lacan recognized the existence of a contradiction between the human naturalness and the reality of the human condition. He identified the reality of the human condition with the “Es” and the “I Real”, while identified the naturalness with the “I Potential”, or initial. He believed inevitable the passage from “imaginary”, or reality natural, next to the birth, at the “symbolic”, namely, the acquisition of language and of the logic of reality. In truth, as there is a natural authority, in childhood, and since this passage, implies the passage to the subjugation to the authority and to the structural power, constitutes a contingent need, but not inevitable ontologically. The latter hired is, however, demonstrated by the fact that the critics of Lacan they are afraid of the its theoretical danger, recognizing the danger, inherent in his theory, of locate the overcoming actual of structural reality historical and that someone, following his example, may proposes the path of an actual overcoming of the reality structural historical (7). The “psychoanalysis Lacanian” speaks of “disappearance” or “Replacing the subject”, when the subject natural, which Lacan defined the “because of the need”, is “replaced” by subject (of structural determination), whom subject is defined the “cause of desire”. Lacan in fact, had identified the needs with the instincts or the “tendencies” natural and the desires with the “desires of the other”, namely, the structural determinations. He spoke of a “original subject”, defined as “subject of the need” or “subject full” in the sense of an undivided subject, “subject in itself”, “subject without signifiers” and finally “subject identified with the primordial object”. He contrasted this subject at the “subject of desire”, “subject divided”, “subject replaced” by the “signifier of the other”, “subject touched by castration”, namely, subject that accepts the castration, the which last, replaces (the original essence of the) subject. He relegated the “original subject” in the realm of myth, as well as he intended to lock the needs. Had defined the neurotic as one who refuses to “submit himself to the desire of the other” and namely refuses the acceptance, although it is in its aware, of the its own castration, refusing, at the same time, the castration of others. The neurotic person tends to avoid the encounter with the other, “detector of the object which is the because of desire” (namely, the detector of the logic of the structural reality). Lacan stated that the “analytical process” of the “psychoanalysis” makes the neurotics incurables, because it induces them to accept the castration, and not lead them to healing. The unconscious, the tendencies natural, the which it substantiate him, according to the “Lacanian theory”, are definable as the natural rationality or of base of the individual.

Kurt Lewin stated that the reality of social structures and its evolution, they do not enter to constitute the psychological field of an individual. He was only in charge of the study of the “area of life” (8) of the individual himself, without distinguishing between what is the fruit of the inner area of the psychological field and what is the fruit of the outer zone (or the structural reality). He was aware of the need to know the “psychological ecology” (9) or structural reality which he had believed that it can be modified with “means different from those psychological”. The topological psychology of Lewin accepts the determinism, both of the structural type or historical, both in relation to human nature, recognizing the homogeneity of human nature or the “specific character of the behavior” (10).

Lewin fought against the idea that makes every reality extra-natural (or extra-physics) a metaphysical fact and, therefore (according to the current idea of metaphysics): imaginary. He supported that the social reality, such as that psychological, either natural (or physically consistent) such as that of type physic or mathematic. This last concept derives clearly by a concern not to be accused to believe in metaphysics, fearing, so, to place themselves outside of the field of things “existing” (namely: what are considered the only the possible objects of the scientific investigation). The metaphysical prejudice (namely: against metaphysics), the victims of which are researchers in the structural field and psychic, influence every approach to structural reality or psychic, making it impossible the scientific progress of these. Lewin had defined scientifically, the one that we defined the structural reality historical: “The structural properties are characterized by the relationship between the parties rather than by the parties or by the elements themselves”. The social structures historical, thus characterized as: relationships between physical subjects or between living beings, acquire a valence of reality, which should be analyzed as a true fact, and not as a methodological construct or form attributed to reality (11). He, in order to break the taboo about the existence of the structural reality, had proposed to overcome the moment of the classification, passing to experimentation, in order to locate the constituent elements of the reality of social structures and of the psychic reality. Lewin compared the “Field Theory” and the use of the “spaces of phase” (or Cartesian diagrams) with “the mathematics economy” or the economy “formalist”, stating that “if you it is conscious of the limit of the analytical investigation separated of certain aspects of the social field, this inquiry then becomes an upper stage useful and actually necessary”. He theorized three development phases, for the study of social forces: 

1) Development of analytical concepts and theories

2) Their theoretical quantification, by means of equations; 

3) Measurement of specific cases

He stated, optimistically, that the first point was, by now, reached and that for the other two, it is necessary to achieve the interdisciplinary study of social sciences. Lewin enounced the conditions of a theory of thumb:

1) the existence of constructs that: 

A) are related to observable facts (symptoms), by means of operational definitions, corresponding to the possibilities of observation, in different circumstances;

B) have properties conceptual, clearly defined. 

In order to draw inferences strict it is necessary that these properties are coordinated with certain mathematical concepts.

2) Laws (which are defined as the ratio between the behavior, on the one hand, and the field characterized by certain constructs, on the other hand; or between the various factors that determine the camp) should be verified experimentally, and deemed valid: only in the case in which they are not contradicted by any given, in any field of psychology. The laws have, obviously, a general character, from which deviate, partially, the individual cases. The individual case constitutes the specific value, which assumes, from time to time, the general law (12).

Klaus Holzkamp had explaining the fundamental criteria, necessary to carry out scientific research in the field of structural reality and of human nature: 

- reliability of empirical assumptions, 

- integration of theory (or of the theories) in a theoretical framework more general, 

- Relevance “internal” the hypothesis to be tested and of the concepts that are used to formulate the hypotheses, 

- Relevance “external”: namely, the meaning of the object of study in the context of anthropological and wider social (the general context of the structural sciences and humanities) (13).

Lewin noted that these criteria, in particular that of “integration of the theory in a theoretical framework more general”, has been progressively abandoned, and this is a clear symptom of poor scientificity of various gills sciences “social”. In this way it is condemned psychology, as the other human sciences and structural: to irrelevance scientific, or anyway such a scientific content very limited. 

Darwin Cartwright had stated that the process of “conceptualization” (14) of psychology has received a considerable boost by Kurt Lewin, which, in the elaboration of a theoretical system poses the following conditions for the use of the various concepts

1) which make it possible to take into consideration both the qualitative aspects that quantities of the phenomena

2) that represent adequately the attributes genetic-conditional (or causal) of the phenomena

3) that facilitate the measurement (or the operational definition) of these attributes (or cause)

4) which allow: both the generalisation at universal laws, both the concrete examination of the specific case

To process these concepts he proposed the mathematical method of the “elements constructive… (of the) genetic definition”, which highlights the relationship between mutations qualitative and quantitative mutations. Cartwright had stated that the analysis performed by Lewin, of “conceptual dimensions” (15) of the constructs is useful, because these dimensions conceptual determine the way in which a given construct may be combined with other, as well as the way in which it can be measured. Through the conceptual analysis, Lewin, is able to analyze, scientifically, concepts such as: conflict and frustration, managing to make it the object of experimental researches.

Lewin stated that the constructs become truly scientific and scientifically measurable only when it becomes definable their “conceptual nature or conceptual dimension”, namely, when their nature (or essence) is due to known entities and measurable (such as physical terms: time, distance, etc.). Reached this result, it will be possible to compare, with respect to their magnitude, entities having the same size conceptual, with the same metro or unit of measure. In psychology, this is obtained by placing in relationship each construction conceptual with the psychological elements fundamental chosen by the conceptual construction. Lewin had recognized that this operation, in psychology, was not yet possible, if not in embryo, or in a manner not rigorous, or referable at quantitative equations. Lewin insisted on formal properties of the scientific constructs and on the mathematics representability rigorous of the human behavior. However, he preserved a basic attitude of practical type toward science, fearing that the “Formalism” is transformed into voids verbalisms. His “formalism” was dictated by the need to expose and analyze in a rigorous way the subject of science, in order to promote the progress of science itself. The “formal constructions” constitute tools (Guidelines) of further scientific progress. He, therefore, had theorised about the “formalization” and the “mathematization”, only after reaching concrete results through the empirical investigation, using them then to continue the journey, however avoiding the “formalizations”, too soon, or earlier of the empirical analysis. To this end he refused, consistently, of endure unsolvable problems with the techniques employed, namely, he had feared, rightly, that could be formed priori theories, and they could be smuggled in place of science. Kurt Lewin stated that the logical sequence theorized by Clark Hull: definitions, assumptions, conclusions; despite being valid, must be based on the constructs that are well defined, namely, on some conceptual properties well defined. Must, namely, have properties of: Vector, scalar quantity, tensor, region of field, model of the region (namely: to change between the different regions). The lack of the definition of these conceptual properties of the constructs, namely of the their interdependence logic, excludes any logical deduction, with the consequence of leave in the vague the constructs dynamics, that have a leading role at the level deductive. Lewin stated that the conceptualization cannot consist in the “formalization” of statements that have already been made but should draw up constructs, involving both the representation of the empirical data both the formal elaborations, given that there is a close relationship between the logical form and the content. Therefore, the “formal constructs” cannot be arbitraries, but adjusted to reality analyzed, with its internal coherences. Moreover, the various constructs must be processed in such a way as to constitute a “system logically consistent and empirically adequate” (16). He had proposed to identify the “concepts formalized” (17) and to postpone to a later time the “formalization” or systematization in a “formal system”, because he feared that such a systematization could be crippling, since it would not yet reached a sufficient level of empirical verification and scientific.

Lewin stated that, currently (given the level of scientific knowledge that have been reached), instead of arranging some conceptual elements of the constructs, you may have some “conceptual types” (18) of the latters. Through the use of such types conceptual, Lewin had thought you could, gradually, reach to the scientific knowledge of the conceptual dimensions.

Lewin and his collaborators have enuncited psychological laws, in which it highlighted the nature of the human psyche and its behavior: both natural that subordinate on the structural reality. He, in addition to the needs, he theorised about the “valence” and “values of satisfaction” (19). The various valences were defined as employees: in part by the nature of its object, and in part by the state of the needs of the subject, in that moment. Therefore, if the need is a psychological state and has several possibilities of satisfaction, the valence is the specific connection of a given subject to the need of the person as units psycho-somatic complete. He stated that there is a report, but not identification, between valence and value of satisfaction, the latter being the ability of satisfaction of a given object. There is therefore a value of consumption, closely connected with the value of satisfaction.

Chapter 28:

The degree of development of the sciences of structural reality historical and human nature

We must start from the intuition of everything, namely, in the specific case, by structural reality historical, to arrive at the understanding of the parties (which we define: the structural universes, the phases statual and the social systems) and to the detailed analysis of the all and of the various parts (1).

General Characters of Science are:

– delimitation of their field of research,

– functioning of its concepts,

– corrigibility autonomous of the reason, that by itself exerts,

– intersubjective validity of its conclusions (2).

Immanuel Kant theorized one shape of scheme scientific adapted at analyze the natural reality, shape of concept not be alien to the same object (3), and it do not change or does not affect, even indirectly, on the object of knowledge. Vittorio Mathieu stated that any object of science, such as that which we have defined the structural reality, for be thought, must be based on categories own of natural sciences. The structural reality historical is, in fact, established in its substance, by the experience. It is, however, composed of extraneous parameters to human nature and the cosmic nature, in general: not for this cannot be conceived and analyzed scientifically. Kant had poses at basis of shapes of schema, scientific, measuring of the time, while for the shapes of schema of judgment, reserved to the study of structural reality, he posed at basis, the space (which is, moreover, the existential base of the universe structural statual). Kant had recognized as the structural reality constitutes an “indirect object at favor of direct”. Kant, then, had attributed an greater importance to the natural reality human with respect to the structural reality historical. The philosopher of science Percy Williams Bridgman had defined “constructs”: the objects of the shapes of scheme of judgment, where “their reality, is not that of an object of direct experience, but is given by the capability of connecting, in systems increasingly vast and unitary, the phenomena of experience” (4). The Kantian metaphysics, consisted, as he himself had defined the same: in the “doctrine of pure intellect” (5). He had considered “pure ideas” or necessary laws of the intellect: the needs of natural, or instinctual, characteristic to each animal being. Kant proposed to itself the aim to discover “on what basis is founded the ratio of what is said, in us, the representation, with the object” (6), namely, what is the base of the knowledge. He stated that the nature of knowledge and the cause of its evolution are “simply intellectuals” (7). Kant refused to expose reasons or hypothetical arguments, but merely those theories that have reached the scientific validity or can be considered “necessary” (8). Kant defined “logic”: the science of “formal rules of all thought” (9). He thought that this science is perfectly a priori with respect to experience (where for experience, he intended: what we call the structural reality historical). Stated that the science “logic” constitutes the “vestibule” of other sciences “properly so called”. Kant defined “theoretical knowledge”: the determination a priori of the object of the sciences; and “practice knowledge”: the realization of the object of science (10). Since, for “priori knowledge” he pointed to the a priori with respect to structural reality, he intended, essentially, lay the foundations of the knowledge of human nature. Kant defined: analytical judgments, those derived from the experience or inherent in the structural reality, and: “synthetic a priori”, those concerning the human nature or the potential non-structural that he sensed that was existing and that it was of fundamental importance (11). With the term of: “synthetic reviews a priori”, he pointed to the possibility – need to make scientific the knowledge of nature human, which is antithetical to the structural reality (12). He defined his own metaphysics, as survey of the human essence natural, divorced from structural reality (“Natural metaphysics”, because dictated by a “natural disposition”). For the fact that his metaphysics has as its object the nature, he has deduced the conviction of the possibility of the attainment, for its part, of the category of scientificity (13). He defined the own metaphysical as: “Critique of Pure Reason” (14) or, better, “system of pure reason” (15), of which its written on “criticism” was supposed to be a prerequisite. He stated that the field of metaphysics is the mind, in its natural essence, namely, “a priori” of the structural reality, namely, ultimately, consists in the study of human nature (16). Thought that the human knowledge about the nature of the intellect may be distinguished in two gills: sense and intellect. Stated that the sense, since “contains representations a priori” (17), which form the condition for which are data the objects, belongs to the transcendental philosophy. Had defined this first part of the study of the elements of human nature: theory “transcendental of the sensitivity”. Stated, then, that the second part is constituted by the intellect, the its conditions and conditions of its objective approach to the reality (18). The human intellect, being the part of human nature more prone to conditioning of structural reality, needs to reach the condition of scientific knowledge of nature, the knowledge of reality structural, and the mechanisms, even psychological, that determine the rise and the evolution of the historical structures. To do this, he thought necessary make themselves as mentally free, as much as it is possible, from the conditioning of the same historical structures. Only thus, he claimed, would become possible to know the profound nature of the human intellect and the conditions for its further development, conditions that he, unfortunately, did not do everything necessary that it was being materialized the analysis, in a complete way.

Also Popper had recognized as, to create an “objectivist epistemology” (19), in order to realize the science of structural reality, is necessary, to the researcher: “becoming autonomous” from “2° world”, namely, from the structural reality. Only in this way it’s possible analyze, with sufficient effectiveness, the reality of “2° world”.

Kant defined “transcendental logic” the science “that contains the principles of pure thought” (20), namely, the science of the functioning of the human intellect, that is independent, totally, from structural logic. He stated that the difference between: sense and intellect is not purely logical, but transcendental, namely, inherent “the origin and the contents of they” (21). Kant, namely, had believed that the sense belongs to human nature, while the intellect would be connected with the structural reality historical. Stated that knowledge, if it is the subject of itself (apperception), does not concern the human essence spiritual, but regards the way, namely, “as internally it is modified” (22) the subject, namely, relate to the essence of the reality structural (namely, where occurs the dependence of the individual subject from the abovementioned: reality structural historic). He, affirming that the sensitivity is not a fact original, but derivative, and affirming that the sense determines the human existence “in relation to data objects” (23), did of the sense, the vehicle of the structural reality. He stated that the intuitions a priori does not go “beyond the objects of the senses, and can only apply to objects of a possible experience” (24). He, therefore, had thought that the sense can be not only the vehicle of structural reality historical, but can be the vehicle for a reality the authentically human. Kant recognized the inseparable relationship between the sense and the intellect, since “Without sensitivity, not there would be given any object, and without the intellect no object it could be thought” (25). He made a distinction between the “general logic” (26) and the psychology, having identified the first with the study of the nature of the intellect or “Rules of the intellect” (27) and the second with the study of the acquisitions of the structural reality, or acquisitions “empirical” of the psyche, and had defined the latter, also, “logic applied” (28). Defined, also the first: “transcendental logic” (29), where concern only a priori knowledge. Defined “transcendental knowledge” the “possibility of knowledge or the use of it a priori” (30). This demonstrates how Kant had considered to superable the structural reality historical. Kant had distinguished between: logic, or exposure of general laws and necessary of the intellect, and truth, namely the “agreement of a knowledge with his object” (31), with the meaning, for the second, of science of structural reality. Kant stated that there are concepts a priori, existing “virtually” (32) in the human intellect, and that manifest themselves on the occasion of the experience”, if one is freed “from the empirical conditions that at their have corresponded” (33). He defined as a function of the intellect, create the order the representations in concepts: this is its base or the function of the intellect (34). He had defined the thought: “knowledge for concepts” (35). He stated that the concepts a priori, not being founded on experience, cannot show no object “on which base their synthesis” (36). Kant stated that he wanted to replace to the term “ontology”, the term “Analytical of the intellect pure” or “systematic doctrine of the knowledges synthetic a priori of things in general” (37), and this since “the intellect a priori can never do anything else that anticipate the shape of a possible experience in general”. He, since he had a tendency to theorising a reality, foreign to the reality structural, he defined the concepts relative (at an reality actually consistent with human nature) such as “noumena” (38), in opposition to the “phenomena” or concepts relating to tangible reality or material (namely: the structural reality). He identified the firsts with the concepts of the a priori origin, the which, since more appropriate to human nature, can be considered as nonstructural. Kant considered the concept of “noumeno” only in negative (39). This, although he had recognized there can be a experience natural, or psychic, made exclusively through the senses (40). He stated that each object is composed only of “relationships” (41). Had confirmed, so, of know the true nature of one of the objects of his studies: the structural reality historical. Kant stated that he had aim to achieve a “knowledge that accords completely with the laws of the intellect” (42). He tended, namely, at discover the laws of the functioning of the human brain, in order to make possible the existence of a society that is in accord with the human nature.

Kant had recognized as the “ratiocination” is pinned down within limits speculative very precise, in addition to recognizing the danger of further limitations imposed by state power (43). The Kantian category of logic, as process “synthetic a priori”, was assimilated (by the same Kant) at to the mathematical axioms, if deduces its concepts by the rationality, namely from the true nature of human beings.

The historic structural reality, because reality can be an object of science. Because is an contradictory reality with human nature can be the object of a science only partially rational, because its object is not rational. Correspond, therefore, at to an non-rational logic.

Durkheim stated to study the social events “as if they were things” (44). This does not mean, as some believe, that he identified the structural reality with nature, but that he, empirically, he had analyzed the various phenomena and structural facts (45). For example, about the “Marxism”, had put in evidence its valence (46) unscientific, namely, alien to any scientific theory, while he analyzed, with scientific method, the structural facts, including the Marxism itself and the “Socialism”, precisely, because structural facts (47). He had recognized as the “social sciences” are still “young” and not able to serve as the scientific support of the structural movements such as the “socialism” (48). Durkheim showed how to “social science” does not you want to indicate the sociology but the set of the “sciences” structural, whose development has given rise to the birth of sociology, as “science” autonomous, which was, at the origin, a study of the “elements that may have influenced events related to the social structure of the facts of human activity” (49). The “academics” does not identify the sociology with all the “Social Sciences”, and this, because they recognize as sociology does not enclose the entire series of the “Social Sciences” (50), and this, not only for the variety of disciplines of study of structural reality, but especially because you recognizes that, until now, not reached the status of science.

The sociologist Alvin Goùldner had recognized as the theories of the past contain valid parts, which could be assimilated to new systematic theories (51). Durkheim stated that a theory or “doctrine”, to be scientific, should derive from a scientific research. Otherwise, it has little scientific connotations, being in fact an ideology, connected to an analysis of the history, so to speak: tamed (52).

Jacques Heers stated that, when the terms used are scientifically defined and delimited, may also be derived from the vocabulary of the ideologies a priori. For example, Heers had used the term “orders” (53), instead of castes, but highlighting the legal status of the same: the nobility, the clergy and the people, rather than the real social status: dominant castes, castes intermediate and castes subservient. The latter condition (the social status) is well diverging from the first (the juridical condition), as also recognized the same Heers (54).

Chapter 29:

Historiography and analysis of the history of structural reality historic

The same historians “idealists” acknowledge the substantial estrangement of the individual from the causes which determine his actions, actions which, therefore, they are accomplished in contrast to its own essence (1) or nature. This is valid, also, for the action of politicians and statesmen. The human condition, in structural reality statual, can be likened to a group of passengers who are on a train, traveling without driver and without that passengers are aware of traveling on a circular track closed, making laps on laps, apparently indefinitely, or better, in without limits way. The capitalist systems constitute an extension of the circle formed by the track on which the train is moving (with respect to the slavers systems), which, however, does not lose its characteristic of a closed circle. You must make the passengers aware of their condition, so that they may seek to stop the unnecessary travel of the train or prepare to get off before the train derailing.

John BrianTaylor spoke of mythology, indifferently for the statual “Age” as for the “Ages” pre-statual. In reality: if in the universes pre-statual are created myths, with purpose of the religious mold, in the structural universe statual you create mythologies that, as well as carrying out a function cultural-religious, constitute the surrogate of knowledge of history, in coherence with the essence of the feudal phases.

Federico Chabod stated that, with what we call the feudal phase, the story is transformed in mythology, connected to reasons theological and of political (2). He stated that in the “modern age”, the history tends to become the queen of sciences (structural). This would have the possibility to occur, if the metaphysical prejudice fades, with proper historical analysis (3). By analysing the evolution of historical studies, in history, Chabod had referred to the fact that the historical methodology can go ahead with the gradual acquisition of the criticism of the sources and with the passage from political history the “history of civilization” (4), passage, this, that is happened, according to him, with the consolidation and the generalization, of the social system that we call the bourgeois system, namely in the XVI and XVII centuries.

William James criticized what he called the “vicious intellectualism”, founded by Socrates and Plato, according to which the real essence of one thing: it is given by its definition (5). He affirmed, rightly, that this “methodology intellectualistic” is the bearer of ideologization of the structural sciences (6). James stated that originality must, necessarily, be accompanied by the lucidity and by the “mastery of all, the classic, stylistic apparatus” (7). He had quoted Henri-Louis Bergson: as an example to follow. He had distinguished, anyway, between “theoretical knowledge or scientifical” and knowledge “speculative and philosophical, as a fundamental distinction (8). He thought that the most important thing for the human being is the investigation of human nature and of structural reality historic, although he had recognized that the latter had not yet on a scientific level. James defined: ideas true, those whose consequent action is consistent with its effects expected, namely, with the stated purposes of the theory (9). James defined as a criterion of truth, the moral satisfaction or utility, by proposing, in an indirect way, the overcoming the structural logic, when defined as useful: what exalts the human intellect (10). He recognized the relationship of perception with the formation of Thought (11), according to which the greater the perception, greater is the Thought product and vice versa. The character of the “jamesian psychology” consists in considering the psychological phenomenas: “intermediate between the impressions received from the environment and the adaptations of organisms to the same environment” (12). The empiricism of James constituted a sufficient adaptation “of the organism to the many needs of the situation in which he finds himself to live” (13), as well as being a means of knowledge to discover the real essence of every faith or ideology (14), although he considered, rightly, all this: insufficient to “remedying to the conflict between the doctrine of the nature and our individual destiny” (15). To rectify this conflict there is the need: of theories adapted to analyze thoroughly the structural reality historical and its influence on human nature, as well as the existence of the potentiality of the same human nature, sufficient to realize concretely the emancipation from this reality. Even Carl Gustav Hempel stated that we must arrive to achieve the science of history, capable of explaining the historical events, with the ability to make forecasting of the same, in relation to the conditions antecedents or concurrent (16).

The historic Ewart Oakeshott stated that if the historical research it was on their way to becoming truly scientific, you would have the generation of the “complete destruction of history” (17). He, for destruction of history, was intended to, evidently, the destruction of the structural reality, and in particular of the universe structural statual, which is the object of historiography.

W. H. Dray had stated that, where the historiography adopts a scientific method, the object of this science, being different from the nature, you can not to apply to it the same method that it uses to study the human nature or the nature in general (18). He, however, stated that: the laws of historical explanation, as occurs for the natural sciences, they should be derived from the same historical science, and from the social sciences (19). However, the claim of the “functionalism” of codnsider the historiographical methodology as a fact at itself, is illogical, since the same conception “functionalist” (20) does not differ from the good methodology suitable for each science, be it natural that structural (21). It should search, in any case, the general laws valid for the structural reality, in order to be able to consider the history in the same way as any object of science, where the individual events are not sought for other purposes than for the examples of laws and theories, rather than as phenomena unique and unrepeatable, as they do, instead currently, the generality of historians, including the “positivists” (22), the which latter, simply consider as examples, the general appearance of certain phenomena or morphological elements (such as: the revolutions and wars, executions and so forth).

Robert Nisbet, as already Comte (23), had connect the systematic exposition of the ideas-base, or basic categories (24), at to the historic exposure (25), placing the ideas-base in their historical context. Nisbet recognized the possibility to divide the ideal systems in their ideas-base, or “fundamental categories” (26). Nisbet had identified, especially, in these latter the validity of the system concept. The inferential methodology Galileian-newtonian was considered valid by Popper, and consists in “give a causal explanation by deducting an assertion that describes it, using as a basis of the deduction, one or more laws universal, together with certain assertions singular said initial conditions” (27). On the basis of Popper, Antiseri had stated that the proof of the hypotheses takes place through the “forgery”, or experimentation, designed to refute hypotheses. The result of this process it will be possible to classify the theory as scientific law, in case of not confirmation of the falsehood of the hypothesis, taken as proof of its validity, at least provisional (28). In the absence of the possibility to adopt the principle of falsifying, for a given theory, this is certainly by consider non-scientific (29). Antiseri had defined: sciences “historical, in general, those whose interest is focused on specific facts and their explanation” (30). He proposed the use of the scientific method also for history. However, with Popper, he stated that we must still find a scientific methodology adequate for the Sciences “historical-social” (31). The debate between “secessionists” and not (of the historical methodology, from the sciences “theoretical”) leads to the conclusion that for the Sciences “social”, and for the history, in particular, there is no need for a methodology “sui generis”, since it is only a specific definition of the essence of the object of science, in relation both to the human being, and at the level of its evolution bio-psychic (32). The particular characteristic of the historical evolution does not lessen the possibility of his scientific analysis, through scientific laws (33) or extensible to all the field of the Social reality historical (whose extension must be scientifically determined) (34).

Antiseri stated that both in natural field, as in the structural field, you have cases of novelties “extrinsics” (namely, newness of combinations or provisions) (35), while you do not have, if not marginally, news “intrinsics” (with the uniqueness, in itself, of the phenomenon). He had noted as the unique character of a phenomenon is connected with the conditions contingents, that occur inevitably in every phenomenon, whether it be natural or structural (36).

If for the natural sciences you have managed to translate, almost all, the qualities in quantities, not so it happened in the social sciences, although here we make use of the statistic (something very different from the transformation of the qualities in quantities) (37). The lack of an appropriate method to transform the qualities in quantities demonstrates the failure to achieve of the scientificity of structural sciences.

Popper had recognized as the limit of the “social sciences” “must be exceeded” (38).

A symptom of a lack of scientificity, according to some epistemologists, is the methodology, used mainly in the “social sciences”, which is defined, method essentialist: direct survey of the cause for which happens a fact and which is its essence, in comparison to the method of the analysis of as it happens the action, also said the method nominalist (namely, at maximum, the research of the as) (39). The epistemologists ignore, however, the actual difference between the methodology essentialist and the analysis of as it happens the action (proposing the achievement of the knowledge of the essence, through the knowledge of the way of the occurrence of the phenomena). Also the “positivists”, as Popper, they argue that the social sciences use, in reality, nominalists models, although abstract (also, given the abstractiveness of the structural reality) (40). Dario Antiseri had defined historicism, as: a concept, according to which it is possible to identify the laws of historical evolution, in order to predict the subsequent developments. He despised the “holism”, namely, the claim to know totally a given event or historical fact (41). Antiseri had defined the inductive method as the method, according to which, you is legitimated at to go from specific observations of phenomena limited to general theories (42). Karl Popper, even if he had opposed at the inductive method, used by the “social scientists”, he had accepted its the “method eliminatory” (even describing it in another way) and refused the “induction for enumeration or repetitive”, even if (Antiseri stated), in reality, it was use, speaking however, of verification or falsification of principle (43). Popper, like other epistemologists, stressed that the principle of verification, as was formulated by the Vienna Circle, was nonscientific, since science progresses, even without verification (species when eliminatory, momentarily, there can be no verification) (44). Antiseri stated that Popper refused the inductive method, as well as used by “social scientists”, since does not provides a “criterion of demarcation”, appropriate, between metaphysics and empirical science (45). In fact, stated Antiseri, such demarcation is not supplied by the induction, in so far as, if the demarcation is there, is not empirical character, as instead say the “positivists” and the “neo-positivists” (46), which had based their scientific conception on empirical verification (namely, with a method, defined unscientific). Popper had adopted, essentially, the deductive method, the which last, derives the “universal assertions” (namely, the scientific theories, falsifiable, however, on the basis of observations singular) from the laws of nature (or axioms, but also from theories, from conception or from intuitions) (47). The deductive method is valid, but can and must, be used in conjunction with the inductive method (48). Popper had stated that in the human being there are innate needs and that from these, and not from the observation of reality, is appropriate to take start, for the human sciences (49). This is the base of the deductive method of Popper. Antiseri, while recognizing the value of such a method, had recognized the its dangers, being possible to fall in the nativism. Antiseri stated that the conjectures on human nature and the observations of reality have (among them) a ratio very precise, but remain two distinct fields and should adopt different methodologies. Furthermore, the analysis on human nature and on structural reality, proceed from intuitions or “hypothesis”, but these are not born from nothing, but only by a cognitive basis (50) already existing. Therefore, the inductive method and the one deductive: are interconnected and inseparable. Popper stated that the most important aspect of scientific theories consists in the denial of certain capability through the creation of the theoretical of the absurd (51) and through the absurd, for opposition, you create the plausible theories. Antiseri criticized the of Popper, conception according to which science cannot investigate the absolute (52), because we should not seek the essence last of things (53). Antiseri stated that this position (namely, the search of the essence ultimate of things) is unscientific, with the following excuse: no subject is outside the scope of science, for the definition of science itself, although science is always evolving and perfectible (54) (It must, however, consider that the last essence of things can not be refractory to the application of the scientific method, for the own analysis). Popper had stated that to the concept of certainty, in the scientific field, should be replaced that of progress (55), and the evidence should only be considered as “corroborations” (56) (and the corroborations, considered only as miss of falsifications). The scientific methodology, advocated by Popper, was to proceed by trial and error, researching the falsification, as pursuit of the strengthening, or corroboration, of the hypothesis not falsified (57). There was the fear of Popper that ideologies philosophical are able to block scientific progress, while he had hoped that the philosophy of science, or the epistemology, reaches the level of science. Popper had defined the revolutionary concepts such as “holistic” (58). The conceptions “holistic”, are able to distinguish between aspects, or attributes, of a part of reality (in particular relations existing between the various parts) and the aspects that confer to the whole: the typology of organised structure (59). The “holism” proposes the use of the historical method to treat the (60), namely proposes the study, for example, of the various social systems, having in mind the unitary structural essence of the universe structural statual. Popper warned the need to free themselves from the ideological impediments, to achieve genuine social sciences, where he claimed the need of the autonomy of the survey method, from the essence of the object analyzed (61).

Popper accused the sociologists of consider as dynamic: only those systems that, in their opinion, have changes in the structure, noting how in physics and astronomy you consider a system as dynamic, where it has a cyclic mutation, but devoid of structural change (62). The sociologists consider, instead, even, a structural mutation: what we consider the cyclical evolution, own of the universe structural statual, (which is certainly a dynamic system) which alternates two different phases (namely changes some of its characteristics, also relevant) while remaining structurally unique. Popper stated that the scientific laws, to be such, must have universal validity (63). 

In reality, the scientific laws may have a general validity, which it is to be understood as internal validity to the specific field of investigation.

The historians turn up their nose with respect to the method of Arnold Joseph Toynbee of “impose” some models (64) for the comparative analysis of the various societies, feeling (they) that the various societies are incomparable. Toynbee justified its “deviations” from the commonly accepted method, saying that such “deviations” descend, also, from scientific concepts currents. This has meant that his method has been accepted, albeit partially and with reserve. Historians, analyzing the Toynbee method: namely, of demonstrate that the development of every “civilization” (unless of special circumstances) you comply with its generalizations or laws, for what was considered in itself irreproachable, is sharply criticized for each historical particular, inaccurate reported by the same Toynbee (65). It is appreciated the modesty inherent in the declaration of Toynbee of: “attempt a scientific approach to human facts” (66), attempt appreciated, perhaps especially, because of the intrinsic contrast with its declared position anti deterministic, denier of every law historic (67). 

Some historians criticize the scientific method to Henri Pirenne, believing that it is not totally scientific, since it fails to take account of the scientific need to base the theoretical systems or the thesis on a number of examples, exhaustively studied (68). The theses of Pirenne, extraneous to the historical customary accademic, have a certain credit at official historians, who recognize to it the mrit of reflecting on the future of the human species. The theses of Pirenne, substantially correct, have not sufficiently been rehearsed and conducted to their logical consequences. Official historians love to cling to this inadequacy for deny any its validity (69). Many historians use a “typological method” (70), namely that escapes at each system which “generalizes”, or “conceptualism” (71), emerging from the intuition and merely suggest hypothesis circumscribed and provisional, or “working”. This latter method is extraneous at Pirenne, which for this reason is attacked by the “academic culture”. Federico Chabod had stated, for example, that the “historical method” (namely: the general methodology of the historical research, adopted by the academic world) is not, in itself, objective, but need to adapt it according to the situations (72). He had the merit, however, of recognize that the history, like every other branch of human knowledge, will begin to become scientific, when will become autonomous (73), and is not subject to external purposes.

The “historicism” does not distinguish between scientific laws (of general validity) and the “general assertions o increasing sophistication” (74) or restricted generalizations, namely: applicable to certain situations or conditions provisional.

Dray stated that historians are not “objectives”, because the historical research involves “value judgments” (75). He wanted a situation in which the scale of the values of the historical is not involved “logically” (76), namely as the basis of evaluation and addictive the “meaning of his statements” (77). The realisation of a scientific methodology valid for the story, so indisputable or empirically verified, could eliminate the influence of value judgments or, anyway, their impact on the historical objectivity (78): the assessment of values in act in the object of the research should be guided by criteria unrelated to the values own of the structural reality underway (whether they are of a statual phase or of the other (79). Michael Fisch stated that the maximum of objectivity obtainable by the historians is a criticism, that is not in conflict with the evidence of the facts and is open to any further criticism (80).

The methodology of history, proposal from the “functionalism”, instead of researching the causes of events, search for the purpose of the actions and the functions that they play within the social system in act (defined: “Everything” or “integral system of culture”) (81). Antiseri noted as between the “teleology functionalist” and the causal research, there is anything else that a mere linguistic difference (82).

Antiseri divided the hierarchisation of causes in: fundamentals and derived (or primaries and secondary) (83).

The “historians official” attempt to analyze the way in which, who has lived the events: as they have imagined it to be their essence and their epilogue, namely, as they have perceived them. The theory of the “empathy” (or identification in the thought of others) (84) can, marginally, be useful to better analyze thoroughly the real essence of specific cultures, although it is unnecessary for understand the actual human condition and the actual evolution of historical reality.

The philosophers of history of the trend “positivist” say that the experiments in the field of social reality should be carried out with appropriate criteria, but also affirm the scientific nature of the possible experiments in this field, as far as the results should be evaluated in relation at the specific essence of social reality (85). In the field of social reality of structural type, the experiments are resolved in forcing the normal structural evolution. In the field of a possible social reality post-structural, the experimentation is equivalent, vice versa, at to the attempts to overcome the reality structural of history.

Popper stated that the experiments holistic, proposed by those which he had defined as Utopians, are only improperly experiments, namely only in the sense of “action whose outcome is uncertain” (86) since they do not give the possibility to compare the results achieved (this mainly because he recognized the nature of “reinforced dogmatism” [87] of the ideology that is at origin of the experiment that, for this, the experiment itself may not have characteristics of scientificity, in relation to the declared aims and at the authentic human needs).

With the “history pre-literal” the “historians official” they intend, the history, of which, there is not a knowledge, through story written. This highlights how the distinction is typical of an erroneous methodology, as completely alien to any subdivision in periods with specific structural characteristics, as our subdivision into structural universes (88).

Durkheim himself recognized as it was not scientifically correct to use the terms in current use, according to the meanings that they acquire with the use (89), for the lack of systematic and consistency of these attributions (90). Even Bloch had recognized as the terminology, currently in use, it is often misleading and erroneous, in that: offers analogies where there are no and vice versa (91). Boutruche had recognized, moreover, as: in addition to the knowledge gaps, the historians are located in front of in terminological confusion (92). He, had avoided, however, of examine at the bottom, the causes of all this.

Some historians recognize the absolute arbitrariness and conventionality of the term “Middle Ages” (93), which is, generally, temporally localized between the half of the V century and the end of XV.

Robert Boutruche, while recognizing explicitly as in the XI century was reborn the market (94), stated that the “feudalism” (namely, that which we call the feudal phase decentralized) has spread in the West, especially from the XI century (95). Boutruche he thought it was deplorable that in the Studies “on the Middle Ages” there is a distinction between common language and technical terms (96). This shows as historical studies are subject to criteria unscientific as well as submissive to the ideologies, at the prejudices and at the support of the needs of the structural reality. These are the reasons for the poor scientificity of analyzes and investigations of the professional historians, since they confuse the current terminology with the real structural reality and its essential modifications, resulting from the structural evolution, of which, however, they ignore the essence and logic.

Boutruche had recognized as the reality of the feudal societies is “victim of abstractions that place it outside of time and space” (97). Stated that historians define the character of this “lordship” with the term “feudal rule” (98), for indicate the all-encompssing power and totally inhuman, exerted on men and things, existing in the feudal phases. However, they use the same term to indicate the power exerted, in very different ways, in systems that are very different, or even to indicate any type of large landed property (99).

Heers had reported as historians fear, in choosing the terminology to be taken, of to fall victims of various ideologisms or cultural trends. This fear comes from the lack of real scientific criteria.

The “comparativism” may replace the global analysis, where allows to understand the diversities of social realities observed and analyzed, taking into account the fact that each community constitutes a model, almost complete, of a specific type of society.

Bloch proposed to compare similar facts, occurring in environments and dissimilar times (100), as methodology of comparative history. He proposed, then, the systematic comparison between two parallel societies, and nearby, geographically and temporally, and therefore that undergo an ascendancy at each other, at least at the level possibilistic, the one to the other (101). This comparison, although limited, can allow scientific results, although it takes a vision far more high and wide of historical reality.

Lellia Cracco Ruggini, on the basis of the analysis of some historians (102), had equated society “Western” of the IV century CE to the “socialism real” of the XX century CE Lellia Cracco Ruggini (103). This, is able to demonstrate how many historians “moderns” they understand perfectly the real essence of the historical evolution, although they prefer to abstain from the analyze the same in a systematic way. Ruggini, however, identified some discrepancies between the “socialism of State” and the situation of the “Roman Empire of the West”, in the IV century. These discrepancies are in the decentralized nature of western society of the IV century and by the fact that you was in the presence of a society in transition to phase feudal and, in particular, the system feudal-bureaucratic, while in the twentieth century we are in the presence of systems feudal-bureaucratic centralized consolidated. The historians “academics”, in fact, they saw the presence of certain sectors of, they continue to exist in the IV century (104). Historians have noted a mixing of social stratification in western society of the IV century which, however, they neglect to investigate the cause. di cui, tuttavia, essi trascurano Bruno Rizzi had contended, with historians “official”, which do not have considered the system slaver-bureaucratic as part of that that we have defined the feudal phase, because it has no characteristics distinctly military. Rizzi, on the contrary, claimed the thesis according to which it would be produced what we called the feudal phase, although the “Patrons” have possessed some militia “privates”. In reality cannot be considered there was already a feudal phase consolidated, since there was still, the market, although limited, and therefore the materials ratios were not still predominantly of feudal type and, also, the priority value was not yet of type military, although the same characteristics of the hierarchical type-military were gradually incremented.

The proponents of the “Renaissance”, not have resurrected the idea of progress, since they have taken over the culture “ancient”, as a model and as a guide, since the ideal was identified in the restoration of the society “ancient”, considered the mirror of the true nature of the human being (105), in an optimism certainly excessive, but significant, of how they have understood correctly the historical moment that you were experiencing. Marx himself, had identified the term “feudalism” with that which we call the feudal phase, of which acknowledged there are “aspects different in relation with the circumstances of their historical development” (106). If the “historians classical” have illustrated, mainly, the regime, and identify the latter with the term “feudalism”, Marx had highlighted above all the material base. Many historians have used the term “feudalism” to indicate what we have defined the feudal phase, as: with the term “capitalism” have identified the mercantile phase (107) (at least that which it was emancipated from the slavers systems).

Historians recognize, generally, as the “manorial system” has been caused by that which they define: “commercial atony” of the “High Middle Age” (108). Also Comte had considered the feudalism a “transitional evolution”, namely an interlude between the mercantile phase “ancient”, that is, between the “evolution ancient and modern evolution”. He was, therefore, aware of the fact that the mercantile phase “ancient” was analogous to the statual phase who was contemporary to him, while what is called the “medieval feudalism” represented a rupture element, or alternative, between a given statual phase and the other of the same type, but of statual.

Durkheim had distinguished, speaking of “socialism”, among many “socialist systems” and the “socialism” as such, speaking, for the latter, of “system in general” and of specific types of systems: “socialist” (109), for the firsts. He identified the variant between the different “socialist systems”, inside the degree of centralization, from decentralisation to the complete centralization (110).

Pero Ostellino had reported as the concept according to which, with the so-called “Revolution of October”, in reality, it occurred a historical retrogression, there was widespread among the Russian intellectuals anti-conformists of the seventies of the twentieth century (111). This fact shows how the exact understanding of the structural reality, and of its real historical dynamic, is not far, and is only prevented from mental slavery imposed by the dominant ideologies, especially if of type dogmatic.

Some historians recognize as the current historiography is not scientific. They recognize how it can become scientifically valid, by applying to it the scientific method, basing the his analyzes on criteria and concepts: falsifiable. The purpose of the search historiographical will be considered compliant to science, if it meets criteria or scientific methods, consistent with the purpose of human progress (112). Witold Kula had quoted Ossowski, to which last, noted as “the schematics of the dichotomous class structure lend themselves in a more usefully to serve as ideological weapon in the fight against the existing structure, while the hierarchical patterns or functional are most useful for his defense” (113). It should be noted how the fight against structural reality existing in a given historical moment (social systems or phases statual in act) may be aimed at the creation of articulations of the structures statual, not less hierarchical and dichotomous and, therefore, as had noted Kula, the searches on “Social Structure” represent a field “where the ideological passions you … [concretized] more vividly” (114). A scientific analysis of the “social structure”, without having to choose between the “dichotomous scheme” and what of type “hierarchical”, you can easily see the impossibility of denying and the constant presence of the stratification hierarchical (in the two types of phases statual) and organic, and the consequent breakdown of the “social body” in two sections complementary organically: the section of the dominators and that of dominated.

Part VII:

Knowledge and conscience

Chapter 30:

Nature of the self-consciousness or awareness of self

In reality structural historical, knowledge, is transmitted mechanically or repetitively. However, the knowledge, in its creation, is not severable from the affectivity: the one presupposes and implies this other. Affectivity and knowledge, together, represent the purpose of humanity, definable as happiness self-conscious. The love or affectivity, you communicates through the creative sociality and operational. The excess of self consciousness, on the part of an individual, who is such if it exceeds the actual knowledge and ability of the subject itself, you manifested in megalomania. The ability to prophesy, charisma or magnetism of an individual, characterizes a overflowing self consciousness, while had accompanied by a knowledge and ability, in some exceptional way.

The irrationality is a form of error, related to the nature of the agent subject. It is not solely the fruit of the lack of knowledge or not enough knowledge, but also of the incognizance or shortage of awareness. The shortage of awareness of an individual creates a contrast between its real nature and its behavior, creating one affective decompensation with respect to the knowledge gained and at the essential nature of the subject itself. The failure to conscience of knowledge acquired, cancels the its value. The insufficient awareness of the knowledge possessed, makes the latter: sterile or fruitless. The overestimation of knowledge possessed, on the contrary, may determine aggressions or blunders and fanaticisms. Socrates, saying “I know not to know”, proved to have been conscious of the limits of his own knowledge, which would not allow him to define it: authentic knowledge. The conscience cannot be divorced from knowledge. There can’t be, indeed, a high consciousness, without an adequate knowledge. On the other hand, if the conscience implies knowledge, it is not said that knowledge, necessarily, implies consciousness or awareness of the actual reality of what you know, being possible that exists an abstract knowledge and fictitious (soaked in ideologies), not accompanied by adequate consciousness of its failure. You can say that discriminates between scientific knowledge, in the field of human knowledge, and ideological knowledge, elapse between the presence, or not, of the conscience of the actual human nature. The conscience is definable as the awareness of acquired knowledge. This awareness, gives value to knowledge itself, which becomes prolific itself of further knowledge and source of self-satisfaction. The irrational faith consists in the acceptance of an irrational knowledge, antithetical with respect to the empirical ascertainment. The irrational faith, like of the rest also the rational faith is, however, vitlizing, being generatrix of creativity or vital force. Parmenides had considered love: the fruit of the “need” or structural inevitability (1). In reality, the falling in love is a specific type of faith and is, therefore, consonant with the irrational nature of reality structural historical. Baruch Spinoza had stated that love is consequent to the conscience (or the belief) to be loved, believing that you have not provided the its cause (2). The love is, therefore, connected to a given type of faith. Love is greater if there is the “consciousness of freedom” (3). Therefore, the love can, however, coexist with the full rationality and, indeed, it is increased from this, becoming a rational faith. Psychologists define: the perception, the thought and the believe, as “ways intentional of to be” and the object of these “ways intentional of to be” is defined as “intentional object”. The phenomenal awareness or consciousness, or better to say, its objects, are defined “intentional objects of awareness”. Psychologists are wondering what constitutes the brain activity that determines the awareness or conscience. They ask themselves, furthermore, because the consciousness transformed the knowledge into something hardly communicable. The cause of the difficulty to communicate the conscious experience, derives from the irrational contents of the knowledge and from the awareness of these limits. The conscience is defined, by Nicholas Humphrey, as the process psychic that determines the wonder toward the world and the sense amplified of our importance. It ignores that, in reality, awareness is a psychic process precisely of all living matter, namely, of each nervous system biological (4), although this awareness is not accompanied to the knowledge of the own real condition , if not, as potential, not yet realized, of the human beings.

Spinoza had admitted that the non-knowledge constitutes a suffering of the mind (5), while knowledge is a cause of joy (6), although “the principle of conservation” (7) tends to preserve the non-knowledge of individuals.

Giulio Tononi has theorized that conscience is integrated knowledge, namely, a compresent knowledge, namely, integrated, in its entirety, or: in its main synthesis (8). The progress of humanity is measured not only in the field of knowledge but, above, in the field of consciousness: of self and of the others. The actual knowledge of the structural reality historical is an element of the progress of conscience. The human being, with the own intellectual abilities, can judge, and feel foreign to its nature: everything that does not reach its same degree of conscience. The conscience is evolving and, therefore, can reach a level sufficient to enable it to assess such as: totally immoral the structural reality historic in its entirety.

B. F. Skinner stated that conscience is a product of life, in society (9). The human conscience develops through the progress and the evolution of the structural reality historical.

The conscience individual is the complex of morality introjected or made their own by the individual himself, and constitutes its code of conduct. Where the behavior of the subject deviating from its conscience, there occurs an immediate attempt to reduce and eliminate this gap, or through the modification of the conscience itself or a modification of the behavior; where none of these two modifications are occurring, develops the sense of guilt. This, if the conscience has at its base a profound conviction and, at the same time, if the behavior that diverges from the moral has had stringent reasons (10).

Humanity is rooted in each individual, which is the expression, or manifestation, of the species. Humanity, therefore, not transcends individuals, but it is the individual who must take responsibility for the problems of their own species, being the species the generator itself of its individuality and of its sociality, of single individual. The species is present in every individual, in the same way. There is the “co-responsibility of the individual with the generality of the living and co-specific”. Indeed, there is, the responsibility of the individual for humanity, which is, moreover, present in every individual, as an intrinsic need, and the need for survival of the individuals is an aspect of the manifestation of the species. The valorization, and self-valorization, of the single, expresses the social value of the individual: for the collectivity and for himself. For humanity, as a whole, the individual has a value that corresponds to the level of expression of the being, realized by the species, taking account of the contribution that the specific subject he gives to the achievement of one specific level. The responsibility is connected to the consciences of single individuals, while the capacities are connected with their knowledge.

Chapter 31:

The Collective Consciousness and its consequences on the historical reality

Durkheim had recognized as the creation of a science of reality structural historical, which he defined as “social structure”, would lead at the preconditions for the implementation of the “conscience” of the same structural reality (1). 

The working classes, though less educated, have a more concrete perception of the historical reality, of how much they have, often, the members to the upper classes. This, for the contact harder and more direct, with the reality structural statual. This spontaneous conscience, if based on a knowledge of genuinely scientific, would have devastating effects on the same structural reality and its evolutionary dynamics.


The illusion of individuals to be architects of their own lives, collides with the reality of the lack of knowledge and awareness of the essence of the “Monster” which requires all human beings: a certain destiny, of which individuals, even in positions of power, as the various peoples, they ignore the its existence and his objectives. Individuals are forced to recite a part in a drama (or an tragedy), of which they same totally ignore the plot and the epilogue. You do not need interesting aphorisms, phrases or erudite quotations! Must be analyzed, in a proper and thorough way, the essence of this “Monster”, and the goals that he sets out (or at least, the way he wants to lead mankind), making aware of this the human beings, of good will. So we started to do, in this essay, and we intend to continue this analysis in the essays that will follow.

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Thank you!

Giano Rocca


Part I:

Cosmic nature, biological nature, human nature, sociability, society and historical structures

Chapter 1:

Cosmic evolution, biological evolution and human evolution

1 – David Patitucci, “The artificial cell made in Italy that challenge the USA. You head a technique that part by protein synthesis rather than by genetic heritage. Roberto Fabbri, “In the beginning was the bubble”. “Forget amino acids, proteins, RNA and DNA: life is born in spheres of lipids. This is long chains of carbon atoms and hydrogen: simple and perfect”. Interview with Daniel Segrè. From: of the 9/06/10, Item Added “Tutto Scienze”, page 26. 

2 – Mario Di Martino, “There is a factory of life at 700 light years from Earth. It was discovery in interstellar space the existence of a molecule-key. Traces of anthracene. Its presence could resolve the questions on production in the cosmos of ‘bricks’ organic”. From: of the 14/07/10, Item Added “Tutto Scienze” p. 33.

3 – John B. Bury, “History of the idea of progress”, Translation of Vittorio Di Giuro, Pietro Rossi Preface, pp. 9 and ff.

4 – Giorgio Celli, “When Darwin defeated the samurai. The case of the natural selection against harmony zen. Evolutionism. The survival of the most suitable individuals”. From: of the 16/12/09, Item Added: “Tutto Scienze”, p. 26.

5 – Glauco Maggi, “Behold the bacterium that demonstrates the existence of ET”. The NASA: “Discovered in to Yosemite Park. It is an alien creature because it lives of arsenic”. From: of the 3/12/10, p. 28.

6 – Sara Bovio, “This flea has more genes of us”. Research: “Can change morphology and reproductive strategies in response to the changes of the habitat”. “A special Dna which makes it capable of extraordinary metamorphosis”. From: of 30/03/11, Item Added “Tutto Scienze”, p. 25.

7 – Marco Pivato,”The gene ‘feels’ like you live. Our destiny is not etched into the Genome, but itself turn, through habits, that are ‘good’ or ‘bads’. An emerging discipline, the epigenetics, reveals how the influence environmental affects the expression of the DNA”. Maurilio Orbecchi, “So, a child inherits the stresses of father and mother”. From: Item Added: “Tutto Scienze” of 21/12/11, p. 28.

8 – Tullio Regge, “Vital equations. The debate on the principle anthropic: because the universe is governed by measures which are the only ones compatible with the man?” From: of the 20/01/82, Item Added “Tutto Scienze”, p. I. 

9 – Thomas Nagel, “Mind and cosmos: why the materialist neo-Darwinian conception of nature is almost certainly false”. From: of the 30/01/2013, Item Added “Tutto Scienze” p. II.

10 – Francesca Amé, “Discovered the mutant plant: does not follow the genetic laws. The research published by , could help the development of the therapies on DNA”. From: of 26/03/05, p. 16.

11 – Dario Antiseri, “Karl R. Popper: epistemology and open society”, Introduction and Part I, p. 215.

12 – Karl R. Popper, “The objective Knowledge: an evolutionary point of view”, p. 290.

13 – Karl R. Popper, Cited work, p. 290.

14 – Karl R. Popper, Cit. wo., p. 299.

15 – Karl R. Popper, Cit. wo., p. 361.

16 – Karl R. Popper, Cit. wo., p. 368.

17 – Karl R. Popper, Cit. wo., p. 368.

18 – L. H. Morgan, “The Ancient Society”, preface by Alessandro Casiccia, Part 1, Chap. 1, pp. 1 – 13.

Chapter 3:

Social progress and progress of the need of sociality

1 – Andrea Malaguti, “Who is more intelligent than between the two? According to the researchers of the University of Oxford the dog beats the cat: is much more social”. From: of the 24/11/10, p. 23.

2 – Claudia Bordese, “Many loves, a thousand perversions. Ethology. Drag queens, changes of sex and prostitution: When sex knows no inhibitions. Even the autoeroticism is not a human invention: ‘acts as stimulus to the coupling’”. From: of the 27/10/10, Item Added “TuttoScienze”, p. 28.

3 – John Bury, Cit. wo., pp. 202 and ff.

4 – J. Copans, “Cultural Anthropology”, Sansoni University, Ch. 2, under-cap. 3, p. 118.

Chapter 4:

Human nature and its specific sociality

1 – Gian Franco Minguzzi, “Psychological dynamic of social groups”, Il Mulino, Ch. 3, p. 93.

2 – Gian Franco Minguzzi, Cit. wo., p. 117.

3 – “Review: The third excluded”, by Ota De Leonardis, Ed. Feltrinelli. From: <La Stampa > of 15/09/90, Item Added <Tuttolibri>, p. V.

4 – Friederich Engels, “The Origin of the Family, of the Property and of the State”, Ch. 2, pp. 54 – 114.

5 – Piotr Kropotkin, “Ethics”, Edigraf, Catania, 1969, Preface and Capp. 1 and 2, p. 38.

6 – Telmo Pievani, “We are animals, in our own way. The man is no longer the exception sacred. Telmo Pievani: in the language there is evidence that Darwin had reason”. From: <La Stampa> of the 20/06/07, Item Added “Tuttoscienze”, p. I.

Chapter 5:

Evolution and progress of historical structures and human progress

1 – John Bury, Cit. wo., p. 182 and ff.

2 – John Bury, Cit. wo., p. 12 and ff.

3 – J. Copans, “From ethnology to anthropology”, Part 1, Chapter 3, pp. 22 – 34.

4 – J. Copans, Cit. wo., Part II, Chapter 15, pp. 279 – 295.

5 – John Bury, Cit. wo., Part 1, Chapter 1, p. 17 and ff.

6 – J. J. Rousseau, “On the origin of inequality”, Editori Riuniti, 1971, Preface and Part I, p. 175.

7 – J. J. Rousseau, Cit. wo., p. 110.

8 – Karl Marx, “Economic Forms Pre-capitalist”, Preface by Eric Hobsbawm, Ch. 1, pp. 7 – 25.

9 – Luigi Pareyson, “Truth and Interpretation”, Mursia, 1972, p. 229.

10 – Luigi Pareyson, Cit. wo., p. 230.

Part II:

Philosophy of being between historical reality and human nature

Chapter 6:

Be, Essence and Degree of Manifestation of the Essence

1 – Erich Fromm, “Have or Be”, p. 112. 

2 – David H. Lawrence, “Fantasy of the Unconscious and other essays on the Desire, the Love, the Pleasure”, Milan, Mondadori, 1978, p. 185.

3 – Ludwig Feuerbach, “The essence of Christianity”, Milan, Feltrinelli, 1971, p. 169.

Chapter 7:

Conception of the rationality and of the irrationality of human nature and artificiality of historical reality structural

1 – G. W. F. Hegel, “Lectures on the history of philosophy”, vol. II, p. 41.

2 – G. W. F. Hegel, Cit. wo., vol. II, p. 64.

3 – G. W. F. Hegel, Cit. wo., vol. II, p. 66.

4 – Arnobio, “Corpus”, Vienna, 4°; Monceaux, “Hist. litt. de l’Afrique chrétienne”, vol III, p. 275 ff., Buonaiuti, “Fragments gnostics”, p. 278 sgg.. From: Nicola Abbagnano, Cit. wo., – Vol. I, Part II, Ch. 2, § 141, p. 283.

5 – Norberto Bobbio, “From Hobbes to Marx”, Chapter 6, “Studies On Hegel”, p. 189.

6 – Norberto Bobbio, Cit. wo., p. 190.

7 – Norberto Bobbio, Cit. wo., p. 191.

8 – Norberto Bobbio, Cit. wo., p. 198.

9 – Immanuel Kant, “Critique of Pure Reason”, Introduction of Vittorio Mathieu, p. V.

10 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. VI.

11 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. XXVIII.

12 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. XXIX.

13 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. XXX.

14 – Augusto Guzzo, “History of Philosophy and of Civilization for Assays”, Vol. IX: “Kant”, Foreword and Capp. 1 and 2 p. 47.

15 – Immanuel Kant, “Critique of Judgment teleological”, § 65, in: Jean – Jacques Rousseau, Claire Salomon – Bayet, Paris, Seghers, Trad. it.: “Rousseau. The life thought the texts specimens”, Milan, Accademia, 1971, p. 138, note 2.

16 – Luigi Pareyson, Cit. wo., Part III, Chapter 1, p. 192.

17 – Norberto Bobbio, “From Hobbes to Marx”, Cit. wo., Chapter 6, “Studies On Hegel”, Cit., p. 184.

18 – Norberto Bobbio, Cit. wo., p. 185.

19 – Norberto Bobbio, Cit. wo., p. 186.

Chapter 8:

The Search of the good of the individuals and his relationship with the search of the social good

1 – Claudio Napoleoni, “Smith Ricardo Marx”, Boringhieri, Ed. 1970, II^ Ed. partial redone 1973, Turin – Cap. 3, p. 41.

2 – Claudio Napoleoni, Cit. wo., p. 42.

3 – Claudio Napoleoni, Cit. wo., p. 45.

Chapter 9:

The Potential Universality, Universality of Knowledge, Universality of Structural Reality Historical and the Universality of the Human Spirit

1 – Immanuel Kant, “Critique of Pure Reason”, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Book II, p. 126.

2 – Al-Gazali, “Trends of philosophers”, trad. lat., “Logica et philosophia”, Venice, 1516; “Averroes, Destructio philosophorum”, and “Destructio destructionum”, and finally, “Tendentiae philosophorum”, Leiden, 1888; “Averroes, Metaphisic”. A. Medieval Traslation, Muckle, Toronto, 1933; L. Vaglieri Veccio and R. Rubinacci edd., “Written chosen”, Turin, 1970; Asin Palacios, “Algazel: dogmatic and moral, ascetic”, Zaragoza, 1901; Carra de Vaux, “Gazali”, Paris, 1902; “Obermann, Der Philosophische und religiòse Subiektivismus Ghazalis”, Vienna – Leipzig, 1921; Watts, “The Faith and Practice of al-Ghazali”, London, 1953; Farid Yabre, “The notion de certitude selon Ghazali dans ses origines psychologiques et historiques”, Paris, 1958. From: Nicola Abbagnano, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Part III, Chapter X, § 237, p. 471.

3 – Marc Bloch, “The work and the technique in the Middle Ages”, Ed. It. 1959, In: <Biblioteca di cultura moderna>, Laterza, VI edition, Bari, 1977 Preface by Gino Luzzatto, Ital. Trans.: Giuliano Procacci, Ch. 1, p. 34.

4 – John Bury, Cit. wo., p. 8.

Part III:

Philosophy of History

Chapter 10:

Adumbrations of conception of the cyclical nature of the universe structural statual

1 – Emile Durkheim, “Le socialisme – Sa définition, ses debuts, la doctrine saint-simonienne”, Paris, Librairie Felix Alcan, 1928 Trad. It. of Elio Roggero edited by Filippo Barbano, “Socialism”, Milan, Franco Angeli, 1973 – Book II, p. 265.

2 – John Bury, Cit. wo., p. 194 and ff.

3 – Pietro Rossi ed., “Il concetto di cultura”, Einaudi Paperbacks – essay: “The concept of Culture in Science”, A. L. Kroeber, part I. In: <Journal of General Education> N. 3, 1949, pp. 99 – 114.

4 – Radcliffe – Brown, Cit. wo., Footnote of edition and Introduction, p. 1.

5 – W. H. Dray, “Philosophy and historical knowledge”, Il Mulino, p. 98.

6 – W. H. Dray, Cit. wo., p. 99.

7 – W. H. Dray, Cit. wo., p. 100.

8 – W. H. Dray, Cit. wo., p. 101.

9 – W. H. Dray, Cit. wo., p. 104.

10 – E. Cassin, J. Bottéro and J. Vercoutter ed., “Gli imperi dell’antico Oriente II”, Vol. III de: “Storia universale Feltrinelli”, p. 214.

11 – Gianni Vattimo, “We, melancholics postmoderns. Vattimo to interview with Lyotard: the history after the end of the big illusions”. From: <La Stampa > of the 14/05/91, p. 17.

12 – Pietro Rossi ed., “The concept of culture”, Cit. wo., p. 128.

13 – Pietro Rossi ed., Cit. wo., p. 129.

14 – W. H. Dray, Cit. wo., p. 152.

15 – Diels, “Fragmente der Vorsokratiker”, 5^ ediz., 1934, vol. I; e in: <Neue Jahrbucher>, 1923, 65 – 76; Heidel, in: <Classical Philology>, 1912; C. Kahn, “A. and the Origins of Greek Cosmology”, New York, 1960. In: Nicola Abbagnano, “Storia della filosofia”, U.T.E.T., 1974 – Vol. I, Part I, Cp. II, § 9, p. 17.

16 – Cit. Bibligraphy, In: Nicola Abbagnano, Cit. wo., p. 18.

17 – Diels, Cit. wo., chap. 31; Zeller – Nestle, Cit. wo., I, 939 ff.; Bignone, “Empedocle”, Turin, 1916; G. Colli, E., Pisa, 1949; W. Kranz, E., Zurich, 1949; J. Zafiropulo, “E. D’Agrigente”, Brussels, 1959. In: Nicola Abbagnano, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Part I, cap.II, § 21, p. 44.

18 – Cit. Bibligr., from: Nicola Abbagnano, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Part I, Chap. IX, § 55, p. 116.

19 – Cit. Bibligr., from: Nicola Abbagnano, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Part I, Chap. XI, § 73, p. 153.

20 – Cit. Bibligr., from: Nicola Abbagnano, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Part I, Chap. XI, § 74, p. 155. 

21 – John Bury, Cit. wo., pp. 21 ff..

22 – G. W. F. Hegel, “Lectures on the history of philosophy”, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Part I, p. 256.

23 – G. W. F. Hegel, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Part I, p. 311.

24 – G. W. F. Hegel, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Part I, p. 319.

25 – G. W. F. Hegel, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Part I, p. 334.

26 – William James, “A Pluralistic Universe”, Cit. wo., Chap. 3, p. 58.

27 – William James, Cit. wo., Chap. 3, p. 62.

28 – S. L. Utçenko, Cit. wo., Editori Riuniti, Preface F. Cassola, Introduction and Chap. 1, p. 31.

29 – S. L. Utçenko, Cit. wo., p. 62.

30 – S. Piano, Cit. wo., p. 8.

31 – S. Piano, Cit. wo., p. 20.

32 – S. Piano, Cit. wo., p. 39.

33 – S. Piano, Cit. wo., p. 194.

34 – F. Wilhelm, “India”, Vol. 17 of: “Storia universale Feltrinelli”, Cit. wo., p. 128.

35 – F. Wilhelm, Cit. wo., p. 129.

36 – Cit. Bibligr., By: Nicola Abbagnano, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Part II, Ch. III, § 146, p. 294.  

37 – Cit. Bibligr.,. By: Nicola Abbagnano, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Part III, Ch. VII, § 220, p. 435.

38 – John Bury, Cit. wo., p. 29 and ff.

39 – John Bury, Cit. wo., p. 35 and ff.

40 – John Bury, Cit. wo., p. 138 and ff.

41 – Robert Boutruche, “Seigniory et Fèodalité. The premier àge des liens d’homme à homme”, Paris, Montaigne, 1968, Italian translation. Mario Sanfilippo, “Lordship and feudalism. Manorial system and clienteles of submission as vassals”, III Edition, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1974, Part II, Ch. 1, p. 223.

42 – Robert Boutruche, Cit. wo., p. 224.

43 – Robert Boutruche, Cit. wo., p. 224.

44 – G. Tobacco, “Egemonie and vicissitudes of power in the middle ages”, Turin, Bottega di Erasmo, 1976, Introduction, p. VII.

45 – G. Tobacco, Cit. wo., p. 29.

46 – G. Tobacco, Cit. wo., Introduction, p. VII.

47 – G. Tobacco, Cit. wo., p. 2.

48 – Emile Durkheim, “Il Socialismo”, Cit. wo., Book II, p. 273.

49 – Emile Durkheim, Cit. wo., Book II, p. 392.

50 – Raymond Aron, “Main Currents in Sociological Thought”, Basic Book Inc. Publishers, 1967, Trad. It. di Aldo Devizzi, “Le tappe del pensiero sociologico” – Milano Mondadori, 1972, Part I, p. 178.

51 – Raymond Aron, Cit. wo., p. 179.

52 – Eugenio Garin, “Rebirths and revolutions: cultural movements from the XIV to the XVIII century”, Bari, Laterza, Chap. I, p. 6.

53 – Eugenio Garin, Cit. wo., p. 9.

54 – Eugenio Garin, Cit. wo., p. 11.

55 – Eugenio Garin, Cit. wo., p. 24.

56 – Eugenio Garin, Cit. wo., p. 22. 

57 – Henri Pirenne, “The cities of the Middle Ages”, Laterza, p. 71.

58 – Henri Pirenne, Cit. wo., Introduction of O. Capitani,, p. XXXIII.

59 – Henri Pirenne, Cit. wo., p. XXXIV.

60 – Henri Pirenne, Cit. wo., p. XXXVI.

61 – Henri Pirenne, Cit. wo., p. XLIII.

Chapter 11:

Structural reality historic, the universes structural, and the various social systems

1 – Radcliffe – Brown, “Structure and function in primitive society”, Chap.1, p. 16.

2 – Radcliffe – Brown, Cit. wo., Chap. 1, p. 18.

3 – Chito Guala, Cit. wo., pp. 5 – 35. 

4 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., p. 101.

5 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., p. 102.

6 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., p. 35.

7 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., p. 37.

8 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., p. 35.

9 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., p. 30.

10 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., p. 36.

11 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., p. 37.

12 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., p. 37 – 38.

13 – J. Copans, “From ethnology to anthropology”, Chap. 1, Subchapter 2, pp. 16 – 20.

14 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., p. 38.

15 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., p. 40.

16 – L. Cracco Ruggini, “New issues of ancient history”, Essay: “Experiences economic and social in the Roman world”, p. 780.

Chapter 12:

Multiplicity of theories on the historical reality and on its evolution

1 – W. H. Dray, Cit. wo., p. 5.

2 – W. H. Dray, Cit. wo., p. 123.

3 – Franco Giliberto, “The first time that the man smiled to woman. A film based on the anthropological researches”. From: of the 3/03/82, Item Added “Tuttoscienze”, p. III.

4 – R. Boutruche, “Lordship and feudalism. Manorial system and clienteles of submission as vassals”,

Cit. wo., Vol. I, Part I, p. 29.

5 – John Bury, Cit. wo., p. 8.

6 – Gianni Vattimo, “Archaeologist of the mind. The lesson and the silences of Foucault”, From: <La Stampa > of the 27/05/82, p. 3.

7 – Arturo Carlo Jemolo, “The dark sense of history”. From: <La Stampa > of the 13/05/1979, p. 3.

8 – Marc Bloch, Cit. wo., p. 228 – 229.

9 – Marc Bloch, Cit. wo., p. 229.

10 – John Bury, Cit. wo., p. 7. 

11 – Gilberto de la Porrée, “De Hebdomadibus”, in <Traditio>, 1953; “Contra Euthychen et Nestorium (De Duabus naturis)”, in <Arch. Hist. Doctr. De la Litt. m. à.>, 1954, pp. 241 – 357; “De Trinitate”, Toronto, 1955; Forest, “Le Réalisme de G. de la P.”, in <Revue des Sc. Phil. et Théol.>, 1937, pp. 449 – 482; Haring, “The Commentary of G. of P. on Boethius, Contra Euthychen et Nestorium”, in <Misc. of University Catt. Milan>, 1956. From: Nicola Abbagnano, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Part III, Chapter VII, § 216, p. 421.

12 – John Bury, Cit. wo., p. 154 and ff.

Chapter 13:

Classification of structural universes, in the evolution of reality structural historical, and of the joints of the aforementioned structural universes

1 – Zeller, “Philosophie der Griechen”, Ital, trans. of Mondolfo, Firenze, 1932, vol. I, III, 2, 124 ff., 165 ff., 234 ff.; Dihl, “I detti aurei”, in: “Anthol. Lyrica”, Lipsia, 1923; Mullach, “Fragm. phil. graec.”, I; “Porfirio e Giamblico”, Ital. trans. of Pesenti, “Detti aurei, Simboli, Lettere e Vite di Pitagora”, Lanciano, 1922, <Cultura dell'anima>. Da: Nicola Abbagnano, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Part I, Chap. XVII, § 117, p. 241.

2 – J. Copans, “From ethnology to anthropology”, Cit. wo., Chap. 1, Subchap. 5, pp. 36 – 38.  

3 – J. Copans, “Cultural Anthropology”, Cit. wo., Chap. 2, Subchap. 4, pp. 123 – 132.

4 – Jacques Heers, “Clans familial au Moyen Age”, Presses Universitaires de France, 1974 – Ital. trans. By Alessandro Masturzo, “The family clan in the Middle Ages”, Naples, Liguori, 1976, p. 17.

Chapter 14:

Determinisms various or several theories of the factors determinants

1 – John Bury, Cit. wo., p. 65 and ff.

2 – John Bury, Cit. wo., p. 96 and ff.

3 – John Bury, Cit. wo., p. 116 and ff. 

4 – Pietro d’Abano, “Conciliator”, Venice, 1476, 1483, 1565; Pietro d’Abano, “Expositio problematum Aristotelis”, Mantova, 1475; S. Ferrari, “The times, life, doctrines of Pietro d’Abano”, Genova, 1900; Duhem, “Système du monde”, IV, pp. 229 – 263; Nardi, “Around the philosophical doctrines of P. d’Abano”, Milan, 1921; Troilo, “Theories of Averroes and Aristotelianism of Padua”, Padova, 1939; Gilson, “Etudes de philosophie médiévale”, Paris, pp. 51 – 75; J. Rivière, in <Dict. de théol. Catholique>, VIII, pp. 764 and ff.; McClintock, “Perversity and Error”, Indiana, 1956; John Baconthorp, “Commentary to judgments”, Milan, 1510; Michalski, “Les courants philosophiques à Oxford et à Paris pendant the XIVe siècle”, Krakow, 1922, p. 13 and ff. From: Nicola Abbagnano, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Part III, Chapter XXI, § 312, p. 616. 

5 – Henri Pirenne, Cit. wo., Introduction of O. Captani, p. XXXVII.

6 – Henri Pirenne, Cit. wo., p. XLI.

7 – Emile Durkheim, “Social work”, Cit. wo., p. 65.

Chapter 15:

Cyclic trend of the universe structural statual, with the transition periods and the partitions of the two historical cycles

1 – Antonio Aimi, “21/12/2012 The end of the world? What hides behind the ‘prophecy’ Maya that feeds a a growing trend of fantasies and business”. From: of the 2/08/09, Item Added: “Cultura & Spettacoli”, p. 31.

2 – W. H. Burston & D. Thompson edd., “Structure and teaching of history”, Armando p. 152.

3 – W. H. Burston & D. Thompson edd., Cit. wo., p. 155.

4 – Pietro Rossi, “Positivism and industrial society”, pp. 32 – 33.

5 – Pietro Rossi, Cit. wo., p. 33 and ff.

6 – Pietro Rossi, Cit. wo., p. 35 and ff.

7 – Pietro Rossi, Cit. wo., p. 80.

8 – Pietro Rossi, Cit. wo., p. 120.

9 – Emile Durkheim, “Social work”, Cit. wo., p. 389.

10 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., Introduction and Part I, p. 22.

11 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., p. 114 – 115.

12 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., p. 117.

13 – Carlos Barbè, “Notes for a theory of legitimacy”, pp. 7 and ff.

14 – Carlos Barbè, Cit. wo., p. 42, Note 1.

15 – Carlos Barbè, Cit. wo., p. 54 – 55.

16 – J. Copans, Cit. wo., “Cultural Anthropology”, Ch. 1, Subchap. 3, § 3, pp. 22 – 25.

17 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., p. 193.

18 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., p. 208 – 209.

19 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., p. 291.

20 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., p. 196.

21 – Emile Durkheim, “The Socialism”, Cit. wo., p. 136.

22 – Emile Durkheim, Cit. wo., p. 47.

23 – Emile Durkheim, Cit. wo., p. 138.

24 – Emile Durkheim, Cit. wo., p. 68.

25 – Chito Guala, Cit. wo., Chap. 10, p. 106.

Part IV :

Essence of science and of the ideologies

Chapter 16:

Definition of the various types of science

1 – Antonella Del Rosso, “When it seems in crisis, knowledge advances. Blunders or new truth? Always remains current the Galileo’s lesson”. From: of the 26/11/08, Item Added: “TuttoScienze”, p. IV.

2 – Karl R. Popper, “Objective knowledge: a point of view according to the theory of evolution”, p. 490.

3 – Karl R. Popper, Cit. wo., p. 494.

4 – Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave edd., “Criticism and the growth of knowledge”, 1970, Cambridge University Press, Ital. transl. and Introd. di Giulio Giorello, “Critica e crescita della conoscenza”, Feltrinelli, Milan, 1976, pp. 84 and 203.

5 – Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave edd., Cit. wo., p. 84 – 85.

6 – Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave edd., Cit. wo., p. 175.

7 – Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave edd., Cit. wo., p. 194.

8 – Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave edd., Cit. wo., p. 195.

9 – Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave edd., Cit. wo., p. 201.

10 – Christian Descamps, “I speak to you of the land of the sacred . Interview with the Thinker at the frontiers of philosophy and of the Judaism”. From: of the 28/11/80 p. 9.

11 – Karl R. Popper, “Objective knowledge: a point of view of evolutionary”, Cit. wo., p. 11.

12 – Karl R. Popper, Cit. wo., p. 150.

13 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 14.

14 – Norberto Bobbio, “From Hobbes to Marx”, Morano, Naples, 3^, 1974, p. 85.

15 – Hochstetter, “Studien”, Cit. wo.; Doncoeur, in , 1921, p. 5 – 25; S. G. Ternay, “W. of O.‘s Nominalism”, in , 1936, p. 245 – 268; P. Vignaux, “Nominalisme, au XIVe siècle”, Montréal – Paris, 1948. In: Nicola Abbagnano, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Part III, Chapter XXII, § 316, p. 626.

16 – Karl R. Popper, “Objective knowledge: a point of view of evolutionary”, Cit. wo., p. 13.

17 – Eugenio Garin, Cit. wo., Chap. IX, p. 308.

18 – Karl R. Popper, “Objective knowledge: a point of view of evolutionary”, Cit. wo., p. 37.

19 – Karl R. Popper, Cit. wo., p. 41.

20 – Karl R. Popper, Cit. wo., p. 44.

21 – Karl R. Popper, Cit. wo., p. 45.

22 – Karl R. Popper, Cit. wo., p. 47.

23 – Karl R. Popper, Cit. wo., p. 53.

24 – Karl R. Popper, Cit. wo., p. 72.

25 – Karl R. Popper, Cit. wo., p. 83.

26 – Karl R. Popper, Cit. wo., p. 86.

27 – Karl R. Popper, Cit. wo., p. 88.

28 – Karl R. Popper, Cit. wo., p. 215.

29 – Karl R. Popper, Cit. wo., p. 220.

30 – Karl R. Popper, Cit. wo., p. 253.

31 – Karl R. Popper, Cit. wo., p. 244. 

32 – Francesco Barone, “Defense of the method. Between Science and pseudoscience”. From: of the 11/06/82 p. 5.

33 – Alberto Conte, “The curve which amazed mathematicians. Fifty years after the death of Giuseppe Peano”. From: of the 21/04/82, Item Added: “Tuttoscienze” p. III.

34 – Franca D’Agostini, “Science and philosophy. The third way of Pera. A speech over the ‘method’ between Descartes and Feyerabend”, from: of the 27/07/91, Item Added , p. VI.

35 – Eugenio Garin, Cit. wo., Chap. IX, p. 324.

36 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., Presentation of Filippo Barbano, p. XI.

37 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., p. XII.

38 – John Bury, Cit. wo., pp. 202 and ff.

39 – Kurt Lewin, “Theory and experimentation in social psychology”, Il Mulino, Introduction to Ed. Italian A. Palmonari, p. VII.

40 – Maier, “Socrates, sein Werk und seine geschichtliche Stellung”, Tubinga, 1913, Ital. transl., Firenze, 1944, Vol. I, Part I, Chap. 3; Part II, Chap. 4. From: Nicola Abbagnano, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Part I, Chapter VII, § 34, p. 71.

41 – V. Goldschmidt, “Les dialogues de Platon”, Paris, 1947; Jaeger, “Paideia”, II and III, New York, 1943. From: Nicola Abbagnano, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Part I, Chap. IX, § 47, p. 93.

42 – Zeller, “Philosophie der Griechen”, Cit. wo., III, 1, p. 378; Lucretius, “De rerum natura”, Giussani, Turin, 1896 – 98; Gomperz ed., “De signis”, Leipzig, 1865; William ed., “Diogenes Enoanda of fragments”, Leipzig, 1907. From: Nicola Abbagnano, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Part I, Chapter XIV, § 98 p. 212.

43 – Cit. Bibliogr., From: Nicola Abbagnano, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Part I, Chap. IX, § 47, p. 95.

44 – Spinoza, Cit. wo., Part II, p. 104.

45 – Spinoza, Cit. wo., Part IV, p. 237.

46 – Immanuel Kant, “Critique of Pure Reason”, Cit. wo., Vol. II, Book II, p. 623.

47 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., Vol. II, Book II, p. 624.

48 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., Vol. II, Book II, p. 632.

49 – Karl R. Popper, “Objective knowledge: a point of view of evolutionary”, Cit. wo., p. 285.

50 – Karl R. Popper, Cit. wo., p. 405.

51 – Franco Prattico, “Dear Albert, Dear Michael”. From: of the 30/07/95, Item Added “Cultura”, p. 23.

Chapter 17:

Science and concepts of causal principle and of purpose

1 – Immanuel Kant, “Critique of Pure Reason”, Cit. wo., Book II, Ch. 2, Section 3, p. 198.

2 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. 208.

3 – Alberto Masani, “More carefully teacher Regge with the anthropic principle”. From: <La Stampa > of the 10/03/82, Item Added “Tuttoscienze”, p. III.

4 – Ermanno Bencivenga, “Since when the world is no longer the world. In the West has won the arrogance of realism, but we can regain the freedom of dreams and utopias”. From: <La Stampa> of the 17/09/04, p. 27.

5 – Gabriele Beccaria, “Interview with Paul Steinhardt: Thousand Big Bang in the universe that has no end. Past and future are linked by an evolution. But in the next cycle we could not exist”. From: <La Stampa > of the 29/10/08, Item Added “Tuttoscienze”, p. IV.

6 – Silvano Costanzo, “Now the followers of the ‘heretical’ Adler do not have more complexes of inferiority. It was concluded yesterday in Camogli the II National Congress of the S.I.P.I.”. From: <Stampa Sera> of 12/10/81, p. 9.

Chapter 18:

Knowledge and human purpose of the self-consciousness and of the consciousness of nature, in general

1 – Radcliffe-Brown, Cit. wo., Chap. 8, pp. 129 – 143.

2 – Alberto Masani, “The universe, the research and the controversies. Attentive to the news that come from the Cosmos”. From: <L’Unità> of 18/01/82, p. 3.

3 – Cerniscevski, “What to do?” U. E., 1950, p. 142.

4 – Federico Chabod, Cit. wo., Frederick Meinecke”, p. 259.

5 – John Bury, Cit. wo., pp. 47 ff..

6 – John Bury, Cit. wo., p. 56 and ff.

7 – Ennio Caretto, “Alarm of the biologists, after the ‘super mice’ the temptation to try even on man. Requested some laws against human experiments in genetic engineering”. From: <La Stampa > of the 7/01/81, p. 4.

Chapter 19:

: in the reality structural historical and for the overcoming this reality

1 – Roberto Sabatino Lopez, “The birth of Europe: centuries V – XIV”, Turin, Einaudi, 1966, p. 415.

2 – Piotr Kropotkin, Cit. wo., p. 27.

3 – Luigi Pareyson, Cit. wo., Chap. 2, p. 220.

4 – Luigi Firpo, “Wishes without hope”. From: <La Stampa > of the 14/03/82, p. 2.

5 – Mauro Ceruti, “We will live dangerously”. From: <La Stampa > of 16/07/08, Item Added “Tuttoscienze”, p. VII.

6 – Eight Kallschheuer, “Bobbio. What remains of the ’900. In an interview to The philosopher tells the germans his reflections on the century and on the limits of reason”. From: of the 30/12/99, p. 23. 

7 – John Bury, Cit. wo., p. 65 and ff.

8 – Gianni Vattimo, “Eco: The work is interrupted. Exits the essay ‘the limits of interpretation’”. From: of the 9/02/91, Item Added “Tuttolibri”, p. IV.

9 – Pietro Rossi ed., “The concept of culture”, assay of Ralph Linton, “Culture, Society and the individual”, in: <The tree of Culture>, A. Knopf, New York, 1955, pages 29 – 40, reproduced p. 229.

10 – Pietro Rossi ed., Cit. wo., – assay of Robert Lowie, “Cultures and Ethnology”, Ch. 4, McMurtrie, New York, 1917, reproduced pp. 75 – 94.

11 – Karl R. Popper, “Objective knowledge: a point of view of evolutionary”, p. 46.

12 – Bacon, “Opus maius”, London, 1773, Venice, 1750, Bridges, 2 voll., Oxford, 1897; Brewer ed., “Opus minus, Opus tertium, Compendium philosophiae”, in: “Opera quaedam hactenus unedita”, London, 1859; Steele ed., “Opera hactenus unedita”, 5 fasc., Oxford, 1905 – 1920; Rashdall ed., “Compendium studii theologiae”, Aberdoniae, 1911; Little, “The Gray Fiars in Oxford”, Oxford, 1892, 195 – 211; Mandonnet, in <Revue néoscol.>, 1913, p. 53 – 68, 164 – 180; Charles, “Roger Bacon, Sa vie, ses ouvrages, ses doctrines”, Paris, 1861; Carton, “L’expérience physique chez R. B.”, Paris, 1924; Id., “L’expérience mystique de l’illumination intérieure chez R. B.”, Paris, 1924; Id., “The doctrinale syntése de R. B.”, Paris, 1924; Duhem, “Système du monde”, V, 375 – 491; Easton, “R. B. and his search for a Universal Science”, New York, 1952; Alessio, “Myth and Science in R. B.”, Milano, 1957. From: Nicola Abbagnano, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Part III, Chapter XIX, § 300, p. 588.

13 – Marc Bloch, Cit. wo., p. 12.

14 – Eric Hobsbawn, “The Short Century”, Milan, R.C.S. Books, p. 317.

15 – Eric Hobsbawn, Cit. wo., p. 318.

16 – J. J. Rousseau, Cit. wo., p. 113.

17 – Eugenio Garin, Cit. wo., Chap. IX, p. 323.

18 – M. Godelier, “The Economic anthropology”, in: A.A. V.V., “Cultural Anthropology”, Sansoni Università, chap. 1 and 2 Section 1 – 3 pp. 163 – 171.

19 – M. Godelier, Cit. wo., in: A.A. V.V., Cit. wo., chap. 2 Sect. 4 – 8 pp. 171 – 185.

20 – Luigi D’Ardres – S. Sforza, “The greek civilization, roman and medieval”, Vol. II, Part 1, Chapter VI.

21 – Cit. Bibliog. in: Nicola Abbagnano, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Part III, Chapter VII, § 215, p. 417.

22 – G. Ostrogorsky, “History of the Byzantine Empire”, Einaudi, Chap. 4 (1st part), p. 246.

23 – R. Boutruche, “Seigneurie et Fèodalité. L’Apogeèe (Xie – XIIIe siècle)”, Paris, Aubier Editions Montaigne, 1970, Ital. Transl. by Maria Luisa Ceccarelli, “Lordship and feudalism. Lordship rural and fief”, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1974, Part I, CAPP. 1 – 2, p. 14.

24 – March Bloch, Cit. wo., p. 90.

25 – March Bloch, Cit. wo., pp. 82 – 83.

26 – Piero Ostellino, “Live in Russia”, Milan, Rizzoli, 1977, p. 260.

27 – Piero Ostellino, Cit. wo., p. 257 and ff.

28 – Piero Ostellino, Cit. wo., p. 263.

29 – Eric Hobsbawn, Cit. wo., p. 344.

30 – L. H. Morgan, Cit. wo., Part 1, Chapter 1, pp. 1 – 13.

31 – Karl Marx and Friederich Engels, “The German Ideology”, pp. 17 – 57 in: Karl Marx, Cit. wo., pp. 131 – 137.

32 – Karl Marx and Friederich Engels, Cit. wo., p. 144.

33 – Charles P. Kindleberger, “The Economic Development”, Milan, Kompass Etas, 1967, p. 183.

34 – Charles P. Kindleberger, Cit. wo., p. 183.

35 – Charles P. Kindleberger, Cit. wo., p. 177.

36 – Charles P. Kindleberger, Cit. wo., p. 184.

37 – Charles P. Kindleberger, Cit. wo., p. 188.

38 – From: Nicola Abbagnano, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Part I, Chap. IX, pp. 84 – 130.

39 – Karl R. Popper, Cit. wo., p. 213.

40 – Karl R. Popper, Cit. wo., p. 167.

41 – M. Piattelli Palmarini, “Make poetry with gestures. Two scientists have debunked the common places on the deaf and dumb”. From: <La Stampa> of the 6/09/80, p. 3 and Mario Fazio, “Konrad Lorenz: three risks for man. Speaks the nobel ethologist, winner of the ‘Cervia Environment’”. From: <La Stampa > of the 7/09/80, p. 3.

42 – Gianni Vattimo, “Benjamin in the crisis of Marxism. The philosopher, the time, the revolution: a congress reopens the debate”. From: <La Stampa > of the 4/05/82, p. 3.

43 – Luciano Gallino, “Love of a Computer. The brain and the machine”. From: <La Stampa > of the 15/02/83 p. 5.

Chapter 20:

Essence of ideologies

1 – John Bury, Cit. wo., pp. 182 and ff.

2 – Ziesche, “Die hl. B. Lehre von der logisch psychologischen – Analyze des Glaubensaktes”, Wroclaw, 1908. From: Nicola Abbagnano, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Part III, Chapter XIII, § 261, p. 510.

3 – Karl R. Popper, Cit. wo., p. 387.

4 – Karl R. Popper, Cit. wo., p. 389.

5 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., Preface, p. IX.

6 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., Preface, p. X.

7 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., p. 283.

8 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., p. 401.  

9 – Karl Marx, “Critique to the Gotha Program”, Ital. trans. of Ileana Pasqualoni, Rome, Samonà & Savelli, 1972 [2^], p. 32.

Part V:

Branches of science of structural reality historical and their relationship with the ideologies

Chapter 21:

Metaphysic ideologized at base of the ideologies, and metaphysic scientific at basis of the scientific knowledge: of human nature and of structural reality historic

1 – Norberto Bobbio, Cit. wo., – Chapter 6, “Studies on Hegel”, p. 174.

2 – Norberto Bobbio, Cit. wo., p.175.

3 – Norberto Bobbio, Cit. wo., p. 224.

4 – Norberto Bobbio, Cit. wo., p. 225.

5 – Norberto Bobbio, Cit. wo., p. 223.

6 – Norberto Bobbio, Cit. wo., p. 226.

7 – Norberto Bobbio, Cit. wo., p. 227.

8 – Norberto Bobbio, Cit. wo., p. 236.

9 – William James, “The dialectic in Marx”, Cit. wo., p. 57.

10 – William James, Cit. wo., p. 237.

11 – Norberto Bobbio, Cit. wo., – Chapter 6, “Studies on Hegel”, p. 120.

12 – William James, Cit. wo., p. 237. 

13 – Emile Durkheim, “The social work”, op.cit., p. 266.

14 – Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave ed., “Criticism and the growth of knowledge”, 1970, Cambridge University Press, trad. It and introd. di Giulio Giorello, “Criticism and the growth of knowledge”, Feltrinelli, Milano, 1976, p. 261.

15 – Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave ed., Cit. wo., p. 262.

16 – Pietro Rossi ed., “Positivism and industrial society”, Cit. wo., p. 60.

17 – Pietro Rossi ed., Cit. wo., p. 173 and ff.

18 – Emile Durkheim, “The Socialism”, Cit. wo., p. 43.

19 – Emile Durkheim, Cit. wo., p. 46.

20 – Norberto Bobbio, “From Hobbes to Marx”, Cit. wo., Chap. 7, “The dialectic in Marx”, p. 252.

21 – Norberto Bobbio, Cit. wo., p. 253.

22 – Enzo Bettiza, “The tragedy of the brothers cannibals. Between 1948 and 1956, along the Istrian boundaries, the war between the communists. Italian allies of Stalin and the communists Slavs, followers of Tito”. From: of the 21/11/04 p. 23.

23 – Giancarlo Masini, “The computer between the two cultures. To overcome the gap that divides the science and humanistic studies”. From: <La Stampa> of the 27/01/83, p. 3.

24 – Immanuel Kant, “Critique of Pure Reason”, p. 166.

25 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. 168.

26 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. 167.

27 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. 174.

28 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. 176.

29 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. 196.

30 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. 197.

31 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. 197.

Chapter 22:

: its transformation, with scientific method, or persistence of function and of the ideological content

1 – Spinoza, Cit. wo., Part I, p. 65.

2 – Norberto Bobbio, “From Hobbes to Marx”, Cit. wo., Chap. 6, “Studies of Hegel”, p. 122.

3 – Antonio Santucci, “The thought of William James”, Loescher, Turin, Ch. 5, p. 164.

4 – Chito Guala, Cit. wo., p. 3. 

5 – Luigi Pareyson, Cit. wo., Part III, Chapter 1, p. 203.

6 – Carlos Barbè, “Notes for a theory of legitimacy”, note 3, p. 8.

7 – Immanuel Kant, “Critique of Pure Reason”, Cit. wo., Introduction of Vittorio Mathieu, p. XVIII.

8 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. XVIII.

9 – Antonio Santucci, Cit. wo., p. 171.

10 – Dario Antiseri, “Contemporary epistemology and didactics of history”, Armando, p. 90.

11 – Karl R. Popper, Cit. wo., p. 412.

12 – S. Plan ed., Cit. wo., p. 188.

13 – S. Plan ed., Cit. wo., p. 189.

14 – S. Plan ed., Cit. wo., p. 189.

Chapter 23:

Definition of the economy such as: the Study of structural reality historic and of its relationship with the material base of this reality (or structural economy)

1 – Siro Lombardini, “Course of political economy”, UTET, Torino, 1973, Vol. I, Part I, p. 4.

2 – Siro Lombardini, Cit. wo., p. 5.

3 – Siro Lombardini, Cit. wo., p. 4.

4 – Siro Lombardini, Cit. wo., p. 6.

5 – Siro Lombardini, Cit. wo., p. 36.

6 – Siro Lombardini, Cit. wo., p. 33.

7 – Siro Lombardini, Cit. wo., p. 8.

8 – Siro Lombardini, Cit. wo., p. 10.

9 – Siro Lombardini, Cit. wo., p. 11.

10 – Siro Lombardini, Cit. wo., p. 12.

11 – Siro Lombardini, Cit. wo., p. 14.

12 – Siro Lombardini, Cit. wo., p. 15.

13 – Siro Lombardini, Cit. wo., p. 16.

14 – Siro Lombardini, Cit. wo., p. 28.

15 – Siro Lombardini, Cit. wo., p. 30.

16 – Siro Lombardini, Cit. wo., p. 31.

17 – Siro Lombardini, Cit. wo., pp. 19 and 23.

18 – Siro Lombardini, Cit. wo., p. 20.

19 – Siro Lombardini, Cit. wo., p. 20.

20 – Siro Lombardini, Cit. wo., p. 21.

21 – Siro Lombardini, Cit. wo., p. 21.

22 – Siro Lombardini, Cit. wo., p. 22.

Chapter 24:

Official historians, and awareness of the necessity of the birth of the science of history

1 – Radcliffe – Brawn, Cit. wo., p. 2.

2 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., “Karl R. Popper: epistemology and open society”, Cit. wo., p. 49.

3 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 58.  

4 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 59.

5 – R. Boutruche, “Lordship and feudalism. Sorting manorial, and clienteles of vassals”, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Part I, p. 63.

6 – R. Boutruche, Cit. wo., p. 68. 

7 – R. Boutruche, Cit. wo., p. 68. 

8 – Bruno Rizzi, “The ancient ruin and the feudal age”, Vol. II, “The patronage”, p. 126, § I.

9 – Bruno Rizzi, Cit. wo., Vol. II, p. 133, § IV.

10 – R. Boutruche, “Lordship and feudalism. Sorting manorial, and clienteles of vassals”, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Part I, p. 154.

11 – Jacques Heers, Cit. wo., p. 15.

12 – Jacques Heers, Cit. wo., p. 16.

13 – R. Boutruche, “Lordship and feudalism. Sorting manorial, and clienteles of vassals”, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Part II, p. 234.

14 – R. Boutruche, Cit. wo., p. 234.

15 – R. Boutruche, Cit. wo., p. 233.

16 – Bruno Rizzi, “The ancient ruin and the feudal age”, Vol. III, Chapter VII, p. 102, § 3.

17 – J. Copans, “Cultural Anthropology”, Cit. wo., p. 107 – 112.

18 – Dario Antiseri, “Contemporary epistemology and didactics of history”, Cit. wo., p. 104.

19 – Carlos Barbè, “Progress and development”, Cit. wo., pp. 49 ff..

Chapter 25:

Sociology and other “social sciences”: the their ideological elements and attempts embodiment of the science of reality historical structural

1 – Robert Nisbet, “The Sociological Tradition”, New York, Basic Book, 1966, Kurt H. Wolff ed., “The Sociology of Georg Simmel”, New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964, pp. 181 – 187, Ital. Transl. By Gian Piero Calosso, “The sociological tradition”, Florence, La Nuova Italia, 1977, Part II, Ch. 3, p. 80.

2 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., p. 82.

3 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., p. 81.

4 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., p. 85.

5 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., p. 82.

6 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., p. 83.

7 – Carlos Barbè, “Progress and development, the formation of the theory of development and the development as ideology (Auguste Comte – Herbert Spencer)”, Preface by Filippo Barbano, Turin, Giappichelli, 1974, p. 85 And sgg..

8 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., Preface, p. XXI.

9 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., p. 16.

10 – Emile Durkheim, “The social work”, Cit. wo., p. 77.

11 – Emile Durkheim, Cit. wo., pp. 163 – 164.

12 – Dario Antiseri, “The contemporary epistemology and didactics of history”, Cit. wo., pp. 91 and 97.

13 – Raimond Aron, Cit. wo., p. 130.

14 – J. Copans, “From ethnology to anthropology”, Cit. wo., pp. 21 – 22.

15 – Emile Durkheim, “The Social work”, Cit. wo., p.124.

16 – J. Copans, “From ethnology to anthropology”, Cit. wo., Part I, p. 25 – 29.

17 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., p. 67 – 68. 

18 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., p. 70.

19 – Emile Durkheim, “The Social work”, Cit. wo., p. 193.  

20 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., Preface, p. XXI.

21 – Emile Durkheim, “The Social work”, Cit. wo., p. 155.

22 – Emile Durkheim, Cit. wo., p. 75.

23 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., p. 33.

24 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., p. 367.

25 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., p. 370.

26 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., p. 373.

27 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., p. 368.

28 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., p. 78.

29 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., p. 34.

30 – Dario Antiseri, “The Contemporary epistemology and didactics of history”, Cit. wo., p. 190.

31 – Bruno Rizzi, “The ancient ruin and the feudal age”, Cit. wo., Vol. IV: “Of feudalism”, Chap. 11, pp. 113 – 142.

32 – Luigi Pareyson, Cit. wo., Part I, p. 30.

33 – From review de: “At that serves the ideology”, Ernest Topisch, Laterza, Bari, 1975.

34 – Carlos Barbè, “Progress and development”, Cit. wo., p. 209 and ff.

Part VI:

The sciences of the reality structural historical, and of the human nature

Chapter 26:

Distinction between the sciences of cosmic nature and the sciences of reality structural historical

1 – Prantl, “Gesch. der Logik”, III, 202 – 232; Heidegger, “Die Kategorien und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus”, Tùbingen, 1916; “Minges”, in: <Beitràge>, VI, 1, 1908. From: Nicola Abbagnano, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Part III, Chapter XIX, § 305, p. 598.

2 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Part II, p. 129. 

3 – Claudio Gallo, “The moral can become a ‘exact science’?” From: <La Stampa> of 6/04/83, Item Added “Tuttoscienze”, p. IV.

4 – Karl R. Popper, “The logic of Scientific Discovery”,1934, Itali. Transl. by Mario Trinchero, “Logic of scientific discovery. The self-correcting character of science”, Einaudi Paperbacks, 1970, p. 484.

5 – LucioColletti, “Nature soulless. Jacob: the myth and the science”. From: <La Stampa> of the 15/05/83, p. 3.

6 – Francesco Barone, “Lockpicks of the world. Science is truth?” From: <La Stampa> of the 22/04/83, p. 3.

7 – Gianni Vattimo, “Eco: The work is closed. Exits the essay ‘the limits of the interpretation’”, Cit. wo., From: <La Stampa> of the 9/02/91, Item Added “Tuttolibri”, p. IV.

8 – Radcliffe – Brawn, “Structure and function in primitive society”, Cit. wo., p. 3.

9 – Radcliffe – Brawn, Cit. wo.,p. 6.

10 – Radcliffe – Brawn, Cit. wo., p. 69.

11 – Francesco Vaccarino, “Mathematics at walking between the polymers. The numbers who seek an order in the chaos of probability”. From: <La Stampa> of the 2/11/11, Item Added “TuttoScienze” pp. 27 and 30.

12 – Karl R. Popper, “Logic of scientific discovery. The self-correcting character of science”, Cit. wo., p. 400.

13 – Karl R. Popper, Cit. wo., p. 401.

14 – Cit. Bibliogr. From: Nicola Abbagnano, Vol. I, Part II, Chapter II, § 141, p. 283.

15 – Dario Antiseri, “Karl R. Popper: epistemology and open society”, Cit. wo., p. 19.

Chapter 27:

Psychology inherent: to human nature and to the humanity submissive to the contingent structural reality

1 – Lazarus, “Psychology of Personality”, p. 54.

2 – Lazarus, Cit. wo., p. 102 and ff.

3 – Lazarus, Cit. wo., p. 106 and ff.

4 – Gian Franco Minguzzi, Cit. wo., Chap. 3, p. 111.

5 – Kurt Lewin, Cit. wo., Chap. 5, p. 129.

7 – Gianni Vattimo, Lacan: “The ego poised between mystical and science. He was the founder of the Freudian school”. From: of the 11/09/81 p. 3.

8 – Kurt Lewin, Cit. wo., Chap. 3, p. 82.

9 – Kurt Lewin, Cit. wo., Chap. 3, p. 85.

10 – Kurt Lewin, Cit. wo., Chap. 5, p. 124.

11 – Kurt Lewin, Cit. wo., Chap. 10, p. 253.

12 – Kurt Lewin, Cit. wo., Chap. 11, p. 312.

13 – Kurt Lewin, Cit. wo., Introduction to Ed. Italian A. Palmonari, pp. X – XI.

14 – Kurt Lewin, Cit. wo., Introduction of Darwin Cartwright, p. 6.

15 – Kurt Lewin, Cit. wo., Introduction of Darwin Cartwright, p. 7.

16 – Kurt Lewin, Cit. wo., Chap. 1, p. 43.

17 – Kurt Lewin, Cit. wo., Chap. 1, p. 44.

18 – Kurt Lewin, Cit. wo., Chap. 2, p. 60.

19 – Kurt Lewin, Cit. wo., Chap. 11, p. 349.

Chapter 28:

The degree of development of the sciences of structural reality historical and human nature

1 – Luigi Pareyson, Cit. wo., Part I, p. 26.

2 – Luigi Pareyson, Cit. wo., Part III, Chapter 1, p. 191.

3 – Immanuel Kant, “Critique of Pure Reason”, Cit. wo., Vol. I – Introduction of Vittorio Mathieu, p. XXI.

4 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. XXV.

5 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. XLVIII.

6 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. LI.

7 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. LI.

8 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., Vol. I, p. 11.

9 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. 16.

10 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. 16.

11 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. 47.

12 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. 53.

13 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. 56.

14 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. 57.

15 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. 58.

16 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. 59.

17 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. 61. 

18 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. 61.

19 – Karl R. Popper, “Objective knowledge: a point of view of evolutionary”, Cit. wo., p. 157.

20 – Immanuel Kant, “Critique of Pure Reason”, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Part I, p. 67.

21 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. 85.

22 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. 90.

23 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. 92.

24 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. 92.

25 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Part II, Ch. 1, p. 94.

26 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. 95.

27 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. 96.

28 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. 96.

29 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. 98.

30 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. 97.

31 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. 99.

32 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. 104.

33 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. 104.

34 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. 105.

35 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. 106.

36 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. 124.

37 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Book II, Ch. 3 p. 250.

38 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. 255.

39 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. 257.

40 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. 259.

41 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., p. 277.

42 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., Vol. II, Book II, Ch. 3, Section 3, p. 285.

43 – Immanuel Kant, Cit. wo., Vol. II, Book II, Ch. 3, Part II, p. 574.

44 – Emile Durkheim, “The social work”, Cit. wo., p. 36.

45 – Emile Durkheim, Cit. wo., p. 13.

46 – Emile Durkheim, Cit. wo., p. 38.

47 – Emile Durkheim, Cit. wo., p. 39.

48 – Emile Durkheim, “The Socialism”, Cit. wo., p. 132.

49 – Emile Durkheim, “The social work”, Cit. wo., p. 59.

50 – Emile Durkheim, Cit. wo., p. 60.

51 – Emile Durkheim, Cit. wo., p. 153.

52 – Emile Durkheim, “The Socialism”, Cit. wo., pp. 74 and 183.

53 – Jacques Heers, Cit. wo., p. 18.

54 – Jacques Heers, Cit. wo., p. 19.

Chapter 29:

Historiography and analysis of the history of structural reality historic

1 – W. H. Dray, “Philosophy and historical knowledge”, Il Mulino, p. 72.

2 – Federico Chabod, Cit. wo., p. 18.

3 – Federico Chabod, Cit. wo., p. 24.

4 – Federico Chabod, Cit. wo., p. 31.

5 – William James, “A pluralistic universe”, Cit. wo., p. 129.

6 – William James, Cit. wo., p. 130.

7 – William James, Cit. wo., p. 133.

8 – William James, Cit. wo., p. 146.

9 – Antonio Santucci, Cit. wo., p. XXIII.

10 – Antonio Santucci, Cit. wo., p. XXV.

11 – Antonio Santucci, Cit. wo., p. XXXI.

12 – Antonio Santucci, Cit. wo., p. 35.

13 – Antonio Santucci, Cit. wo., p. 149.

14 – Antonio Santucci, Cit. wo., p. 150.

15 – Antonio Santucci, Cit. wo., p. 151.

16 – W. H. Dray, Cit. wo., p. 7.

17 – W. H. Dray, Cit. wo., p. 21.

18 – W. H. Dray, Cit. wo., p. 15.

19 – W. H. Dray, Cit. wo., p. 18.

20 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 130.

21 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 131.

22 – W. H. Dray, “Contemporary Epistemology and Didactics of History”, Cit. wo., p. 21.

23 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., Presentation of Filippo Barbano, p. IX.

24 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., p. XIII.

25 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., p. XV.

26 – Robert Nisbet, Cit. wo., p. XIII

27 – Dario Antiseri, “Karl R. Popper: epistemology and open society”, Cit. wo., p. 22.

28 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 31.

29 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 85.

30 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 32.

31 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 44.

32 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 134.

33 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 136.

34 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 139.

35 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 143.

36 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 145.

37 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 163.

38 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 165.

39 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 165.

40 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 168.

41 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 19.

42 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 30.

43 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 39.

44 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 35.

45 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 36.

46 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 37.

47 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 41.

48 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 43.

49 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 71.

50 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 71.

51 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 75.

52 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 89.

53 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 88.

54 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 89.

55 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 96.

56 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 97.

57 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 161.

58 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 195.

59 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 198.

60 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 201.

61 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 212.

62 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 214.

63 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 208.

64 – W. H. Dray, Cit. wo., p. 142.

65 – W. H. Dray, Cit. wo., p. 143.

66 – W. H. Dray, Cit. wo., p. 145.

67 – W. H. Dray, Cit. wo., p. 147.

68 – Henri Pirenne, Cit. wo., Introduction of O. Captains, p. XVIII.

69 – Henri Pirenne, Cit. wo., p. XXI.

70 – Henri Pirenne, Cit. wo., p. XXIII.

71 – Henri Pirenne, Cit. wo., p. XXIII.

72 – Federico Chabod, Cit. wo., p. 6.

73 – Federico Chabod, Cit. wo., p. 16.

74 – Dario Antiseri, “Contemporary Epistemology and Didactics of History”, Cit. wo., p. 140.

75 – W. H. Dray, Cit. wo., p. 40.

76 – W. H. Dray, Cit. wo., p. 41.

77 – W. H. Dray, Cit. wo., p. 43.

78 – W. H. Dray, Cit. wo., p. 42.

79 – W. H. Dray, Cit. wo., p. 45.

80 – W. H. Dray, Cit. wo., p. 66.

81 – Dario Antiseri, “Contemporary Epistemology and Didactics of History”, Cit. wo., p. 127.

82 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 129.

83 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 95.

84 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 118.

85 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 153.

86 – Dario Antiseri, “Karl R. Popper: Epistemology and Open Society”, Cit. wo., p. 204.

87 – Dario Antiseri, Cit. wo., p. 171.

88 – G. Giannelli, “Treaty of Greek history”, Pàtron, Bologna, 1976, Introduction and Part I, p. 3.

89 – Emile Durkheim, “The social work”, Cit. wo., p. 187.

90 – Emile Durkheim, Cit. wo., p. 191.

91 – Marc Bloch, Cit. wo., p. 51.

92 – R. Boutruche, “Lordship and feudalism. Sorting manorial, and clienteles of vassals”, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Part II, 222.

93 – Alessandro Barbero, “Challenge for Le Goff: abolish the Middle Ages. We find the way to call him in another way: why the civilization of the centuries between the XII and XV has more traits in common with the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that not with the era of Carlemagne”. From: of the 8/11/03, Item Added , p. 7.

94 – R. Boutruche, “Lordship and feudalism. Sorting manorial, and clienteles of vassals”, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Part I, p. 214.

95 – R. Boutruche, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Part I, p. 212.

96 – R. Boutruche, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Part II, p. 324.

97 – R. Boutruche, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Part I, p. 127.

98 – R. Boutruche, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Part I, p. 128.

99 – R. Boutruche, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Part I, p. 152.

100 – Marc Bloch, Cit. wo., p. 31.

101 – Marc Bloch, Cit. wo., p. 34.

102 – L. Cracco rusts, Cit. wo., p. 780.

103 – L. Cracco rusts, Cit. wo., p. 780.

104 – Piero Ostellino, Cit. wo., p. 208.

105 – R. Boutruche, “Lordship and feudalism. Sorting manorial, and clienteles of vassals”, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Part I, p. 33.

106 – R. Boutruche, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Part I, p. 40.

107 – R. Boutruche, Cit. wo., Vol. I, Part I, p. 34.

108 – Pietro Rossi ed., “Positivism and industrial society”, Cit. wo., p. 193.

109 – Emile Durkheim, “The Socialism”, Cit. wo., p. 46.

110 – Emile Durkheim, Cit. wo., p. 46.

111 – Pietro Rossi ed., “The concept of culture”, Cit. wo., Essay of E. B. Taylor, “Primitive cultures”, Ch. 1, Einaudi Paperbacks, p. 25.

112 – Norberto Bobbio, “De Felice, historical and idealist. The study of the past is not exact science. Between antifascism and anti-communism”, from: of the 4/09/95 p. 14.

113 – Witold Kula, “Problemy i metody historii gospodarczej”, Cit. wo., Warzszawa, “Paùstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe”, 1963,Ital. Transl.: “Problems and methods of economic history”, Milan, Cisalpino – Goliardica, 1972, p. 436.

114 – Witold Kula, Cit. wo., p. 436.

Part VII:

Knowledge and Conscience

Chapter 30:

Nature of the self-consciousness or awareness of self

1 – G. W. F. Hegel, “Phenomenology of Spirit”, Cit. wo.,Vol. I, Part I, p. 281.

2 – Spinoza, Cit. wo., Part III, p. 171.

3 – Spinoza, Cit. wo., Part III, p. 176.

4 – Nicholas Humphrey, “The way in which the ego forces us to be curious and happy”. From: of the 10/22/08, Item Added “Tutto Scienze”, p. II.

5 – Spinoza, Cit. wo., Part III, p. 139.

6 – Spinoza, Cit. wo., Part III, p. 146.

7 – Spinoza, Cit. wo., Part III, p. 141.

8 – Silvio Ferraresi, “Interview with Giulio Tononi. ‘With the formula Phi I take measures to my ego’. From a series of tests was born the ‘theory of integrated information’. ‘The next step is to map all connections in the brain’”. From: <La Stampa> of the15/06/11, Item Added “TuttoScienze” p. 28.

9 – B. F. Skinner, “Beyond the freedom and dignity”, Arnoldo Mondadori, p. 223.

10 – Hilgard, “Psychology”, p. 179.

Chapter 31:

The Collective Consciousness and its consequences on the historical reality

1 – Emile Durkheim, “The social work”, Cit. wo., p. 124.

Cover Image: Costantino jpg – Mosaics in the Hagia Sophia, section: Maria as patron saint of Istanbul, detail: Emperor Costantine I with a model of the city – The Yorck Project: 10000 Meisterwerke des Maleri DVDROM, 2002 ISBN 3936122202 Distributed by: DIRECTMEDIA Publishing Gmbh – https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Byzantinisher Mosaizist um 1000 002jpg

Gods and Monsters: The Scientific Method Applied to the Human Condition - Book I

The world is governed by an entity which can be defined as omnipotent. Any reasonable person can believe it’s true, easily, since the evolution of world history takes place unconsciously and unexpectedly, and it is also unpredictable for scholars of “social sciences” and the rulers, even the most powerful. That such an entity is to be defined as “good” and “that does justice”, only those who have had, from the same entity, the “grace” of an irrational faith, can believe it. Such irrational faith seems to allow you to place the maximum trust in such entity right in the periods of more apathy. In historical periods when, instead, there is greater emphasis fideistic (which ends, often, in the fanaticism), you end up believing the entity which it is object of faith (that religions have identified in one, or more, deities, and the non-religious people, in less sacred entity, but equally abstract, such as the “Proletariat”) as needing the intervention and human support (in the form of: wars, riots or revolutions). Such “voluntary” positions arouse accusations of “blasphemy” by those who have positions “fatalistic” or “confidants in the Providence” (for those who have religious views), while arouse accusations of “treason” (for those who have “secular” conceptions or political-social type). All this shows that: the “goodness”, the “fairness” and the “morality”, attributed to the entity that dominates the world, is simply a justification of historical reality, since the mere finding of reality can’t leave doubt about the real: unfairness, lack of freedom and morality, of all of historic reality. Sociologists speak, by always, of the “St. Matthew's Law”, to indicate the sentence given by the evangelist Matthew at the verse 25-29, uttered by Jesus Christ: “For to everyone who has will be given, and he shall have abundance; but to those who has not, it shall be taken away even what he has". Everyone can easily see how the world, namely: each society, where more where less, is based on this principle. All (or most people) they would make false papers in order to have a modicum of power or influence on other people. But no one, not only politicians and bureaucrats, they love (and, even, they accept, easily,) of assume liability for the consequences of the choices generated by that power. To exempt, the deities, by any liability for the resulting harm to their power and authority, they have done this the theologians, who have invented, specifically, the concept of "arbitrariness free", that would be endowed, for this theory, humans, which they would be, therefore, the only ones responsible for all the "moral evil" which exists in the world. To induce the gods (of any religion or ideology), by definition, omnipotents, to assume their responsibilities, you will need to make human beings fully responsible for their own actions, or truly free and, especially, authentically mature, regardless of the so-called "free will". The dominant culture of various historical societies, with the support of religions, identifies everything, that is: the good, the well and the right, with what is foreign to human beings: God, religion, the Church, the Ethics and the State. Conversely, all that is: evil, vicious, unfair, irrational; is identified with human beings, who need to feel that their most authentic needs are responsible for all the evil that there is in the world and therefore must rely, at dead body, in the hands of these external entities with respect to oneself, or “transcendental”, disregarding their being more authentic, in order to be “saved”. The reversal of this vision of reality, it is a precondition for a radical change in the human condition, will be the beginning of human redemption, and the instrument for the attainment of happiness!

  • ISBN: 9781370580774
  • Author: Giano Rocca
  • Published: 2017-03-29 17:20:28
  • Words: 66289
Gods and Monsters: The Scientific Method Applied to the Human Condition - Book I Gods and Monsters: The Scientific Method Applied to the Human Condition - Book I